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TANGLED UP IN KHAKI AND BLUE: LETHAL AND
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS IN RECENT
CONFRONTATIONS
DAVID A. KOPLOW*
“I helped her out of a jam, I guess, but I used a little too much force.”
Bob Dylan, “Tangled Up in Blue” 1974
I. INTRODUCTION
The governmental mechanisms that exercise a state’s physical coer-
cive power—various cadres of military and law enforcement agencies—
often face a difficult dilemma. In confrontations with recalcitrant
opposing forces, the authorities must recognize that if they exercise too
much power, they incur an unacceptable danger of “collateral damage,”
unintended casualties to civilians and unnecessary destruction of valu-
able property. On the other hand, if they exercise too little power, they
may risk the safety of their own personnel and compromise the
accomplishment of an important and legitimate mission.
In recent years, this dilemma has arisen with painful frequency inside
the United States and elsewhere. Officials increasingly express frustra-
tion at having only an impoverished array of tools at their disposal,
especially regarding confrontations in which the specific target of the
police or military forces is intermingled with civilians or innocent
bystanders. Government actors may have only “bullhorns or bullets” to
choose from; if emphatic verbal instructions and warnings do not
suffice, the only recourse official forces have is the application of
deadly force, which often cannot be applied with anything like the
desired surgical precision.
This Article presents that dilemma in the context of the imminent
development of a novel toolkit of so-called “non-lethal weapons” (NLW),
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which promise to radically alter the existing Hobson’s choice. These
armaments—a wide range of technologies, new and old, incorporating
different types of physical mechanisms, capable of both anti-personnel
and anti-materiel operations—seek to provide a viable intermediate
capability, for the first time affording governmental actors additional
options in volatile situations. These emerging capabilities include a
breathtaking array of devices such as enhancements of the traditional
“rubber bullets”; foam sprays that make a surface either impossibly
slippery or impassively sticky; millimeter wave “heat rays” that peace-
fully repel people without inflicting lasting harm; projectile netting or
other entangling devices to capture individuals or vehicles; chemicals
that temporarily irritate, repel, or becalm a person; biological agents
that embrittle metal or contaminate petroleum products; and many
more.
This Article examines three representative recent confrontations:
the 1993 shootout and siege at Waco, Texas, involving federal ATF and
FBI units against the Branch Davidians led by millennialist David
Koresh; the 2002 seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow by
Chechen separatists; and the 2003 Gulf War II fighting by the British
Army against indigenous resistance in Basra, Iraq. Although in each of
these episodes government forces “prevailed” in some crude sense,
each was at least partially unsatisfactory, resulting in more carnage and
more destruction than anyone would have wanted. Therefore, the goal
of this Article is to determine whether the availability of a richer
configuration of non-lethal weapons might have made a difference.
These three case studies provide an array of contrasts: they occurred
on three different continents, they involved three different countries
and three different types of resistance units as protagonists, and they
engaged notably different genres of armaments and tactics. In addi-
tion, the three selected incidents are usefully diverse in yet another
regard. The first, Waco, was clearly a law enforcement operation,
initially occasioned by the effort to serve ordinary arrest and search
warrants. In contrast, the third, Basra, was plainly a conventional
military operation, occurring in the midst of a broad-gauged interna-
tional armed conflict. The second, Moscow, presents a sort of middle
ground, containing aspects of both law enforcement and military
counter-terrorism operations, thereby illuminating the rainbow of
legal and policy considerations at play.
This Article does not argue that non-lethal weapons should have been
applied in these confrontations, or that they necessarily would have
made a profound difference in resolving the clashes at appreciably less
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
704 [Vol. 36
cost. It may be that these instances were simply intractable, that the
opposing forces were so resistant, fanatic, or entrenched that even
improved technology and tactics would have proven unavailing. Still,
the hypothetical inquiry remains: in these three tragic cases, what
might have happened if the respective governments had been able to
try something else—something non-lethal?
The Article proceeds in the following steps. First, Section II surveys
the emerging world of non-lethal weapons, beginning with the observa-
tion that the very name “non-lethal” is at least partially misleading; any
application of force by police or military units inherently carries the
potential for death. Although this new family of technologies at least
attempts to reduce greatly the probability of mortality and widespread
destruction of property, it offers no absolute guarantees.
Section II also describes a variety of NLW technologies, starting with
the more familiar devices long used by governments around the world,
such as tear gas, water cannon, and plastic bullets, among others. It
then introduces some of the more tantalizing possibilities that loom on,
or just over, the horizon: gizmos that disable or deter, that ensnare or
blockade, that corrode or contaminate. Section II also describes some
of the animating spirit behind the investigation of, and the burgeoning
investment in, these esoteric capabilities: the classic scenarios in which
military and police forces imagine they would be better able to control
incendiary situations, perform their assigned missions, and protect
themselves and any bystanders with greatly reduced fatalities and
destruction.
Next, Section III assesses the law applicable to non-lethal weapons,
starting with the international legal constraints upon battlefield vio-
lence. Treaties that regulate chemical, biological, and other categories
of specialized conventional armaments are highlighted, along with the
more general evolving law of armed conflict. This body of law was
crafted largely with other kinds of implements of war in mind, but it
must now adapt to embrace NLW as well. Domestic United States law
also governs non-lethals, constraining both the research on selected
armaments concepts and the application of force by federal and local
law enforcement in specific situations. In particular, the prohibition
against, and the definition of, “excessive” force by police demands
attention in the context of NLW.
Next, the Article presents three selected case studies: Waco in
Section IV, Moscow in Section V, and Basra in Section VI. Many recent
events have provided an altogether too rich assortment of unhappy
incidents of collective violence to choose from, but these three repre-
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sentatives usefully characterize the field. Each of the three confronta-
tions has already been described in the relevant literature; thus, the
focus here is not to re-tell each story in lurid detail, but to concentrate
on the types of weapons used by police, military, and their opponents.
More tellingly, this inquiry asks about the types of weapons that were
not used in each incident: what might have happened, and how might
things have turned out differently, if an additional category of weapons,
with a variety of specialized non-lethal effects and attributes, had been
available? The point is not simply to critique the beleaguered combat-
ants or to second-guess their choices of negotiating strategies, political
positions, or assault tactics. Instead, this Article poses the hypothetical
inquiry about whether NLW could have played a useful contributing
role in saving lives and accomplishing missions.
Section VII then sounds a necessary cautionary note, recounting
some of the many critiques of the nascent movement to embrace
non-lethal weapons and exploring a miscellany of arguments as to
why the United States and other governments might still hesitate to
go wholeheartedly down this procurement pathway. Even if one believes
that NLW could have made a positive contribution to a more peace-
ful resolution of the three selected case studies, there are counter-
balancing considerations. Prominent among these concerns are
the danger of proliferation of the weaponry—to opposing military
forces, to criminals, to human rights abusers—and the release of
existing inhibitions against too-adventurous applications of governmen-
tal force.
Finally, Section VIII offers some recommendations and conclusions,
boiling down to a cautious “green light” for NLW development pro-
grams. There are good reasons to be hopeful that emerging non-lethal
technologies can liberate police and military forces from their existing
dilemma; if the military or police have only the ability to over-react or
to under-react, then they cannot do a very good job of promoting law,
order, and security. If sticky foam, acoustic rays, tasers, vehicle nets, and
other esoteric devices could enable military and law enforcement
authorities to behave with a more deft touch, complementing existing
firepower with an enriched range of possibilities, this would be a most
welcome boon. But international and domestic law restraints, and
prudent projections about how other actors might respond to the U.S.
articulation of new NLW capabilities, mandate a reflective, step-by-step
approach. Indeed, non-lethal weapons might be helpful in some
categories of important, challenging, and all-too-frequent confronta-
tions, but such weapons are no panacea.
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II. THE WORLD OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
A. Defining “Non-Lethal”
What does the term “non-lethal” weapons mean? A variety of defini-
tions has been proffered, the most visible of which comes from the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD), where the U.S. Marine Corps houses
the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), the leading
military arm in research, development, and procurement in the field.
As specified in the definition section of DoD Directive 3000.3:
3.1. Non-Lethal Weapons. Weapons that are explicitly de-
signed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel
or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environ-
ment.
3.1.1. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their
targets principally through blast, penetration and fragmenta-
tion, non-lethal weapons employ means other than gross physi-
cal destruction to prevent the target from functioning.
3.1.2. Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of
the following characteristics:
3.1.2.1. They have relatively reversible effects on personnel or
materiel.
3.1.2.2. They affect objects differently within their area of
influence.1
In partial contrast, the National Institute of Justice, which orches-
trates the U.S. Department of Justice’s exploratory programs in the
field, articulates the objective as the “identification and development of
new or improved weapons and other technology that will minimize the
risk of death and injury to officers, suspects, prisoners and the public,
and contribute to the reduction of civil and criminal liability suits
against police, sheriff, and corrections departments.”2
Other experts have promulgated rival definitions with varying de-
1. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Directive No. 3000.3: Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons (July 9, 1996)
[hereinafter DoD Directive No. 3000.3], available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/
html/30003.htm.
2. Lois Pilant, Crime and War: An Analysis of Non-Lethal Technologies and Weapons Development,
POLICE CHIEF, June 1998, at 55 (quoting the National Institute of Justice).
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grees of formality and inclusiveness.3 NATO, for example, formally
refers to the area as “weapons which are explicitly designed and
developed to incapacitate or repel personnel, with a low probability of
fatality or permanent injury, or to disable equipment with minimal
undesired damage or impact on the environment.”4
For purposes of this Article, it is useful to supplement these working
definitions by differentiating more precisely between anti-personnel
and anti-materiel NLW. Anti-personnel NLW are weapons designed
and used to have relatively temporary effects, which disappear either
simply via the passage of time or via the administration of relatively
minor treatment. Anti-materiel NLW are designed and used either: a)
to have relatively temporary effects, which disappear either simply via
the passage of time or via the administration of relatively minor
treatment; or b) to destroy a target via non-explosive means.5
3. See NICK LEWER & STEVEN SCHOFIELD, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: A FATAL ATTRACTION?: MILITARY
STRATEGIES AND TECHNOLOGIES FOR 21ST-CENTURY CONFLICT 6-7 (1997) (noting three slightly
different definitions of NLW from different authors). The Human Effects Advisory Panel
established by the JNLWD has proposed a quantitative definition, under which a weapon would be
classified as non-lethal if it incapacitates 98% of the people it is used against, while killing no more
than 1/2%, permanently injuring no more than 1/2%, and having no effect on 1%. David P.
Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 51, 62 (1999)
[hereinafter Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons]; see also James C.
Duncan, Non-Lethal Weapons: Tools Which Expand the Commander’s Use of Force Options, J. COUNTERTER-
RORISM & SECURITY INT’L, Fall 1999, at 16-18 (noting that almost every definition of non-lethal
weapons features two elements: the physical capability of these weapons not to permanently kill,
injure or destroy property, and their potential application to the entire spectrum of traditional
military operations as well as to diplomatic matters).
4. Press Statement, NATO, NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons ¶ 3 (Oct. 13, 1999)
[hereinafter NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons], available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/
1999/p99103e.htm.
5. See generally A Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons: Guidance for Non-Lethal Weapons Develop-
ment, MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Mar. 1998, at A6 [hereinafter Joint Concept] (reversibility of
anti-personnel non-lethal weapons that cause “temporary disorientation, passivity, pain, or loss of
consciousness,” that would be reversible with the passage of “a few minutes to a few hours” or the
administration of a pharmaceutical or antidote).
As elaborated infra, these definitions bring within the embrace of NLW weapons that are
either: (1) temporary (in allowing the targeted person or object to return to ordinary functioning
relatively quickly); or (2) stealthy (in permanently destroying an object via mechanisms that are
relatively precise and quiet). For present purposes, this Article dispenses with potential NLW (e.g.,
specialized chemical or biological weapons) that might be designed specifically to target plants or
animals.
Various authorities organize the NLW field in different ways. For some, the weapons concepts
are best organized under five capabilities: anti-personnel, anti-materiel, anti-mobility, anti-
infrastructure, and area-denial. For present purposes, the two categories of anti-personnel and
anti-materiel suffice.
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It is important to note that none of these definitions includes any
complete assurance against lethal effects of the weaponry.6 The effort is
to reduce the probability of mortality, but not necessarily to negate it
altogether. In any application of organized violence, especially one
undertaken in such a wide variety of environments and contexts,
against people of diverse health histories, strengths, and weaknesses,
there is some inherent, irreducible danger of fatalities. A projectile,
chemical, or other mechanism that would merely disable or tempo-
rarily incapacitate one person (e.g., a young, healthy soldier in the
open air) might well inflict mortal injury on another (e.g., a child in a
This Article follows the literature’s convention of excluding from the current discussion
consideration of a variety of other weapons, tactics, and programs that would typically be
“non-lethal,” at least in their initial effects, but that raise so many sui generis problems of their own
that separate analysis is warranted. Joint Concept, supra, at A1; Joseph W. Siniscalchi, Nonlethal
Technologies and Military Strategy, in THE TECHNOLOGICAL ARSENAL: EMERGING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
129, 131 (William C. Martel ed., 2001). Among these important topics—related to, but different
from, the NLW described here—are computer warfare, psychological operations, robotics,
nanotechnology, precision guidance, and advanced sensor systems. For a discussion of some of
those elusive topics, see U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Office of General Counsel, An Assessment of
International Legal Issues in Information Operations (May 1999) (computer operations), available at
http://downloads.securityfocus.com/library/infowar/reports/dodio.pdf; Robert D. Pinson, Is
Nanotechnology Prohibited by the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
279 (2004) (nanotechnology); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, AN
ASSESSMENT OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (2003) (sensor technology)
[hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].
6. DoD Directive No. 3000.3, supra note 1, § 4.6; Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A1; Siniscalchi,
supra note 5, at 131; NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 4.
Some of the early literature breathlessly foresaw NLW promising “bloodless war,” with these
allegedly “harmless weapons” enabling the superior force to prevail in combat without inflicting
casualties on either combatants or civilians. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND SOCIETY, HARMLESS
WEAPONS (1978); ALVIN TOFFLER & HEIDI TOFFLER, WAR AND ANTI-WAR: SURVIVAL AT THE DAWN OF
THE 21ST CENTURY 125-36 (1993). This unrealistic expectation has now dropped out of the NLW
concept. Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 130, 149; JOHN B. ALEXANDER, FUTURE WAR: NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS IN 21ST CENTURY WARFARE 184 (1999) [hereinafter FUTURE WAR].
It is also noteworthy that proponents of NLW tend to overlook what might be termed “second
order” or “indirect” injuries and fatalities associated with the weaponry. That is, if a non-lethal
device were to stun or disorient a person, or cause her to lose traction or balance, so she fell down,
the initial incident or impact might cause only a relatively minor injury; but if, in falling, she hit
her head on the ground or some other object, a more serious danger could arise. On a larger
scale, if a non-lethal weapon were to disrupt, even temporarily, a targeted region’s electricity
supply, it is likely that hospitals and water treatment plants would be affected as well as military
bases, resulting in predictable deaths. See U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-60, JOINT
DOCTRINE FOR TARGETING I-7 (2002) (“Sound planning should allow for consideration of the risks
of unintended second- and third-order consequences.”).
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confined space or an elderly person already compromised by illness).7
Many observers, therefore, regard the very term “non-lethal weapon”
as an oxymoron and have substituted alternative vocabularies.8 They
would refer to the topic as embracing weapons that are “sub-lethal,”
“less lethal,” “less than lethal,” “disabling,” or that accomplish a “soft
kill” or a “mission kill.”9 For similar reasons, the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross and some other authors, when referring to this
7. INDEP. TASK FORCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NON-LETHAL TECHNOLOGIES: MILITARY
OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 2 (1995) [hereinafter CFR TASK FORCE 1] (“There is no sharp division,
but rather a continuum, between non-lethal weapons and precision-directed lethal weapons.”).
Realistically, the opposite pole of the spectrum of lethality is also merely a matter of
probability: even the most “lethal” of traditional weapons are fatal in only a fraction of their
applications. Battlefield statistics indicate that Kalashnikov rifles, for example, kill only 20% of the
soldiers they injure, and hand grenade injuries are fatal only 10% of the time. Robin M. Coupland,
“Calmatives” and “Incapacitants”: Questions for International Humanitarian Law Brought by New
Means and Methods of Warfare with New Effects? 2 (Apr. 26-27, 2003) (presented at The 19th
Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological
Weapons Conventions, on file with the Georgetown Journal of International Law); Robin M.
Coupland & David Meddings, Mortality Associated with Use of Weapons in Armed Conflicts, Wartime
Atrocities, and Civilian Mass Shootings: Literature Review, 319 BRIT. MED. J. 386, 407-08 (1999)
(reporting that in conflicts during and after World War II, deaths in combat never exceeded 26%
of all battle casualties).
Assessment of the effects of candidate NLW technologies upon human beings is a major part
of the weapon development process, and the Joint Directorate and the individual U.S. military
services have instituted elaborate procedures for vetting the health impact of new concepts,
including establishing a Human Effects Process Action Team, a Human Effects Review Board, a
Human Effects Center of Excellence, and a Human Effects Advisory Panel. NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 38-41, 44-45, 77-79, 148-65; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS INDEPENDENT
TASK FORCE, NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 33-34 (1999) [hereinafter CFR
TASK FORCE 2]; JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2000); Victor Wallace,
Non-Lethal Weapons: R2IPE for Arms Control Measures?, in THE FUTURE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS:
TECHNOLOGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW 141, 153 (Nick Lewer ed., 2002).
8. Even the word “weapon” is at least partially inapposite here, because the notion of NLW
also includes a variety of devices such as enhanced barrier systems, sealants, tagants, and other
tools that provide an advantage in combat or law enforcement, but do not attack, harm, or capture
an enemy force in the way a “weapon” might. See infra text accompanying notes 11-69.
9. LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 5-6 (Sometimes, a term such as “pre-lethal” is also
applicable, as the non-lethal weapons are used to incapacitate an enemy force, boosting the
effectiveness of a subsequent employment of fully lethal force; sometimes, in view of the horrific
injuries they may cause, these weapons may be labeled as “worse than lethal.”); James C. Duncan,
A Primer on the Employment of Non-Lethal Weapons, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 5 n.13 (1998); FUTURE WAR,
supra note 6, at 17. The Department of Justice has traditionally referred to this topic as the
investigation of “less than lethal” systems, while the Department of Defense has adopted
“non-lethal.” David G. Boyd, The Search for Low Hanging Fruit: Recent Developments in Non-Lethal
Technologies, in NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS § 5 (Malcolm
Dando ed., Nov. 2000).
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entire category of ordnance, routinely place the term “non-lethal
weapons” inside quotation marks or use a phrase like “so-called non-
lethal weapons.”10
While acknowledging the somewhat misleading connotation of the
term, this Article will follow the mainstream of the literature and
employ the term “non-lethal” (ordinarily without quotation marks).
For better or worse, this is the language that has established itself as the
leading expression and, lacking an obviously-better alternative, it re-
mains a plausible form of reference.
B. Traditional Forms of Non-Lethal Weapons
The concept of a non-lethal weapon is hardly a recent creation.
Indeed, a variety of NLW have been staples in the inventories of
armies—and especially of police—around the world for decades. Among
the most familiar low-technology devices for crowd control have been
truncheons, water cannon, K-9 corps, and cattle prods.11 One step
higher on the ladder of escalation have been rubber or plastic bullets,
or, more generally, firearms that utilize projectiles that inflict a blunt
trauma upon the target, without intending to penetrate the skin or
inflict fatal wounds, such as aerodynamic beanbags or plastic batons.12
A different approach comes from the world of chemistry: law enforce-
ment officials in the United States, the United Kingdom, and many
other countries have employed sequential generations of tear gas or
other noxious vapors, designated CN, CS, or Mace.13
These devices and tactics proliferated around the world, frequently
demonstrating at least partial tactical successes. In many instances,
police use of these limited, albeit crude, measures aided in breaking up
a crowd, isolating the most determined opponents, and deterring the
10. See, e.g., Coupland, supra note 7, at 2; Fidler, The International Legal Implications of
“Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 60 (asserting that “the term ‘non-lethal’ persists not because
more accurate terms cannot be found but because it is easier for the military to market
‘non-lethal’ weapons in military and civilian contexts”).
11. Joseph F. Coates, Nonlethal Weapons for Domestic Law Enforcement Officers, in LAW ENFORCE-
MENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 787-97 (S.A. Yefsky ed., 1967). See generally REX APPLEGATE, RIOT
CONTROL-MATERIEL AND TECHNIQUES (1969); ANTHONY DEANE-DRUMMOND, RIOT CONTROL (1975).
12. FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 88-94. Kinetic energy munitions were among the first NLW;
they rely upon relatively short-range general purpose or specially-designed firearms to propel
rubber, plastic, or wooden projectiles that stun, confuse, or frighten people without inflicting
death or permanent injury. Grenades, land mines, and other weapons can also be adapted to fire
non-lethal projectiles, such as clusters of rubber balls or sponges. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
supra note 5, at 24-26.
13. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 26-28, 60-61.
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more faint of heart. In several turbulent settings, authorities succeeded
in protecting property, fracturing an illegal demonstration, apprehend-
ing ringleaders, and avoiding further incitement of the populace.14
But these immature mechanisms were burdened with important
defects and limitations. Many operated only at short range—for ex-
ample, a police officer would have to come within arm’s length of the
offender to strike with a nightstick—and that proximity could be
hazardous in situations where the police might be outnumbered.15
Some of the devices were unreliable (the electric charge in a cattle
prod might fail or might be insufficient to alter the target’s behavior)
or subject to available countermeasures (crowds could avoid water
cannon, or outmaneuver or outlast the vehicles transporting it).16
Chemical sprays could be dissipated by adverse weather—rain degrades
some chemicals very quickly—and a capricious wind could turn the gas
back onto the police themselves.17 Importantly, these devices were
sometimes not non-lethal; deaths from plastic bullets, for example,
were not uncommon, as a projectile might strike a particularly vulner-
able person, might hit someone at a closer range than anticipated, or
might impact a sensitive body part.18 Of course, public reaction to these
displays of force was frequently adverse; police sometimes seemed to
14. For example, over the past three decades the British Army in Northern Ireland has
employed—not without controversy—a wide array of NLW for purposes of crowd and riot control,
including tear gas, rubber and plastic bullets, and water cannons. Several hundred injuries have
been reported due to these devices over the years, and 17 deaths have resulted since 1970 (though
no deaths since 1994). NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 59-60; FUTURE WAR, supra
note 6, at 89-92; Colin Burrows, Operationalizing Non-Lethality: A Northern Ireland Perspective, in THE
FUTURE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW, supra note 7, at 99,
103; LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 59-77 (also describing U.S. use of chemicals in Vietnam
and other NLW case studies).
15. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 34 (“By their nature, non-lethal weapons
technologies often have limited range and some variation in effects.”).
16. CAROL ACKROYD ET AL., THE TECHNOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONTROL 205-07 (2d ed. 1980)
(tactical drawbacks of water cannon).
17. Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 132 (identifying four problems with chemical NLW: (1) the
availability of protective equipment to blunt its effects; (2) the possibility that rain or wind would
limit its effective radius; (3) the unpredictability of its effects upon any particular person; and (4)
the treaties that constrain its use).
18. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 25 (also noting efforts to develop a rifle
system with an adjustable muzzle velocity, allowing the shooter to modulate the speed of the NLW
munition depending upon the range to the target, which could reduce serious injuries); A New
Police Rifle Programmed to Fire Bullets at Different Speeds, in NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND
OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at app. D (reporting on a variable speed rifle, capable of
controlling the velocity of the projectile, which accommodates use against targets at different
ranges); Charles Heal, The Quest for the ‘Magic Bullet,’ in NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND
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create additional enemies and damage their own reputations, even
when they were sincerely attempting to modulate their application of
restrained power.19
C. Modern Non-Lethal Weapons Concepts
The turn of the century has ushered in a dramatically new era of
NLW; a bewildering array of unforeseen capabilities is now set to spill
out of laboratories and test sites.20 The literature on NLW has likewise
mushroomed, including contributions from a wide range of disci-
plines, such as public policy,21 medicine,22 popular culture,23 military
science,24 and law.25 Both U.S.26 and international27 authorities, espe-
OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, § 4.5 (NLW projectiles of various design are generally
inaccurate and far less than 100% effective).
19. The public reaction to governmental uses of force can be quite important, and quite
adverse—and has gained even more weight in the “CNN era,” when television cameras immedi-
ately broadcast evocative images to the entire world. Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A2. Most
recently, the displays of snarling dogs, threatening prisoners at the Abu Ghraib camp in Iraq,
shamed the American military and intelligence personnel who had used that form of NLW
to intimidate and humiliate their prisoners. See, e.g., JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FINAL REPORT OF
THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter
DOD INDEPENDENT PANEL REPORT], available at http://www.dod.mil/news/Aug2004/
d20040824finalreport.pdf; Josh White & Thomas E. Ricks, Iraqi Teens Abused at Abu Ghraib, Report
Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2004, at A1.
20. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 40-44 (listing “legacy programs” and the
“technology investment program” activities of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate as a
sampling of the ongoing activity in the field); Duncan, supra note 9, at 13-21 (describing three
categories of NLW, with dozens of examples); LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 33-43
(recounting evolution of the U.S. Government’s NLW research and development programs).
21. The Council on Foreign Relations has sponsored three independent task forces to
analyze non-lethal weapons and make recommendations for future actions. See CFR TASK FORCE 1,
supra note 7; CFR TASK FORCE 2, supra note 7; COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS INDEPENDENT TASK
FORCE, NONLETHAL WEAPONS AND CAPABILITIES (2004) [hereinafter CFR TASK FORCE 3]. The author
was a member of the third task force. Other public policy organizations such as the Sunshine
Project and the Federation of American Scientists have focused attention on selected NLW
options, bringing to public attention a variety of important documents and analyses. See http://
www.sunshine-project.org; http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw.
22. See, e.g., Jean-Paul Yih, CS Gas Injury to the Eye, BRIT. MED. J., July 29, 1995, at 276;“Safety” of
Chemical Batons, 352 THE LANCET 159 (1998); James S. Ketchum & Frederick R. Sidell, Incapacitat-
ing Agents, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 287-306 (Frederick R. Sidell
et al. eds., 1997).
23. See, e.g., Eric Adams, Shoot to Not Kill, POPULAR SCI., May 2003, at 88; John Barry & Tom
Morganthau, Soon, “Phasers on Stun,” NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24; Stephen Mihm, The Quest for
the Nonkiller App, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 2004, at 38.
24. See, e.g., Timothy J. Lamb, Emerging Nonlethal Weapons Technology and Strategic Policy
Implications for 21st Century Warfare, MILITARY POLICE, Apr. 2003, at 6-9; Robert Mandel, Nonlethal
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cially British,28 are engaged, and a variety of academic29 and commer-
Weaponry and Post-Cold War Deterrence, 30 ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY 511, 511-37 (2004); Civil
Disturbances: Incorporating Non-Lethal Technology: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, Newsletter 00-7
(U.S. Army, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.), Apr. 2000, at ch. 4,
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_00-7_ch4.htm;
Robert T. Durkin, The Operational Use of Non-Lethal Weapons (Feb. 8, 2000) (unpublished
paper, Naval War College, on file with the Georgetown Journal of International Law); W.M.
Callihan, Non-Lethal Weapons in Conventional Combat Operations: Leveraging Capabilities or
Violating the Rules of War? (May 17, 1999) (unpublished paper, Naval War College, on file with
the Georgetown Journal of International Law).
25. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 9; Burrus M. Carnahan, Unnecessary Suffering, The Red Cross
and Tactical Laser Weapons, 18 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 705, 705-32 (1996); Fidler, The
International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3; Neal Miller, Less-Than-Lethal
Force Weaponry: Law Enforcement and Correctional Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Excessive Force,
28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 733, 733-94 (1995); W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV.
1, 1-225 (1990); Vincent Sautenet, Legal Issues Concerning Military Use of Non-Lethal Weapons, 7
MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. 8, June 2000, at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v7n2/
sautenet72.html.
26. See, e.g., Lynn Klotz et al., Beware the Siren’s Song: Why “Non-Lethal” Incapacitating Chemical
Agents Are Lethal, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, Mar. 2003; Mark Wheelis, Biotechnology and Biochemical
Weapons, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Spring 2002, at 48-53; Mark Wheelis, “Nonlethal” Chemical
Weapons: A Faustian Bargain, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 2003, at 74.
27. See, e.g., Coupland, supra note 7; Robin M. Coupland, “Non-lethal” Weapons: Precipitating a
New Arms Race, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 72 (1997) (editorial); Isabelle Daoust et al., New Wars, New
Weapons? The Obligation of States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare, 84 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 345 (2002); Friedhelm Kruger-Sprengel, Non-Lethal Weapons: A Humanitarian Perspective
in Modern Conflict, 42 MILITARY L. & L. WAR REV. 357, 359 (2003).
28. See, e.g., MALCOLM DANDO, A NEW FORM OF WARFARE: THE RISE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
(1996); LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3; Malcolm R. Dando, Strengthening the Chemical Weapons
Convention, The Danger to the Chemical Weapons Convention from Incapacitating Chemicals, FIRST CWC
REVIEW CONFERENCE PAPER No. 4 (Mar. 2003); Nick Lewer et al., The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons, 17
MED. CONFLICT & SURVIVAL 180, 180-93 (2001); Nick Lewer, Research Report No. 1, BRADFORD
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS RESEARCH PROJECT (BNLWRP) (Ctr. for Conflict Resolution, Dep’t of Peace
Studies, U. of Bradford, U.K.), Nov. 1997, available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/
research_reports/researchreport1.php; Nick Lewer, Research Report No. 2, BRADFORD NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS RESEARCH PROJECT (BNLWRP) (Ctr. for Conflict Resolution, Dep’t of Peace Studies, U.
of Bradford, U.K.), June 1998, available at http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/
researchreport2.php; Tobias Feakin, Research Report No. 3, BRADFORD NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
RESEARCH PROJECT (BNLWRP) (Ctr. for Conflict Resolution, Dep’t of Peace Studies, U. of
Bradford, U.K.), Aug. 2001, available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/
researchreport3.php.
29. See, e.g., Institute for Non-lethal Defense Technology, Applied Research Laboratory at
Pennsylvania State University, at http://nldt2.arl.psu.edu/homepage.php; Nonlethal Environmen-
tal Evaluation and Remediation Center, Kansas State University, at http://www.engg.ksu.edu/
NEER/nonlethal/; Non-lethal Technology Innovation Center, University of New Hampshire, at
http://www.unh.edu/ntic; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 44 (noting Non-Lethal
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cial NLW activities30 have captured the imagination. The U.S. Govern-
ment has started to devote significant funds to the area,31 and U.S.
NATO allies are being brought to the topic as well,32 despite criticisms
that progress has not been as rapid as promised.33
Some of the new NLW advances are sequential improvements on
existing concepts, incrementally upgrading the current arsenal. Others
augur entirely new technologies, never before seen on the battlefield
or the streets.34 A few have already been tried and found wanting;
insurmountable (at least for now) technical problems make them
infeasible or unattractive. Many NLW advances are still in development
and may similarly fail to meet the complete set of design criteria and
operational desiderata.35 Others, however, have already been deployed
Technology Innovation Center at the University of New Hampshire and the U.S. Marine Corps’
Small Business Innovation Research Program).
30. See NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, at
Introduction (noting four international conferences on NLW sponsored by Jane’s Information
Group starting in 1997).
31. Because many NLW development programs are classified, it is impossible to track the
U.S. Government’s entire annual spending on non-lethal weapons. One crude, partial indicator is
the budget of the Joint Directorate, which oversees certain multi-service research and develop-
ment programs. This account has grown from $9.3 million in FY 1997 to $28.1 million in FY 2001
to $43.4 million in FY 2004, with a projected budget of $45.7 million in FY 2009. CFR TASK FORCE 3,
supra note 21, at 16; see also CFR TASK FORCE 2, supra note 7, at 28-29.
32. NATO Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 4; European Working Group, Non-
Lethal Weapons, 2nd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons (Feb. 2, 2003), at http://www.non-
lethal-weapons.com/sy02index.html#main.
33. See, e.g., CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 8 (“We found little evidence that the value
and transformational applications of nonlethal weapons across the spectrum of conflict are
appreciated by the senior leadership of the Department of Defense. Despite successes on the small
scale, NLW have not entered the mainstream of defense thinking and procurement.”); CFR TASK
FORCE 2, supra note 7, at viii; CFR TASK FORCE 1, supra note 7, at 10-12. In the words of U.S. Marine
General John Sheehan, NLW “will always be tomorrow’s weapons unless we move now. We need to
pull them from the laboratories and place them in operational units.” Duncan, supra note 9, at 56.
34. Gwen Shaffer, Force Multiplier, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 2, 2004, at 19. One of the most
desirable characteristics of the new generation of weaponry would be a “rheostatic” feature, giving
the user the option to switch quickly and easily between lethal and non-lethal applications. For
example, a dual-capable rifle with two barrels and two ammunition supplies might enable the user
to toggle between a conventional deadly round and a NLW payload carrying a stinger or dose of
riot control chemicals. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 21; Joint Concept, supra note 5,
at A4-A5; Mihm, supra note 23.
35. Non-lethal weapons, as any other proposed new arms, would have to satisfy the user on a
variety of performance characteristics. No matter how promising the innovation might otherwise
be, it will not be adopted if it is too expensive, cumbersome to transport or use, difficult to
maintain or repair, demanding of training, susceptible to countermeasures, dangerous to the
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to troops in the field or held in reserve for emergencies.36 This Section
cannot undertake to survey all of the NLW technologies in various
stages of development.37 But the Section does introduce a sampling of
the most salient NLW technologies, describing a few of the emerging
systems, ranging from the increasingly familiar to the “gee wiz.”
Sticky foam and slippery foam. Among the earliest modern NLW con-
cepts that fleetingly grabbed public attention in the 1990s were sticky
foam and slippery foam. The former would be expelled, like a high-
pressure aerosol, from a backpack tank worn by a soldier or police
officer. The sticky foam might reach a range of 10 yards or so and
would douse a targeted person with a moist spray, which would quickly
harden to a styrofoam-like rigidity. Once so ensnared, the target could
not run away, could not maintain aggressive actions, and could not
effectively resist police arrest.38
Slippery foam would be similarly sprayed from a tank or ejected from
user, etc. DoD Directive No. 3000.3, supra note 1, § 5.6.3-5.6.4; Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A3-A4;
Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 136-37.
36. The most advanced example of new operational military non-lethal arms is the creation
and distribution of “nonlethal capability sets,” which comprise fifty-five types of NLW in four
different modules, including pepper spray, beanbag rounds, plastic handcuffs, spotlights, and
shields. JNLWD distributed these sets to U.S. military units around the world and they were used
to good effect in Iraq in 2003 by U.S. Army Quick Reaction Forces that supported small units that
found themselves surrounded by hostile crowds. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 13, 18, 28, 49;
David P. Karcher, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program (Jan. 2003) (slide show, on file with the
Georgetown Journal of International Law).
37. For descriptions of the array of NLW capabilities being studied, developed, or produced
for anti-personnel, anti-materiel, and anti-capability functions, see JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 23-72,
120-47; FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 222-25; Rennie Campbell, Product and Producer Information, in
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, app. C; Duncan,
supra note 9; Jorma Jussila, Future Police Operations and Non-Lethal Weapons, in THE FUTURE OF
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW, supra note 7, at 87-98; LEWER
& SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 7-15; Nick Lewer & Tobias Feakin, Perspectives and Implications for the
Proliferation of Non-Lethal Weapons in the Context of Contemporary Conflict, Security Interests and Arms
Control, in THE FUTURE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW,
supra note 7, at 126-40 (identifying three generations of NLW); Siniscalchi, supra note 5.
38. FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 70-71. A related adaptation (anti-materiel, rather than
anti-personnel) of similar technology would be non-lethal rigid foam, a polyurethane/epoxy
concoction that could be quickly dispensed from a hand-held device to create an impermeable
barrier on doors, windows, vehicles, generators, weapons, etc. JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 11; Steven H. Scott, Sticky Foam as a Less-Than-Lethal
Technology, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR OPTICAL ENGINEERING: SECURITY
SYSTEMS AND NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 96 (John B. Alexander et al. eds.,
1996); Peter B. Rand, Foams for Barriers and Non-Lethal Weapons, in id., at 104.
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a projectile. It would be designed to spread itself to cover a flat
surface—for example, a hallway, road, bridge, or runway—with a
super-slippery sheen, preventing people from walking or vehicles from
driving on it. The prototypes of the “liquid ball bearings” were hun-
dreds of times more slippery than the slickest ice sheets, inspiring the
hope that the system could be used, for example, to protect an embassy
from an advancing crowd, to foreclose enemy use of a strategic intersec-
tion or rail yard without permanently destroying it, or to prevent
demonstrators from crossing a coated municipal square.39
Unfortunately, the promise has to date exceeded the reality. Sticky
foam lost favor with researchers and has largely been abandoned
because the foam was not reliably non-lethal; the substance could cover
the target’s nose and mouth, blocking airways.40 Slippery foam, which
is still being actively investigated, might be negated by simple counter-
measures such as throwing sand or dirt onto the coated surface, quickly
and cheaply restoring the attackers’ traction.
Electric guns. Instead of a gun firing lethal (or sometimes-lethal)
projectiles, electricity might be marshaled to stop an attacker. Electric
handguns, such as the Taser brand, have become quite popular with
law enforcement authorities and, more recently, with the U.S. mili-
tary.41 These sidearms typically eject a pair of small darts, trailing very
thin wires to a distance of twenty-one feet (a longer range version, to
39. Cf. JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
40. FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 70-71 (noting that in addition to being potentially lethal,
sticky foam is difficult to clean up and requires a bulky recharging unit; nonetheless, it may still
prove useful for creating barriers around threatened buildings, even if not for direct anti-
personnel use); Boyd, supra note 9, § 5.1 (sticky foam required such painstaking cleanup that it
was impractical for law enforcement purposes); Margaret-Anne Coppernoll, The Nonlethal Weapons
Debate, 52 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 112, 119-120 (1999) (noting that freon, which constitutes nearly
one-third of sticky foam, is on the list of controlled substances under international and domestic
U.S. environmental law because of ozone depletion and is being phased out).
41. Manya A. Brachear, Chicago Police to Carry Stun Guns; ‘Less Than Lethal’ Tasers on Way to 200
Sergeants, CHICAGO TRIB., Sept. 12, 2003, at C3; Brian D. Crecente, Cops Charged Up Over Tasers;
Number of Less-Lethal Guns in Patrol Cars to Double by September, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 29, 2003,
at 5A; Beth DeFalco, Taser Wins $1.8 Million Stun Gun Contract, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 1, 2004
(reporting purchase by U.S. military of 1000 electric stun guns and accessories, following an order
of 3,348 taser weapons by foreign military; more than 4500 police forces in forty-nine U.S. states
use taser technology, and 700 departments arm all their patrol officers with these devices);
Neil Davison & Nick Lewer, Research Report No. 6, BRADFORD NON-LETHAL WEAPONS RESEARCH
PROJECT (BNLWRP) (Ctr. for Conflict Resolution, Dep’t of Peace Studies, U. of Bradford, U.K.),
Oct. 2004, at 21-23 (reporting large orders for taser weapons placed by U.S. military and
police departments), available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/research_reports/docs/
BNLWRPResearchReportNo6_Oct04.pdf.
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allow engagements at greater standoff distance, is under develop-
ment). Barbs on the darts attach to the target’s skin or clothing, and a
brief but powerful electric shock is administered. The electric charge
(50,000 volts) causes the target immediately to lose muscle control, fall
down, and be unable to resist for five seconds or longer.42
Proponents assert that the charge is highly effective, even against the
most determined (or substance-abusing) resisters, yet no permanent
injury is inflicted.43 Electric guns are also much more useable in
confined spaces, such as inside an aircraft in flight, where use of a
conventional bullet would be inadvisable.44 Critics, on the other hand,
challenge the effectiveness and the safety of the system, noting severe
or lasting injuries and several deaths following exposure to Taser
power.45
Pepper Spray. The search for a more effective, yet safer, chemical
means of crowd control has inspired generations of alchemists and
inventors. The newly-emerging leading technology employs oleoresin
capsicum (OC), derived from natural cayenne pepper plants. Available
in spray cans that project to a distance of twelve feet or more, OC has
42. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 32-33; CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at
27 (speculating about extending the taser’s range to 100 feet); Campbell, supra note 37, at app. C;
Sarah Kershaw, As Shocks Replace Police Bullets, Deaths Drop but Questions Arise, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7,
2004, at A1; Davison & Lewer, supra note 41, at 29-30 (describing development efforts for a
wireless electrical weapon).
43. See ANTHONY BLEETMAN & RICHARD STEYN, THE ADVANCED TASER: A MEDICAL REVIEW (Apr.
27, 2003), available at http://www.taser.com.documents.tasersubmit.pdf; Darren Laur, Taser
Technology Research Paper, Canadian Police Research Centre, Technical Report 01-2000, Sept. 2000,
available at http://www.cprc.org/tr/tr-2000-01.pdf. See generally Taser International, at http://
www.taser.com/.
44. See Press Release, Taser International, Korean Airlines Selects Advanced Taser for Use on
All Aircraft (Mar. 27, 2002); Press Release, Taser International, United Airlines and Mesa Airlines
Apply to Transportation Security Administration to Use Advanced Taser M26 for In-Flight Aircraft
Security (Jan. 21, 2003); Press Release, Taser International, Taser International, Inc. Commends
Greek Police Special Forces on Use of Advanced Taser M26 to Arrest Turkish Airlines Flight 160
Hijacker (Apr. 1, 2003).
45. Eric M. Koscove, The Taser Weapon: A New Emergency Medicine Problem, 14 ANNALS EMER-
GENCY MED. 1205, 1205-06 (1985); Ronald N. Kornblum & Sara K. Reddy, Effects of the Taser in
Fatalities Involving Police Confrontation, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 434 (1991); James Campbell, Taser Guns
May Be an Alternative, but Not a Panacea, HOUSTON CHRON., July 12, 2004, at B9; Alex Berenson, As
Police Use of Tasers Soars, Questions over Safety Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2004, at A1 (noting fifty
deaths following taser shocking); Eric M. Weiss, Va. Man Dies After Battle with Officers, WASH. POST,
Aug. 18, 2004, at B3 (suspect continued to resist police officers even after they repeatedly sprayed
him with pepper spray, shocked him with a taser until his hair caught on fire, and shot him with a
.40 caliber handgun); see Raymond M. Fish & Leslie A. Geddes, Effects of Stun Guns and Tasers, 358
THE LANCET 687 (2001).
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already earned such a reputation for effectiveness that it has very
largely displaced earlier CS and CN (mace) chemical sprays in the
United States. Vendors and advocates contend that pepper spray acts
much more quickly (a two-second burst can inflame the eyes, nose,
throat, and lungs, causing temporary blindness and shortness of breath
for fifteen to sixty minutes) and that it will safely incapacitate even
individuals who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs and
beyond the reach of other chemicals.46 Again, critics contest: (1) the
effectiveness of the substance, asserting that a substantial percentage of
people are not restrained by it; (2) its safety, noting deaths associated
with OC use; and (3) its propensity for inappropriate use, such as
application against individuals who are already under restraint.47
Acoustic rays. One of the most evocative early NLW candidate technolo-
gies was a concept for an acoustic ray. This tool would have emitted
inaudible, invisible sound waves—perhaps from a parabolic dish
mounted on top of a jeep or Humvee that also carried the power
source—to a distance of approximately 100 yards. The infrasound
waves would penetrate the target’s body, disrupting internal organs
(stomach, lungs, etc.) with unfamiliar harmonics, inducing uncontrol-
lable nausea. The victim would have no choice but to retreat or to fall
down with paralyzing sickness, which would ebb once the originating
wave source was removed. The acoustic waves would propagate effi-
ciently even through dust, fog, or smoke. Early tests validated the
principle that targets were rendered unfit for combat or any other
concerted action, but developers to date have been unable to craft a
46. Boyd, supra note 9, § 5.4 (calling OC “the less-than-lethal weapon of choice for US
police”); Pepper Spray, Inc., at http://www.peppersprayinc.com/; Association of Defensive Spray
Manufacturers, at http://pepperspray.org; Jami Onnen, Oleoresin Capsicum, INT’L ASS’N CHIEFS
POLICE, June 1993, available at http://www.zarc.com/english/cap-stun/tech_info/oc/iacpocrep-
ort.html; John Granfield et al., Pepper Spray and In-Custody Deaths, INT’L ASS’N CHIEFS POLICE, Mar.
1994, available at http://www.zarc.com/english/other_sprays/reports/iacp_oc_death_1994.html;
Oleoresin Capsicum: Pepper Spray as a Force Alternative, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. TECH. ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Wash.
D.C.), Mar. 1994, available at http://www.justnet.org/pdffiles/pepper.pdf; Craig H. Steffee et al.,
Oleoresin Capsicum (Pepper) Spray and “In-Custody Deaths”, 16 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 3
(1995); Davison & Lewer, supra note 41, at 34-36 (listing recent examples of large-scale use of
chemical irritants for crowd control in several countries).
47. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., PEPPER SPRAY: A MAGIC BULLET UNDER SCRUTINY
(1993); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF S. CAL., PEPPER SPRAY UPDATE: MORE FATALITIES, MORE
QUESTIONS (1995); Black Leaders Urge Pepper Spray Ban, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Nov. 4, 1997, at 4C
(between 1990 and 1997, eighty-four people died in police custody after being sprayed with
chemicals; some allege a racial pattern in whom police spray with OC); Mark I. Pinsky, If Pepper
Spray Isn’t Lethal, Why All the Deaths?, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at A1.
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suitably directional device. The acoustic beam fans out from the
emitting source, affecting anyone nearby, both friendly and opposing
forces.48
Directed energy heat ray. Greater success has been earned by a facially
similar device that employs millimeter waves instead of acoustic waves.
A mobile prototype, denominated “Active Denial System” (ADS) or
“Vehicle-Mounted Active Denial System” (VMADS), has been thor-
oughly tested by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory in the New
Mexico desert and is approaching the stage of operational deployment.
The invisible millimeter wave—effective at the speed of light to a
remarkable range of a kilometer or more—stimulates the nerve end-
ings in human skin, but penetrates only 1/64 of an inch. It almost
immediately produces a powerful sensation of heat—as if the person
were touching a hot light bulb—but does not, in fact, burn the skin or
inflict any injury. The targeted person cannot resist the pain—one
must involuntarily recoil or avoid the painful stimulus—but the punish-
ment ceases as soon as the person withdraws or the device is aimed
elsewhere. The device is effective even through heavy clothing, and the
utility of other avoidance tactics (hiding behind a mirror or layers of
wet towels, for example) is still being explored. Proponents foresee
using the millimeter wave to “clear a space”—to compel a crowd to
abandon a contested area—or at least to differentiate between civilians
or others who might just be “hangers-on” in a mob versus those more
48. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 25; FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 95-102; Jurgen
Altmann, Acoustic Weapons: Myths and Reality, in NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND
OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, § 6 [hereinafter Altmann, Acoustic Weapons]; Jurgen
Altmann, Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies: The Case for Independent Scientific Analysis, in THE FUTURE
OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW, supra note 7, 117-19
[hereinafter Altmann, Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies]. Sound waves, audible or inaudible, could
be used directly to inflict pain upon targeted persons, but doing so would jeopardize hearing,
possibly resulting in permanent damage. Another concept would seek “acoustic bullets”—high-
powered low-frequency blasts—to create an impact wave. The more favored approach now would
use inaudible sound waves to disrupt internal organs, causing temporary incapacitation, but this
system demands very large amplifiers and speakers, restricting its mobility, has only limited range,
and generates more heat than it can dissipate effectively. Some believe that this last approach
would be more promising for underwater applications, such as to warn or deter scuba divers who
might be approaching a U.S. ship in a port. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 31-32;
Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 133. Others promote the concept of long-range audible sound
propagation. Press Release, American Technology Corporation, American Technology Reports
on Growing Long Range Acoustic Devices (LRAD) Business (Aug. 26, 2004), at http://
www.atcsd.com/press_releases.html.
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determined and prepared individuals who may constitute a real threat.49
Four to six of the VMADS devices are being mounted onto armored
vehicles denominated “Sheriffs” and are planned to be rushed into
service in Iraq as early as September 2005, to help scatter crowds and
root out insurgent fighters.50
Chemical calmatives or malodorants. Additional chemical anti-person-
nel systems are also under consideration. The “holy grail” for research-
ers would be a chemical that produced an immediate incapacitating
effect, but inflicted no lasting harm, and was safe and effective for the
full range of human populations. That goal is likely to continue to
prove as elusive as the real holy grail itself.51 The unavoidable problem
is the range of human physiology; a dose that would be just barely
sufficient to generate the intended effect on one person would be
simultaneously too much for someone else, causing death or lasting
injury, and too little for a third person, not sufficing to ensure disabil-
ity. Even in a closely controlled and monitored setting such as a
hospital operating room, the proper amount of anesthetic can vary in
dramatic and unpredictable ways. When police or military authorities
confront a crowd that includes young, healthy kidnappers and infirm
civilians, the proper amount of chemicals to apply becomes hopelessly
inexact.52
Nonetheless, a pharmucopia of candidate chemicals is under explo-
ration, including some that “becalm” a targeted person, rendering him
or her listless, disoriented, or unconscious,53 and “malodorants,” sub-
stances that simply smell so bad that people—other than those pre-
49. U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Fact Sheet: Active Denial System—Advanced Con-
cept Technology Demonstration (Feb. 2003) (noting that $51 million has been invested in the
ADS over the past 11 years, $9 million of which was devoted to human effects testing), available at
http://www.de.afrl.af.mil/factsheets/activedenial.html; CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 25;
Mihm, supra note 23.
50. Tony Freinberg & Sean Rayment, Microwave Gun to Be Used by US Troops on Iraq Rioters,
LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 19, 2004.
51. For maximum utility, the chemical would also have to be undetectable by the targeted
persons, so they would not have an opportunity to respond in any way before the disabling effects
occurred. Moreover, the optimal chemical system would enable the user to avoid the effects (such
as by wearing protective masks) and would be short in duration, easy to clean up, and without
adverse environmental effects.
52. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 27, 148-65 (examining the relationship
between an “effective dose”—which is sufficient to induce the desired effect upon the recipient—
and a “lethal dose”—which would prove fatal).
53. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 27 (concluding that “[c]almatives represent
a class of chemical substances that offer strong potential as effective NLW”); Boyd, supra note 9,
§ 5.1 (Attorney General’s conference in 1986 recommended devoting most if not all of the
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equipped with specialized breathing apparatus—feel compelled to
escape.54 Again, the utility of these concoctions is hotly debated.55
Projectile netting. Non-lethal weapons’ capabilities tackle anti-vehicle
missions, as well as anti-personnel missions. One of the most vexing
cross-cutting demands is the challenge of stopping a fleeing or oncom-
ing person, car, truck, boat, or airplane without inflicting permanent
harm. A family of nascent capabilities seeks to employ netting of
different composition and strength for these tasks. For example, a
small anti-personnel version could be fired from a shotgun-like arm,
flying out to ensnare a person in inescapable but non-damaging rope
bindings.56
A larger, stronger version could tackle the job of stopping a car or
truck possibly driven by a terrorist carrying explosives, but also possibly
transporting a family of innocent civilians who did not recognize or
understand signs and orders to stop. One model, denominated “Por-
table Vehicle-Arresting Barrier,” could be embedded in a roadway near
a contested military checkpoint and is portable enough to be trans-
ported by police to a highway ahead of a fleeing vehicle. It relies upon
ropes and netting to entangle a vehicle’s tires and undercarriage and is
capable of stopping a 7,500 pound truck traveling at 45 miles per hour
within a distance of 200 feet.57 Trailing in the development sequence is
the “Running Gear Entanglement System,” a waterborne mechanism
that the Coast Guard, for example, might use to interdict cigarette
boats suspected of drug trafficking. If the suspect is fast enough to
outrun law enforcement cutters, and the officials are constrained not
to employ deadly gunfire in ambiguous circumstances, a neat alterna-
tive might be to launch a netting that could capture the target’s
propellers, forcing the craft to stop for boarding and inspection.58
Department of Justice’s NLW research funds to the task of developing a suitable anesthetic agent
and delivery system).
54. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 26-27 (natural and synthetic malodorants
hold promise as devices for repelling people); Heal, supra note 18, § 4.5 (maloderants do not
incapacitate, but are so offensive that no one can stand to be near the stench); Israel Devises New
‘Smelly’ Bomb, BBC NEWS, Aug. 25, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/
middle_east/3598734.stm.
55. See, e.g., FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 76-80.
56. Id. at 82-84.
57. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 18; JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 7, at 10.
58. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 33-34, 65-66 (noting that rapid deployment
and precision delivery are key obstacles for anti-ship entanglement systems); CFR TASK FORCE 3,
supra note 21, at 18; see also Vivienne Heines, Shoot to . . . Disable?, ARMED FORCES J., July 2004, at 23
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Anti-materiel biological and chemical agents. Modern biotechnology and
chemistry suggest a variety of other capabilities that might be adapted
to police or military NLW missions. Genetically engineered microbes
can be imagined—whether they can actually be created on a practical
scale is still an open question—to degrade the petroleum in an enemy’s
repositories, to corrode rubber tires and gaskets on enemy vehicles, to
abrade moving parts, or to perform other similar mischief. A particu-
larly tantalizing image is a metal “embrittlement” agent or other
supercaustic chemicals, which hypothetically could be spread surrepti-
tiously by aerosol or liquid onto enemy tanks or other equipment,
rendering them, unbeknownst to the enemy, much more fragile and
vulnerable in combat.59
Again, critics question the feasibility of these devices (could microbio-
logical processes work quickly enough to have a measurable effect on
combat), their controllability (might they proliferate beyond the in-
tended target area, befouling our own materiel), and their military
value (if our agents could get close enough to enemy forces to deploy
these devices, why not simply use ordinary explosives).60
Miscellaneous NLW concepts. This abbreviated roster of extant and
nascent non-lethal weapons capabilities merely scratches the surface;
enthusiasts have compiled inventories of two dozen or more NLW
(describing a new “non-lethal round that can be fired from a 76mm naval gun to disable
suspicious boats without endangering their crews”); FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 83-84; Andrew
Koch, US Coast Guard Goes Gunning for ‘Go-Fasts’, JANE’S DEF. WKLY., Sept. 22, 1999.
The concept of a non-lethal anti-aircraft mechanism is even more challenging; it is difficult to
force a non-cooperative aircraft to land, without incurring a great risk of a catastrophic crash. See
FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 62, 84-85.
59. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 26; Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 134-35;
FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 71-76, 121-22 (almost any substance can be attacked with one
chemical or another, although there is no “universal solvent” that could degrade everything);
Disabling Technologies: A Critical Assessment, JANE’S INT’L DEF. REV., July 1994, at 33.
Note that anti-materiel applications of this sort would not be “temporary” or “reversible” in
the sense demanded of anti-personnel NLW (although in some scenarios, perhaps the affected
vehicle could be repaired, and parts replaced, more quickly than if it had been struck by a
conventional explosive bomb). The notion of “non-lethal” nonetheless applies to these devices
that cause catastrophic, permanent damage to targeted equipment, buildings, and other sub-
stances, because they operate via unconventional, novel routes, rather than explosions or gross
physical deformities. Programs in pursuit of these concepts are therefore within the ambit of the
Joint Directorate. DoD Directive 3000.3, supra note 1, § 3.1; Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A6.
60. Altmann, Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies, supra note 48, at 114-17 (arguing that expan-
sive claims about the effectiveness of biological or chemical anti-materiel NLW are unreliable);
Disabling Technologies: A Critical Assessment, supra note 59, at 33.
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notions in varying stages of development.61 Some seem hopelessly
ambitious, others may be of questionable military or police value, but
work is progressing apace. In one program, researchers are exploring
high power microwave or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) devices that
might be able to turn off the electrical system of an approaching car or
truck at a standoff distance, so that even if the driver refused directions
to stop at a checkpoint, the vehicle could be halted before it got too
close. But so far, the concept works only against modern computer-
assisted cars, not against the older, simpler iterations of vehicles that
would be more readily employed against American forces by terrorists
in developing countries.62 Another mysterious technology would em-
ploy a “vortex ring generator” to create invisible energy circles (akin to
smoke rings, but with a tremendous punch) that could be propagated
through the air at fifty to seventy meters per second to collide with
targeted individuals.63
Some of the new technologies may provide a modern twist to old
problems. For example, a “ring airfoil grenade” might provide a new
form of non-lethal bullet. The grenade would be an aerodynamic, soft
rubber-like ring designed to spin in flight after being shot from a
ordinary-looking firearm, making it accurate to forty to sixty meters,
with a stunning—but not lethal—impact.64 Another modest advance
would be newer generations of “flash-bangs,” multisensory grenade-like
devices that an assault team could use to temporarily stun barricaded
targets through dazzling lights, loud noises, and foul smells, enabling
the authorities to seize control of the situation in the moments of
61. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 120-47.
62. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 25; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 30;
Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 135-36; U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Fact Sheet: High Power
Microwaves (Sept. 2002); Ian Sample, Police Test Hi-Tech Zapper That Could End Car Chases,
GUARDIAN (London), July 12, 2004; see FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 64-67 (describing evolution of
EMP research programs).
63. See FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 100; Altmann, Acoustic Weapons, supra note 48, § 6.4
(vortex rings could be used to transport irritating chemicals or hot gases, possibly useful for
dispersing crowds).
64. FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 91 (noting that a ring airfoil grenade round could be fired
from a standard M16 rifle adapted with a special launcher; the ring spins in flight at 5000
revolutions per second, to keep it stable, and as it flies, it expands, so it covers a greater area upon
impact, minimizing injuries); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 25; Heal, supra note
18, § 4.5 (ring airfoil is the only kinetic energy bullet that is non-lethal even immediately after
leaving the muzzle of the firearm, but it is ineffective beyond about thirty meters).
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chaos.65 Other forms of momentarily blinding laser “dazzlers” might
also be improved to provide a short-term advantage for a police or
military assault squad.66 Yet another program suggests creating a vast
quantity of opaque, breathable aqueous foam—like a wall of soap
bubbles—to disorient and subdivide a crowd.67
The candidate NLW technologies could be combined in all sorts of
ingenious ways. A plastic bullet can be contrived to carry a packet of
OC, to explode into a disabling spray upon impact; projectile netting
might be outfitted to carry an electrical charge, to further encumber
the victim.68 As Malcolm Wiener has noted, even if a target of police or
military forces came to the fray equipped to negate one form of NLW, it
is difficult to imagine a terrorist or street-mob armed simultaneously
with gas masks, earplugs, body armor, shield mirrors, sand (to throw on
slippery foam), and medications (to combat nausea).69
D. Non-Lethal Missions
Where did all the sudden interest in NLW come from? What has
inspired so many recent investigations into novel non-lethal concepts?
This Section describes a few of the “classic” scenarios in which military
and police officials imagine that new capabilities might prove useful
and superior to existing arms that too often leave them inadequate
flexibility and deftness.70
65. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 29 (future flash grenades, using a novel
fuel-air mixture containing a metalized powder, would greatly reduce the concussion power of the
arm, and accordingly minimize injuries).
66. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 28-29.
67. Tommy D. Goolsby, Aqueous Foam as a Less-Than-Lethal Technology for Prison Applications, in
SECURITY SYSTEMS & NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 38, at 86; see
APPLEGATE, supra note 11, at 291-93.
68. See, e.g., FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 83, 91, 102; Davison & Lewer, supra note 41, at 40-41;
Mihm, supra note 23. A combined effects munition might inflict much less trauma than would a
conventional blunt impact bullet and might carry such a small amount of pepper spray that it
avoids the dangers conventionally associated with that type of device, too—but it might, through
their synergistic effects, achieve the intended result better than either “pure” kind of weapon
alone.
69. Email correspondence with Malcolm Wiener (Sept. 20, 2004) (on file with author).
70. Regarding hypothetical and real scenarios in which NLW might have been applied, see
CFR TASK FORCE 1, supra note 7, at 3-8. See generally FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 125-57; CHARLES
SWETT & DAN GOURE, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS POLICY STUDY,
FINAL REPORT 62-79, 87-130 (1999) [hereinafter CSIS NLW REPORT]; Joint Concept, supra note 5, at
A8-A13; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, MASTER PLAN 2-8 (June 2000);
Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 143-49; CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 51-57; Mandel, supra note
24.
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1. Military Scenarios
The first element animating the newfound military curiosity about
NLW comes from “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).71
American forces nowadays are increasingly deployed abroad to per-
form functions that differ in significant respects from the traditional
notion of large-scale, force-on-force combat. Peacekeeping operations,
for example, may emphasize the task of separating two wary combat-
ants, providing a disengagement barrier to deter further fighting. An
armed U.S. military force may sometimes provide the best such bul-
wark, but any exercise of traditional, lethal force—even in self-defense—
might trigger an outbreak of the very hostilities the United States is
seeking to avoid.72
Similarly, other military missions require a forceful presence, but
with a discreet touch. If U.S. troops are performing a humanitarian
mission—for example, providing protection for a relief mission that is
distributing meals and medical services to a war-ravaged locale—it
hardly makes sense to train deadly force upon the very people we are
trying to aid. But what should the troops do if the populace, growing
weary of their plight, riots at the sight of a food truck?73
To take a slight variant, imagine U.S. troops dispatched into a volatile
country to provide protection for a U.S. embassy or base, or to help
evacuate American civilians who have fallen into harm’s way in the
midst of a coup d’etat or a martial law situation. What should the troops
do if their position is approached by a large and unruly crowd, a mob
composed mostly of unarmed angry civilians, sprinkled with a handful
of more determined armed provocateurs? In particular, what should
the U.S. soldiers do if a shot is fired? Loosing indiscriminate lethal
force upon the crowd is obviously unacceptable, but so is doing
71. DoD Directive No. 3000.3, supra note 1, § 4; U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability
Operations and Support Operations (Feb. 2003); Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A1; CFR TASK FORCE
2, supra note 7, at 10-15; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 15; Duncan, supra note 9, at
33-35. MOOTW missions include a vast array of military activities, including counter-terrorism and
counter-drug operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster assistance, and support for law
enforcement.
72. Regarding possible applicability of NLW in peacekeeping and related peace enforce-
ment and peace support operations, such as those undertaken in recent years in Haiti, Somalia,
and the former Yugoslavia, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 61-62; Joint Concept,
supra note 5, at A12-A13; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, KOSOVO
INCIDENT CASE STUDY: USE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS (Apr. 4, 2000) (noting successful use of sponge
grenades, foam batons, and stinger rounds).
73. Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A8.
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nothing while allowing the perpetrators a safe haven to keep firing.74
The first concerted application of significant NLW in modern mili-
tary history came in just this sort of situation, where civilians and
fighters were thoroughly mixed, and where U.S. forces could not
adequately differentiate between threatening and non-threatening
groups aligned against them. In 1995, the thirteenth Marine Expedition-
ary Unit was assigned the daunting mission of covering the withdrawal
of 2,500 United Nations peacekeepers from chaotic Somalia, while
providing protection against native war lords, disorganized military,
and paramilitary units.
Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni boldly decided to include a
variety of NLW in the Marines’ training and equipment for this
operation “United Shield,” and his departure from standard operating
procedures garnered a substantial amount of publicity. Among the
unconventional tools deployed to Somalia were: sticky foam, used to
create temporary, immediate barriers; caltrops, sharp-edged pyramids
that could puncture the tires of vehicles following too closely; flash-
bang and stinger grenades; low-kinetic-energy rounds which fired
beanbags or wooden plugs; laser dazzlers and target designators; and
chemical riot control agents.
The mission was a resounding success, due at least in part to the
deterrent effect of the unfamiliar non-lethal arms, which allowed the
Marines to protect themselves and the UN forces, even against hordes
of people pressing around them. The UN forces successfully completed
their withdrawal from Mogadishu, and Lieutenant Zinni, reflecting
upon the precedent-setting use of NLW, concluded, “I think the whole
nature of warfare is changing.”75
74. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 58-59. A similarly urgent need is for the
development of new NLW systems to help protect U.S. Navy vessels in foreign ports, to avoid
another catastrophe such as the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000. Advocates
imagine a “layered” system, including NLW, in which increasingly emphatic warnings and
deterrence measures are engaged as unknown vessels (including, of course, even small and
apparently-innocent boats) approach the ship. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at
16-17, 115-18.
75. Rick Atkinson, Lean, Not-So-Mean Marines Set for Somalia, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1995, at
A22; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 53; FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 23-25;
Duncan, supra note 9, at 1-3; LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 68-72; Eric Schmitt, Now, to the
Shores of Somalia with Beanbag Guns and Goo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1995, at A10; Wallace, supra note 7,
at 147-48.
In an earlier deployment, named “Restore Hope,” in Somalia, U.S. forces also had been
equipped with some NLW. But that 1993 experience was much less satisfactory. Wooden batons
proved unsuccessful in controlling crowds that pressed in upon the Marines and the Army
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A rather different motivation for NLW has also emerged even in the
context of full-scale traditional combat.76 Since World War II, the
United States and its allies have fought limited wars for limited pur-
poses. Even during the most intense combat, the United States contem-
plates what will be done once the shooting stops, hoping to create the
most advantageous post-conflict environment. In particular, it often
turns out that the United States will help reconstruct the erstwhile
enemy and, therefore, will share an interest in preserving intact as
much as possible of the country’s infrastructure. In short, the United
States fights to win the war as quickly as possible, while simultaneously
keeping one eye on winning the peace. The latter process is often
materially assisted by avoiding cataclysmic damage to critical roads,
bridges, power plants, and the like.77
Non-lethal weapons can provide a rare mechanism for pursuing both
sets of goals simultaneously, preventing the enemy from using a
resource to the detriment of the United States during the war, but also
preserving it so it can more quickly and easily be restored to full
functioning to assist the civilian economy in post-war recovery. For
example, during the 1999 fighting in Yugoslavia, the United States
refrained from attacking a crucial electrical switching installation in
Belgrade with ordinary explosive ordnance. The facility was a legiti-
mate military target, providing power used by the armed forces, but its
complete destruction would also have retarded restoration of normal
services to civilians during and after that short conflict. The solution
was a “soft kill” attack: loads of carbon fiber strips were dropped onto
Rangers, and the forces were tentative about authorizing and using their OC. In one instance a
soldier was disciplined for shooting his firearm at a civilian who had stolen his sunglasses—he
asserted that there was no other way to prevent such looting. Conversely, in another situation,
marines did use pepper spray against a local man who was brandishing a knife; the spray
succeeded in subduing the threat, but only after the Somali had repeatedly attempted to stab the
Americans. Jonathan T. Dworken, Rules of Engagement, Lessons from Restore Hope, MIL. REV., Sept.
1994, at 26; F.M. Lorenz, Confronting Thievery in Somalia, MIL. REV., Aug. 1994, at 46; F.M. Lorenz,
Law and Anarchy in Somalia, PARAMETERS, Winter 1993-1994, at 27.
76. A related venue for modern combat—and another sector in which NLW may provide
additional value—is Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Where the fighting occurs in
the middle of a city or other built-up area, the danger of collateral damage to civilians and
infrastructure is intensified. Non-lethal capabilities may allow forces to pursue their missions, and
to protect themselves, even in the midst of non-combatants. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 5, at 57-58; Jez Littlewood, NLW and Urban Warfare: Aspects of US Thinking, in NON-LETHAL
WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, § 3.
77. DoD Directive No. 3000.3, supra note 1, § 4.3; FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 14-15 (“Recent
history has shown that it is usually the victor who bears the heavier financial burden” of rebuilding
after the end of hostilities.).
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the facility, causing massive electrical short-circuits and putting the grid
out of order (thereby denying service to the military) in the short term.
The results were reversible relatively rapidly, facilitating the subsequent
restoration of normal service for peaceful purposes.78
Non-lethal weapons, therefore, offer the possibility of multiple tech-
nologies available for a variety of modern military missions. NLW may
find application in both tactical, short-range maneuvers—e.g., to facili-
tate the operations and self-protection of a small unit operating within
a confined space—and in strategic, long-range operations—e.g., to
help prepare the battle-space by compromising the integrity of enemy
assets such as airstrips and railyards long before assaulting troops arrive
on the scene.
2. Police Scenarios
Like the military, the police79 are frequently confounded by sensitive
and complex use of force situations. The police may need, for example,
to control an unruly crowd of demonstrators and to prevent them from
78. Jim Drinkard, Airstrikes Short-Circuit Yugoslavia; High-Tech Bombs Cut Off Electricity, USA
TODAY, May 4, 1999, at A8; Dana Priest, New Bomb Shorted Out Power; NATO Hit Belgrade Grid with
Classified, Lightening-Like Missile, WASH. POST, May 4, 1999, at A15. In contrast, NATO employed
ordinary high explosive bombs against other types of targets in Yugoslavia, such as many of the
bridges over the Danube River, causing their total collapse. Some of these assets remained
unusable years after the fighting, to the profound disadvantage of both Yugoslavians and their
international patrons. Richard Bernstein, Down the River to the Sullen Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19,
2003, at A6.
American forces employed similar anti-materiel non-lethal tactics against Iraq during the
1991 Gulf War. Tomahawk cruise missiles dropped thousands of long spools of very fine carbon
fibers onto switching and transformer areas of several major electrical facilities, causing massive
short circuits. The effect was to remove the generators from service during the early hours of the
fighting, disrupting Iraq’s ability to respond to the air assault, but not destroying the generators.
The Iraqis were able to remove the fibers and restore service within a day or two. LEWER &
SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 66-67; Human Rights Watch, The Means and Methods of Attack, in
NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR: CIVILIAN CASUALTIES DURING THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND VIOLATION
OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1991), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/CHAP3.htm
(criticizing large-scale and long-term damage inflicted upon the Iraqi electrical system, which
resulted in devastating consequences for the civilian population); David A. Fulghum, Secret
Carbon-Fiber Warheads Blinded Iraqi Air Defenses, AVIATION & SPACE TECH., Apr. 27, 1992, at 18.
79. For purposes of this Article, the category of “police” refers generally to the full spectrum
of domestic law enforcement officials, including a variety of federal, state, and local authorities
such as sheriffs, U.S. Marshals, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Drug Enforcement Administration, and others who perform
cognate missions. It can also include National Guard units and military personnel performing
missions of assistance to civil authorities.
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destroying property, but they obviously do not want to apply deadly
force.80 They may need to pursue a fleeing felon, but high-speed car
chases are notoriously dangerous in urban areas.81 The police may
need to subdue a belligerent person, especially someone intoxicated by
alcohol or drugs, impeding compliance with verbal instructions, but
ordinary measures of force can quickly become excessive.82 They
frequently need to transport a dangerous person—dangerous to him-
self, to the officers, and even to their squad car—to a station or jail.83
Corrections institutions, too, are another plausible venue for law
enforcement NLW; prison disruptions and riots can be disastrous, and
80. See generally Jussila, supra note 37, at 87-98. Police use of pepper spray, rubber bullets, and
other NLW riot control equipment has become familiar in situations such as dealing with mass
protests, as against World Bank meetings. See Dana Clark Felty, Protesters Arming Themselves with
Lawyers, SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, June 4, 2004, at B1; Jose Ceja, Non-Lethal Weapons Crucial to
Breaking Up 4th Ave. Riots, ARIZ. DAILY WILDCAT, Apr. 19, 2001 (dealing with student explosions, as
after notable basketball games), available at http://wildcat.arizona.edu/papers/94/140/
01_1_m.html.
81. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 68. From 1990 to 1994, an average of 331
people were killed annually in police pursuits, despite an array of pre-emplaced barriers or
tire-deflation systems used by 90% of law enforcement agencies. Id. The bizarre 1994 pursuit of
O.J. Simpson in his famous white Bronco demonstrated how police officers’ hands may be tied
even in low-speed chases, lacking adequate mechanisms to force a possibly suicidal driver to stop
without danger.
82. Among the most difficult situations for police are confrontations with individuals who,
due to alcohol, drugs, or mental impairments, are outside the realm of ordinary conversation,
instruction, and deterrence. Especially when armed, such people can pose significant threats to
themselves, the police, and others—and the scenario of “suicide by cop,” in which the person is
seemingly intent upon inciting a lethal incident, is particularly agonizing. Police hope that
non-lethal weapons can sometimes provide part of the solution. See, e.g., H. Range Hutson et al.,
Suicide by Cop, 32 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 665, 665-69 (1998); Earnest Winston, Covington Takes
Steps for Safety: Beanbag Guns, Mental-Health Training to Give Police Non-Lethal Options, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER (Ky. Edition), Sept. 18, 1997, at B1 (beanbag shotguns adopted in aftermath of shooting
death in nearby city of a “brick-wielding mental patient”); Detroit Police Consider Use of Non-Lethal
Weapons, UPI, Nov. 22, 1992 (Detroit police investigate tear gas and stun guns, following death of a
motorist allegedly beaten by police); Another Option for the Police, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL,
Oct. 16, 2002, at 18A (successful use of taser against mentally disturbed young woman armed with
knife).
83. FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 54 (noting that even with steel separations between the
prisoner and driver, and even when securely handcuffed, a strong, determined, or substance-
abusing person can still cause havoc, kicking at windows and pounding his head on the divider);
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Office of Science & Technology, Law Enforce-
ment Technology for the 21st Century, Conference Report, May 15-17, 1995, at 13 (NCJ 158024 )
(describing a strong rear seat air bag for the back of a police car; it can be inflated at the push of a
button, to pin a recalcitrant prisoner in place, while allowing him or her to breathe during
transportation), available at http://www.nlectc.org/virlib/InfoDetail.asp?intInfoID5175.
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conventional weaponry alone may not provide a sufficiently discriminat-
ing response.84
In the worst scenarios, police may confront a hostage or barricade
situation, in which an armed individual or group is positioned in the
midst of, and shielded by, innocents. Extreme measures of force may
be required to apprehend and disarm the antagonist and free the
victims—as well as to protect the police themselves—but too often
bystanders may be jeopardized by a lethal crossfire.85
Like the military, police officials experience the most severe strains
regarding the use of deadly force, and they do so on a daily basis. The
“mixed” situation—any of those in which the legitimate target of force
is intermingled with innocents—provokes the greatest disquiet; deft
applications of official violence are, too often, impossible. Compared
to military forces, police often operate at closer range and, quite
frequently, with greater presence of nearby civilians and with an even
greater intolerance for collateral damage.86
Against that background, police forces across the country have a
much greater wealth of experience in operating the low-tech, inexpen-
sive variants of NLW. But the available NLW arsenal for law enforce-
ment is far from adequate. As far back as Lyndon Johnson’s administra-
tion, the United States Government recognized the need for, and
committed itself to develop and procure, safer and more effective
mechanisms of crowd control.87 Nonetheless, despite immense techno-
84. See, e.g., Death Row Inmates Riot at Mansfield, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 6, 1997, at B5
(a seven-hour riot in the death row of the Mansfield Correctional Institution near Cleveland
ended when a prison tactical squad fired tear gas into the unit and regained control; one member
of the squad and four inmates sustained minor injuries, following an uprising in which prisoners
overpowered three guards, took their keys, and freed several death row inmates from their cells);
Robert Knox, Prison Looks to ‘Less-Lethal’ Weapons, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2003, at B1.
85. Ken Hubbs, Less Lethal Munitions as “Extended Range Impact Weapons,” in SECURITY SYSTEMS
& NONLETHAL TECHNOLOGIES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 38, at 37 (noting the special value
of NLW capable of affecting targets at sufficient range that they cannot use their own weapons
against police).
86. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 66-68; see also Tony Pfaff, Military Ethics in
Complex Contingencies: Adapting the Warrior Ethic (Oct. 25, 2004) (paper presented at
Georgetown University Law Center, on file with the Georgetown Journal of International Law)
(arguing that police, unlike military, may never knowingly employ lethal force against civilians).
87. LYNDON JOHNSON, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME TO OUR SOCIETY, H.R. DOC NO. 90-250, at 14
(2d Sess. 1968):
Revolvers and nightsticks are clearly inadequate for the many different crises faced by
the police. New weapons and chemicals—effective but causing no permanent injury—
have been and are being developed. But too little is now known about their potential to
LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
2005] 731
logical growth in so many other sectors of modern American life,
domestic law enforcement officials still often feel that they are equipped
little differently than their nineteenth century predecessors, such as
Wyatt Earp; if somebody will not heed their verbal commands, their
only real recourse is to a firearm.
* * *
In sum, non-lethal weapons carry the promise of important new
capabilities for police and military units in the twenty-first century. It is
difficult to predict at this point which of these novel systems will
ultimately prove to be “revolutionary technologies” and which will be
revealed as dead ends, but it is clear that something important is
already occurring.
The most obvious and familiar manifestations of NLW innovation
may be the least provocative: caltrops, flash-bangs, projectile netting,
and the like are useful, but they can be improved only so much further
and do not raise the most pressing questions of law, tactics, or ethics.
Similarly, the JNLWD has concluded, and the Department of Justice
seems to concur, that the wave of the future for NLW does not feature
further refinements on kinetic energy projectiles—technology has, for
the most part, gone about as far as possible with plastic, rubber, and
wooden bullets—so future iterations of blunt trauma munitions will be
noteworthy only if they can offer appreciably greater range, safety, or
reliability.
For very different reasons, the realm of chemical and biological NLW
proceeds under a cloud. As discussed in the next section, international
obligations and domestic statutes put Biological Warfare (BW) entirely
off limits, and there is little reason to want to disturb those strictures in
preserve order while protecting lives. Too little is known about their limitations. I am
instructing the Director of the Office of Science and Technology, working with the
Attorney General and law enforcement officials, to study these new weapons and
chemicals and other new techniques in crime control. The results of this study will be
made available to enforcement agencies throughout the country.
In addition, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders’ 1968 report notes that “[f]or
the most part, the police faced with urban disorders last summer had to rely on two weapons—a
wooden stick and a gun. Our police departments today require a range of physical force with
which to restrain and control both more humanely and more effectively.” NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N
ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 330
(1968). It called on “[t]he federal government to undertake an immediate program to test and
evaluate nonlethal weapons and related control equipment for use by police and control forces.”
Id. at 492.
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order to proceed with biological or toxin weapons designed for anti-
personnel applications. The notion of anti-materiel BW (bugs that
would quickly and perhaps covertly degrade metal armor, petroleum
products, or machine parts) still seems far-fetched. The Chemical
Weapons Convention likewise takes most military applications of toxic
chemicals off the table; despite the lingering notion that chemical
combat (especially non-lethal chemical combat) might be useful and
even humane in some circumstances, the global consensus has strongly
moved in the opposite direction. Riot control agents—including possi-
bly a wide range of new calmative, malodorant, and other concoctions—
remain available for domestic law enforcement purposes, as well as for
a host of “military operations other than war.” The prospect of leakage
from permitted chemical NLW operations into treaty-forbidden prac-
tices is a serious issue; so again, there is a cap on the future utility of
non-lethal chemicals.
The realm of directed-energy NLW seems to be the most tantalizing
prospect. The VMADS millimeter wave heat ray, the possibility of
improved acoustic systems, and comparable mechanisms suggest the
ability to affect people, buildings, and objects at standoff distances that
would truly provide a revolutionary new capability. The technology is
not yet battle-tested—the new Sheriff system planned for deployment
in Iraq will provide the first operational evaluation88—but already
there is reason to be hopeful that the new NLW can make a useful
contribution in the most difficult engagements.
No one should be too sanguine about the promise of NLW; there
have been plenty of instances in which a promising new military
technology conspicuously failed to live up to its advance billing. And
even advocates grumble that progress has been slower than anticipated
in bringing advanced NLW concepts from the drawing-board into the
field.89
What is clear, however, is the large and growing effort now being
devoted to the enterprise. Government-sponsored research is progress-
ing, loosely coordinated between the Department of Defense, which
88. Freinberg & Rayment, supra note 50.
89. CFR TASK FORCE 2, supra note 7, at viii (noting that in 1999, the Independent Task Force
found that “weapons development and thinking about [NLW] usage has been very slow.
Non-lethal warfare has received low priority in the Department of Defense (DoD), as evidenced by
insufficient research and development funding, inadequate attention to the implications for
military doctrine, barriers to information transfer among the military services and between the
DoD and the relevant civilian agencies, and DoD resistance to complying with legislative
direction.”).
LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
2005] 733
brings more money to the table, and the Department of Justice, which
draws upon more extensive experience in operating NLW through
state and local police forces.90 Even more, private enterprise has
adopted the NLW mission with alacrity and enthusiasm, and human
inventiveness guarantees that candidate non-lethal programs of all
sorts, based on a wide variety of physical mechanisms, will be explored
and tested, and perhaps deployed and utilized, in the coming years.91
III. THE LAW OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
Both international and domestic law fail to make adequate provision
for non-lethal weapons. The existing standards were, of course, crafted
with other stimuli in mind, and contemporary treaties, statutes, and
other legal tools have, for the most part, not yet been adapted to the
unprecedented stresses and opportunities of the modern capabilities.
Still, there are some shreds of law that do regulate the emerging world
of NLW, for better or worse.92 This Section explores three topics. First,
it surveys the international context, treaties, and customary rules that
govern selected aspects of the weaponry wielded by American and
other armed forces. Second, it looks at the domestic U.S. statutory law
that forecloses one important potential avenue of NLW research and
development regarding biological weapons. Third, it examines the
domestic U.S. constitutional and other law regulating police use of
force, including NLW capabilities, and highlights the evolving jurispru-
dence in the field.
90. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Office of Science & Technology,
Technology Solutions for Public Safety, Conference Report, Apr. 9-11, 1996, at 12 (NCJ 162532)
(noting advantages of transferring military technology to law enforcement, to address common
missions, save tax dollars, and field test the equipment), available at http://www.nlectc.org/virlib/
InfoDetail.asp?intInfoID5174.
91. Coppernoll, supra note 40, at 128 (concurring with “the scholars, military leaders, and
planners who postulate that in the decades to come the political and military value of the
now-emerging non-lethal capability will be regarded as superior to lethal ones in the furtherance
of the national security policy and national strategy, because it fills so well the gap between oral
warnings and deadly force”); CSIS NLW REPORT, supra note 70, at 40-41 (summarizing current and
future advantages of NLW); DAVID A. MOREHOUSE, NONLETHAL WEAPONS: WAR WITHOUT DEATH 5
(1996) (“Nonlethality is a revolutionary concept that can guide the international community into
realizing a new world order. When non-lethal technologies replace old weapons of destruction,
diplomacy will take its rightful place as the supreme method of conflict resolution.”).
92. See generally Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3.
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A. International Law on NLW
Only a few treaties deal directly with non-lethal weapons, and they do
so in a distinctly incomplete fashion, but those few exemplars are worth
exploring. Similarly, the international law of armed conflict imposes a
number of general limits on the use of non-lethal weapons.
1. Chemical Weapons Convention
The first noteworthy relevant international agreement is the 1993
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-
piling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention or CWC).93 The CWC is a comprehensive
edict against a particularly obnoxious form of combat, and it has
attracted 164 parties, reflecting the world’s consensus that this hideous
scourge is to be avoided absolutely.94 At the same time, however, the
scope of the treaty’s prohibitions must not be too broad. Because of the
phenomenon of “dual capability”—many of the same chemical sub-
stances can be used both for weapons and for plastics, paints, fertilizers,
and insecticides across the full spectrum of the global civilian economy—
the treaty must be careful not to disrupt essential patterns of commer-
cial activity.95
The CWC, therefore, defines its applicable coverage with care. A
93. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997) [hereinafter CWC]; see also Protocol for
the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriologi-
cal Methods of Warfare, signed June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (The Geneva Protocol)
(earlier instrument outlawing the use of chemical weapons in particular circumstances, but not
forbidding their development and possession).
Regarding the international control of chemical weapons, see generally Charles C. Flowerree,
Chemical and Biological Weapons and Arms Control, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL & DISARMA-
MENT 999 (Richard Dean Burns ed., 1993); William Lawler, Progress Towards International Control of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 13 TOL. L. REV. 1220 (1982); George Bunn, Banning Poison Gas and
Germ Warfare: Should the United States Agree?, 1969 WIS. L. REV. 375 (1969); Fact Sheet 1: The
Chemical Weapons Convention & the CWC—How They Came About (Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, The Netherlands), July 2000, available at http://
www.opcw.org/docs/fs1.pdf.
94. State Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, at http://www.opcw.org/html/db/
members_ratifyer.html (last modified Nov. 19, 2004). The United States, as well as all the other
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, are members.
95. Julian Perry Robinson, The Negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Historical
Overview, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION—IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS 17 (Mi-
chael Bothe et al. eds., 1998); Raija Hanski, On-Site Inspections as a Form of Verification in Arms Control
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“chemical weapon” includes “[t]oxic chemicals and their precursors,
except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Conven-
tion, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such
purposes.”96 This definition leads to two other essential definitions.
First, a “toxic chemical” is “[a]ny chemical which through its chemical
action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or
permanent harm to humans or animals.”97 The most important of such
toxic chemicals are identified on a series of three “schedules” annexed
to the treaty and are the subject of a detailed verification regime,
incorporating elaborate reporting and inspection requirements.98
Second, the term “purposes not prohibited under this Convention”
includes an array of industrial, agricultural, medical, and other peace-
ful purposes, as well as “[l]aw enforcement including domestic riot
control purposes.”99 This last exemption then requires the introduc-
tion of an additional set of crucial terms and constraints. Under the
CWC, “[e]ach State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a
method of warfare.”100 Riot control agent is then defined as “[a]ny
Agreements, in THE NEW CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION—IMPLEMENTATION AND PROSPECTS, supra, at
37.
96. CWC, supra note 93, art. II § 1(a), 1974 U.N.T.S. at 319-20. A chemical weapon consists of
two components: the lethal or non-lethal agent (e.g., sarin nerve gas or OC pepper spray) and the
munition or device (e.g., a bomb, mine, or spray tank) that is used to contain the agent, transport
it to the target, and disperse it. For present purposes, we are concerned only with the agent,
although the CWC tightly regulates the delivery systems too. Id. art. II § 1(b).
97. Id. art. II § 2 (emphasis added).
98. Id.; id. Annex on Chemicals; id. Annex on Implementation and Verification.
99. Id. art. II § 9(d). The CWC thus does not bar the use of small quantities of chemical
weapons agents for “protective purposes” such as in experiments designed for the development of
improved anti-CW self-defense equipment such as gas masks. See id. art. II § 9(b). However,
chemicals listed on schedule 1 of the treaty (the most dangerous substances—those toxic
chemicals and their precursors that have previously been developed or produced as chemical
weapons) may be used only for a narrower range of peaceful purposes, not including law
enforcement or riot control purposes. Id. Annex on Implementation and Verification, Part VI.2;
David Fidler, Interpretation of Article II.9(d) of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Regard to
the Use of Toxic Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes, Memorandum to FAS Working Group
Law Enforcement Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (Apr. 24, 2003) [hereinafter Fidler
Memo—Article II.9(d) of the CWC].
Likewise, the treaty recognizes the fact that many ordinary weapons rely upon substances—
such as gunpowder or rocket fuel—that might fit the criteria of “toxic chemicals” in being harmful
to humans, but those chemicals are not being used in combat in a fashion that exploits their toxic
nature. The treaty therefore exempts “[m]ilitary purposes not connected with the use of chemical
weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of
warfare.” CWC, supra note 93, art. II § 9(c), 1974 U.N.T.S. at 319-20.
100. CWC, supra note 93, art. I § 5, 1974 U.N.T.S. at 318-19.
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chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in
humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear
within a short time following termination of exposure.”101
The CWC further requires each party to declare the chemical name,
structural formula, and registry number (although not the quantity
produced, the location, or the purpose) of each chemical held for riot
control purposes and to update the information within thirty days of
any change.102
The interplay of these terms and their net effect on non-lethal
chemicals have been muddled and controversial; the suitability of riot
control agents on the battlefield has been a legal, tactical, and political
quagmire for decades predating and under the CWC.103 The United
States has traditionally argued that riot control agents do not fit the
criteria of “toxic chemicals” and are therefore not “chemical weapons”
under the treaty. Accordingly, riot control agents may be produced,
stockpiled, and deployed without limits, subject only to the restriction
that they may not be used “as a method of warfare.”104 Virtually all
other parties and observers argue, conversely, that riot control agents
are toxic chemicals under the CWC, are chemical weapons, and thus
may be held only in quantities and types appropriate for the articulated
“peaceful purposes,” as well as not being valid “as a method of war-
fare.”105
Only small operational consequences may now remain in this legal
brouhaha. The United States has placed severe internal restraints
against even approaching any uses of riot control agents in the most
101. Id. art. II § 7, 1974 U.N.T.S. at 319-20.
102. Id. art. III § 1(e), 1974 U.N.T.S. at 320-21.
103. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 30-32, 61-63 (reviewing U.S. use of tear gas in
Vietnam; noting that in some scenarios, judicious use of chemicals could help save lives on all sides
of a battle, but any application of even non-lethal chemicals would inevitably raise the danger of
triggering a massive retaliatory employment of lethal CW); David Isenberg, Next Up: ‘Non-Lethal’
Chemicals That Kill, ASIA TIMES (Hong Kong), Apr. 1, 2003, at http://atimes01.atimes.com/atimes/
Middle_East/ED01Ak02.html.
104. Ernest Harper, A Call for a Definition of Method of Warfare in Relation to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, 48 NAVAL L. REV. 132, 134-43 (2001); Fidler Memo—Article II.9(d) of the CWC, supra
note 99; Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 72-73; W.
Hays Parks, Classification of Chemical-Biological Warfare, 13 TOL. L. REV. 1165 (1982); Bunn, supra
note 93, at 394-406.
105. Harper, supra note 104, at 136-45; Fidler Memo—Article II.9(d) of the CWC, supra note
99; Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 72; J.P.
Winthrop, Preliminary Legal Review of Proposed Chemical-Based Nonlethal Weapons (U.S. Dep’t of the
Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate General, International & Operational Law Division, National
Security Law Branch), Nov. 30, 1997, at 13; Isenberg, supra note 103.
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contentious hypothetical cases.106 But what would be a use of chemi-
cals, including non-lethal chemicals, as a prohibited “method of war-
fare”? Surely any employment against fighting forces would be covered,
such as the American applications of riot control agents during the
Vietnam War to drive enemy soldiers out of underground bunkers or
tunnels.107 A closer case might be “search and rescue” missions; for
example, if a pilot is downed behind enemy lines, would it be legal to
use riot control agents to prevent local civilians from approaching his
position until a helicopter can extract him?108 Or what if an enemy is
illegally using civilians as “human shields”? Would it be an acceptable
reprisal to employ a non-lethal gas that would incapacitate the entire
crowd, permitting a more discrete application of deadly force against
the perpetrators?109 Most plausibly on the “legal” side of the fence
would be the use of riot control agents in rear areas, away from the
fighting, such as to control rioting civilians in occupied territory or
106. Under the Standing Rules of Engagement, promulgated by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
to guide American forces in the field, non-lethal chemical weapons such as riot control agents may
be used only with the direct approval of the national command authority, which is rarely given. See
Harper, supra note 104, at 137-58 (observing that non-lethal chemicals may be lawfully used for
purposes other than warfare, but they may be stockpiled only in forms and quantities that would
be appropriate for those restricted applications); see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note
5, at 80-82 (noting that development of new military NLW chemicals has received little attention
since adoption of the CWC).
Non-governmental organizations, such as the Sunshine Project and the Centre for Conflict
Resolution, Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project at Bradford University (UK), have been
diligent in drawing attention to chemical and biological NLW programs that could raise issues
about compliance with the relevant arms control treaties. See generally Sunshine Project, at
http://www.sunshine-project.org/; Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Program (BNLWRP),
at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/nlw/; see also David P. Fidler, “Non-lethal” Weapons and Interna-
tional Law: Three Perspectives on the Future, MED. CONFLICT & SURVIVAL, July-Sept. 2001, at 194-204
(discussing the tension between international legal standards and NLW enthusiasts).
107. The United States employed non-lethal CS gas quite widely in Vietnam, to flush
Vietcong fighters from subterranean enclaves, both to induce surrenders and to facilitate the
subsequent application of lethal force. Paul L. Howard, Operational Aspects of Agent CS, Apr. 1973
(USATECOM Deseret Test Center Technical Report DTC-FR-S700M) (regarded as unclassified
Dec. 1979); Bunn, supra note 93, at 394, 405-06.
108. See Harper, supra note 104, at 137-56; Fidler, The International Legal Implications of
“Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 72-73.
109. In this scenario—where enemy belligerents are (in violation of international law)
hiding behind civilians as willing or coerced shields—deft application of non-lethal chemicals
might be expected to save lives, serving both a humanitarian role and enabling U.S. forces to
accomplish their mission and protect themselves better. But even advocates of NLW concede that
in practice even a limited employment of chemicals would likely propel the conflict down a
notoriously “slippery slope” into general use of despised lethal CW. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note
21, at 61-63; Harper, supra note 104, at 149-52.
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interned enemy prisoners of war.110 It is worth noting that anti-materiel
chemical weapons—lethal or non-lethal—are outside the scope of the
CWC altogether.
David Fidler has argued for a narrow interpretation of the phrase
“law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes” within the
CWC’s strictures allowing chemicals for “peaceful purposes.”111 He
asserts that the treaty permits a party to employ non-lethal chemicals to
ensure compliance with its domestic legal strictures within its own
territory and in areas subject to its jurisdiction, but does not authorize
chemicals for extraterritorial enforcement of its domestic law or of
international law. Furthermore, NLW chemicals could legitimately be
applied by military forces in areas they occupy, or by authorized
peacekeepers, for the law enforcement purpose of preserving public
order and safety, but only against noncombatants.112
In contrast, Hays Parks has argued that the CWC’s outlawing of riot
control agents as a “method” of warfare is appreciably less constricting
than if the treaty had banned chemicals as a “means” of warfare. Under
this analysis, the “methods” of warfare are broad policies, aimed at the
strategic, operational level of war, while the “means” of warfare operate
at the tactical level.113 The contemplated application of NLW chemi-
cals on the battlefield would all be in discrete, specific, localized
situations as “means” of accomplishing a particular mission, not as
broad-gauged “methods” of defeating an enemy state. Accordingly, the
CWC should be interpreted to tolerate these particularized applica-
tions of NLW riot control agents.114
Current U.S. policy stands approximately midway between these two
perspectives, as reflected in Executive Order No. 11850, promulgated
by President Gerald Ford in 1975. There, President Ford asserted the
right to use riot control agents in defensive military modes to save lives,
such as in four specified situations: (1) to control rioting prisoners of
110. Fidler Memo—Article II.9(d) of the CWC, supra note 99, at 12-16 (studying possible use
of NLW chemicals in law enforcement operations undertaken inside other countries); Winthrop,
supra note 105, at 13 (effect of U.S. deliberations regarding ratification of CWC).
111. Fidler Memo—Article II.9(d) of the CWC, supra note 99, at 3-4 (also observing that the
treaty’s permission for chemicals in “law enforcement” is broader than the subcategory of “riot
control.” Chemicals used for capital punishment, for example, would fit the former category, but
not the latter.).
112. Id.; see also LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 95-96 (noting the ambiguity in the CWC’s
use of key terms, such as “law enforcement” and “method of warfare,” without providing adequate
definitions).
113. Harper, supra note 104, at 154-55.
114. Id.
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war; (2) to counter enemy attacks that use civilians as shields; (3) to
rescue downed pilots; and (4) to protect rear areas away from the
fighting against riots and terrorists.115 That position, despite its facial
inconsistency with the CWC, has been frozen into U.S. law by the
Senate’s insistence during the treaty advice and consent process. But it
is also clear that any application of even non-lethal chemicals in any
near-battlefield circumstances would be politically, legally, and tacti-
cally risky; such action would have to be authorized only by the
uppermost echelons of the national command authority and is unlikely
to be tolerated.116
The “bottom line” for assessing the impact of the Chemical Weapons
Convention on possible use of non-lethal chemicals remains, therefore,
shrouded in some uncertainty. Clearly, no chemicals, including non-
lethal riot control agents, can be utilized “as a method of warfare.”
Likewise, any effort to test the limits of that prohibition—such as
considering possible applications of NLW riot control agents in near-
combat situations—would be controversial and fraught with political
and strategic peril. Most of the world would not accept as legitimate any
meaningful introduction of NLW chemicals into a theater of war, and
the eventual retaliation might overwhelm whatever temporary tactical
advantage was obtained by the first user. The treaty does not similarly
constrain law enforcement applications of non-lethal chemicals, but
neither does it offer much assistance in attempting to segregate the
military from the police applications in close cases.117
2. Biological Weapons Convention
A similar, but less textually-based, story emerges from analysis of the
CWC’s predecessor, the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biologi-
cal) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (Biological Weap-
ons Convention or BWC).118 The BWC predated the CWC by two
115. Exec. Order No. 11,850, 3 C.F.R. 980 (1971-1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 1512 (2003).
116. Winthrop, supra note 105, at 16-19; Nicholas Wade & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Use of Tear Gas
Could Violate Treaty, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003, at B13.
117. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 31-32; W. Hays Parks, Non-Lethal Weapons: Musings
from Experience, Presentation to the Council on Foreign Relations NLW Task Force (Sept. 8,
2003) (observing that any effort to re-open the CWC or to clarify or relax its limitations on NLW
would inspire other countries to proffer their own ideas about amending the treaty in ways the
U.S. would dislike) (on file with the Georgetown Journal of International Law).
118. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature
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decades; reflecting its era, the earlier instrument is vastly shorter,
lacking richly-detailed definitions, schedules of covered substances,
elaborate verification protocols, and consideration of diverse scenarios
for possible legitimate uses of biological agents.119
The BWC states simply: “[e]ach State Party to this Convention
undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile
or otherwise acquire or retain . . . [m]icrobial or other biological
agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or other peaceful purposes.”120 The treaty therefore applies
equally to lethal and to non-lethal biological agents; it makes no special
provision for conceivable biological “riot control agents” or other
less-noxious breeds of bugs. The outstanding question—unadorned in
the treaty’s text—is whether the permission for “prophylactic, protec-
tive or other peaceful purposes” could be stretched to embrace mi-
crobes used for non-war, but war-related or law enforcement, applica-
tions.
There is little real authority on this topic and, to date, little discus-
sion of it; likewise, few people have systematically considered the
Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (entered into force Mar. 26, 1975) [hereinafter
BWC].
The difference between a “chemical” weapon and a “biological” weapon is elusive. In general,
a biological weapon (such as anthrax or smallpox) relies upon living creatures (usually micro-
scopic) or infectious materials derived from them (or on artificially-created analogues), which
reproduce and cause a “disease” in the targeted person, plant, or animal. A chemical weapon
(such as sarin or mustard gas), in partial contrast, uses a substance with direct toxic effects,
generally not causing a communicable illness. A “toxin” weapon (such as rattlesnake venom or
botulin) is a sort of middle ground—it employs poisonous substances extracted from living things
or created in a laboratory. The CWC and BWC therefore overlap to some extent; the legal
pigeonholes do not precisely correspond to the vagaries of nature. See generally Flowerree, supra
note 93, at 999; Erhard Geissler, New Assessments of the Potential Value of BW and TW Agents, in
STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES (Erhard
Geissler ed., 1990); Lawler, supra note 93.
119. There have been repeated efforts to strengthen the BWC by grafting onto it provisions
related to declarations about ambiguous activities, inspections of suspicious locations, and
creation of institutional structures comparable to those of the CWC. Most recently, these
negotiations have been blocked by opposition from the United States, concerned about intrusions
upon private and governmental secrecy. See Jonathan B. Tucker, The BWC New Process: A Preliminary
Assessment, NONPROLIFERATION REV., Spring 2004, at 27-33; Briefing Paper on the Status of Biological
Weapons Nonproliferation, ACA ISSUE BRIEF (Arms Control Association, Wash., D.C.), Sept. 2002;
John R. Bolton, Remarks at Tokyo America Center: The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons
Convention: Combating the BW Threat (Aug. 26, 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/t/us/
rm/13090/htm.
120. BWC, supra note 118, art. I, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166.
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possibility of genetically-engineered microbes deliberately dispersed in
an anti-materiel role. The treaty mostly contemplates bugs and toxins
that counteract living things by causing a disease or interfering with life
processes. How should it deal with supercaustics or super-biodegrad-
ers?121
3. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
A third treaty reveals a different aspect of the emerging NLW story:
how the world community sometimes deals with selected weaponry that
it considers particularly loathsome, regardless of the device’s non-
lethal character. The 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (Conven-
tion on Certain Conventional Weapons or CCW)122 governs, through a
series of protocols which each party may opt to join separately, a
Pandora’s box of nasty or inhumane weapons such as landmines, booby
traps, and incendiary devices.123
121. See Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at
70-71 (concluding that the BWC bars anti-materiel biological agents, as well as those that attack
living things). The U.S. legislation passed to implement the treaty—regarded as a major expres-
sion of state practice under the treaty—is explicit in outlawing even anti-materiel non-lethal BW.
See infra text accompanying notes 146-48.
122. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
opened for signature April 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 (entered into force Dec. 2,
1983) [hereinafter CCW].
123. The treaty, to which ninety-seven states, including the United States, are party, is an
umbrella that now covers five distinct protocols, each of which may be joined individually: (1)
prohibiting weapons that employ fragments undetectable in the human body via X-rays; (2)
regulating the use of landmines, booby traps, and associated devices; (3) limiting weapons that are
primarily designed to set fires or to cause burn injuries; (4) banning blinding laser weapons; and
(5) addressing unexploded ordnance, the explosive remnants of war. See http://www.ccwtreaty.
com/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
Protocol II, as amended in 1996, deals with landmines, as does the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 241-44. Landmines, although commonly
designed for lethal effect, could also be engineered as NLW, and these treaties apply to such
devices that incapacitate or injure, as well as those that kill. Id. art. 2.1, 2056 U.N.T.S. at 242
(explicitly covering mines that “incapacitate”); CCW, supra note 122, art. 2, Protocol on Prohibi-
tions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 168,
19 I.L.M. at 1529 (implicitly covering even non-lethal mines) [hereinafter CCW Protocol II]. See
Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 68-69; Mark
Hewish & Rupert Pengelley, In Search of a Successor to the Anti-Personnel Landmine, JANE’S INT’L DEF.
REV., Mar. 1, 1998, at 30.
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Protocol IV to the treaty, concluded in 1995, confronts blinding laser
weapons.124 It is a response to the impending proliferation of laser
devices of various sorts on the battlefield. Such devices can perform a
number of functions, including range-finding, target designating, and
potentially blinding enemy soldiers.125 Under the Protocol, “[i]t is
prohibited to employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole
combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause perma-
nent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the naked eye or to the
eye with corrective eyesight devices.”126 The Protocol deals only with
systems that create irreversible, uncorrectable blindness and that do so
deliberately, specifying that “[b]linding as an incidental or collateral
effect of the legitimate military employment of laser systems, including
laser systems used against optical equipment, is not covered by the
prohibition of this Protocol.”127 Related laser systems, such as tempo-
rary “dazzlers,” intended to disorient and cause temporary loss of
vision, are therefore outside the scope of the CCW.128
Protocol IV thus reflects a growing global consensus—a sentiment
also appreciated in internal United States government policy129—that
some forms of non-lethal combat are no longer acceptable. Even where
the weapon is exquisitely “precise,” in the sense of being targeted on a
particular individual, and even when it results in “merely” a horrific
injury, rather than in death, this particular non-lethal weapon is widely
124. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, July 30, 1998, 35 I.L.M. 1218
[hereinafter CCW Protocol IV]. Currently there are seventy-nine parties to Protocol IV; the
United States is not a party.
125. Scott Gourley, Making Light Legal, JANE’S DEF. WKLY, May 24, 2000, at 22-26 (describing
multiple kinds of uses of laser systems on the modern battlefield); see also FUTURE WAR, supra note
6, at 59-61 (recounting use of laser target designators as NLW in Somalia, where some hostile
forces were driven to surrender when they realized they were caught in the unique red or green
laser light, even before any shots were fired); LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 91-95.
126. CCW Protocol IV, supra note 124, art. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1218.
127. Id. art. 3, 35 I.L.M. at 1219.
128. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 28-29; see also Agreement on the Preven-
tion of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. IV, 28 I.L.M 877, 882
(bilateral agreement to notify each other, and to follow appropriate safety measures, before using
a laser that “could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces” of the
other party).
129. News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, DoD Announces Policy on
Blinding Lasers (Sept. 1, 1995). U.S. policy bars lasers “specifically designed to cause permanent
blindness” but considers other types of laser systems (for detection, targeting, communications,
etc.) “absolutely vital to our modern military.” Id.
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reviled, and now legally barred.130
4. Law of Armed Conflict
In addition to these individual arms control treaties, the corpus of
the law of armed conflict—both customary international law131 and
broadly applicable treaties132—imposes other noteworthy limita-
tions.133 These more general standards apply to all weapons, lethal and
non-lethal alike, even those (such as the acoustic, electric, netting, and
blunt trauma projectiles noted above) that have not yet been subjected
130. Many people find this outcome surprising—even bizarre—that it would be legal in
some combat circumstances to kill an enemy soldier, but not to do lesser damage, such as blinding
him. See Fred Reed, All Weapons Produce Grisly Results, NAVY TIMES, Oct. 23, 1995, at 70 (arguing
against the “irrationality” of opposing some weapons as less humane than others, and asking why,
if we are willing to inflict large-scale deaths, we would deem it immoral to inflict individual
blindness).
131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102(2) (1986) (customary international
law “results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation;” it binds countries independent of their participation in or avoidance of any particular
treaty).
132. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287;
see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I
to the Geneva Conventions]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions]. The United States is a party to
all four 1949 conventions, but not to the two 1977 additional protocols.
133. Among the earliest modern rules of warfare was the ban on bullets with soft or
expanding heads, known as “dum-dum” bullets, which were reviled because they cause so much
damage and pain to the human body. Hague Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899,
1 SUPP. AM. J. INT’L L. 155-59 (1907). While this is hardly a “non-lethal” technology, it is relevant to
this Article’s investigation because these arms may find application in some contemporary
counter-terrorist applications (for example, in an airplane hijacking crisis, where an ordinary
bullet fired at close range might go right through the body of a targeted person and disastrously
puncture the skin of the aircraft; a dum-dum bullet in contrast, is more likely to stay inside the
body). The 1899 treaty applies only to international armed conflict, so bullets with expanding
heads may lawfully be used in MOOTW. See Robin Coupland & Dominique Loye, The 1899 Hague
Declaration Concerning Expanding Bullets: A Treaty Effective for More Than 100 Years Faces Complex
Contemporary Issues, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 135 (2003). The United States is not a party to the
1899 treaty, but U.S. officials have taken the position that the United States will generally comply
with its terms.
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to any dedicated treaty regime such as the CWC, BWC, or CCW.134
The most important relevant criterion here is the imperative of
avoiding “superfluous injury” and “unnecessary suffering.”135 Obvi-
ously, in any war, the parties deliberately inflict upon each other a great
deal of pain. Pain is ordinarily inherent in the effort to bend the
adversary to your will. But this agony is not without limit; the legitimate
objective is only to cause the enemy forces to submit. Anything not
designed and executed with that objective may be “unnecessary” and
therefore “excessive” and illegal. Such a subjective standard is all but
impossible to quantify, and it is often difficult to assess in any clear
fashion at all. Nevertheless, the legal standard remains as a touchstone
against which any weapon, including each NLW, must be assessed.136
A second crucial principle of international humanitarian law is that
of discrimination or distinction: a valid weapon must be designed and
employed in a fashion that enables it to be sufficiently precise, to attack
only legitimate targets. It must differentiate, for example, between
civilians and combatants, between a fighting force and those who are
exempt from attack (e.g., medical personnel, individuals who are
134. The “Martens Clause,” a well-accepted proposition of customary international law,
specifies that even if a particular weapon (especially a newly developed type of weapon) is not
specifically covered by any existing treaty or customary law, civilians and combatants nonetheless
remain under the protection of overarching humanitarian principles. Any weapon that is
abhorrent to public conscience is therefore automatically precluded. Robin Coupland & Domin-
ique Loye, Legal and Health Issues: International Humanitarian Law and the Lethality or Non-Lethality of
Weapons, in NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9,
§ 7.2; see also Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 132, art.1.2 (incorporating Martens
Clause into Geneva Conventions).
135. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 132, art. 35.2 (“It is prohibited to
employ weapons, projectiles and materiel and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering.”); Robin M. Coupland, Abhorrent Weapons and “Superfluous Injury or
Unnecessary Suffering”: From Field Surgery to Law, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1450 (1997); Robin M. Coupland,
The Effect of Weapons: Defining Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering, MED. & GLOBAL SURVIVAL,
Mar. 1996, available at http://www.ippnw.org/MGS/V3Coupland.html [hereinafter Coupland,
The Effect of Weapons].
136. Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A2; LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 83-91; Siniscalchi,
supra note 5, at 139 (NLW attempt to “humanize” armed conflict, consistent with the doctrine of
just war). The International Committee of the Red Cross has proposed to quantify the definition
of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering, focusing on factors such as field mortality of
more than 25%, hospital mortality of more than 7%, and infliction of more than 10% grade 3
wounds among survivors. Coupland, The Effect of Weapons, supra note 135; Fidler, The International
Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 86-88; Wallace, supra note 7, at 141,
157-61.
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surrendering, or those already rendered hors de combat).137 In some
large measure, the inability to be sufficiently precise—the fact that they
target wide areas or cannot be adequately focused on belligerents—
underpins the general antipathy to chemical or biological weapons
(which may drift uncontrollably from a battlefield into a city),138 to
anti-personnel landmines (which may remain active for years, explod-
ing when triggered by a farmer tilling a field, long after the soldiers
have marched away),139 and to nuclear weapons (which generate such
massive destruction that even distant non-combatants are inevitably
implicated).140
Corollary to these substantive standards is the procedural obligation
for each country to carefully assess the legitimacy of each of its
weapons.141 Under Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions,142 a country is required, before deploying—and certainly before
using—a new type of weapon, to evaluate in good faith its conformity
with the applicable rules of humanitarian law. It must ascertain, inter
alia, that the device will not conflict with any applicable arms control
treaty, that it will not cause unnecessary suffering, and that it can be
deployed in an acceptably discriminatory fashion. The United States,
for example, routinely subjects new weapons proposals to legal scrutiny
137. Parks, supra note 25, at 113-68; Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal”
Weapons, supra note 3, at 84-86; see Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 139 (suggesting that some NLW may
be deemed less discriminating, because they are designed to engage large groups of people
simultaneously, including both belligerents and surrounding civilians).
138. John Ellis van Courtland Moon, Controlling Chemical and Biological Weapons Through World
War II, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT, supra note 93, at 657; Richard Nixon,
Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and Programs, Nov. 25, 1969, 1969 PUB.
PAPERS 968-69 (1971) (rejecting biological warfare because of its “massive, unpredictable, and
potentially uncontrollable consequences”).
139. Gino Strada, The Horror of Landmines, SCI. AM., May 1996, at 4; INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN
TO BAN LAND MINES, LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2003: TOWARD A MINE-FREE WORLD (2003).
140. See Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8); Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict,
1996 I.C.J. 66 (July 8) (the International Court of Justice addressing the very limited circum-
stances under which it might be lawful to use nuclear weapons).
141. Duncan, supra note 9, at 26-29; Coupland & Loye, supra note 134, § 7.6.
142. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 132, art. 36:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.
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both at the stage where research and development are being under-
taken and at the end of the evolutionary process, when production and
deployment would be authorized.143 Non-lethal weapons from lasers to
pepper spray to acoustic waves have undergone and survived this
gauntlet.144
These critical precepts of the law of armed conflict are instructive for
the evolving consideration of new non-lethal weapons, but they are not
always as definitive as one might like. Many of the principles are
problematic enough even within their traditional spheres, and they
become even more strained when adapting to the unprecedented
challenges of asymmetric warfare, modern super-terrorism, and mili-
tary operations in urban terrain (MOUT). For example, the fundamen-
tal requirement of distinction between civilians and combatants is
muddied these days. If non-uniformed fighters mingle with a crowd,
stir it into a frenzy, and push it forward toward a U.S. military base, at
what point do the unarmed participants in the mob forfeit their
protected status by assuming a direct role in hostilities? Even more
unsettling, if a VMADS system is employed to clear civilians from an
urban area—surely a more benign alternative than destructive house-by-
house combat—how could those tactics square with the traditional
prohibition against directly targeting civilians and their property?145
143. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Directive 5000.1: The Defense Acquisition System (May 12,
2003), § E1.1.15, available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/50001.htm (last
visited Feb. 12, 2005); DoD Directive No. 3000.3, supra note 1, § 5.6.2; U.S. Dep’t of the Army,
Army Regulation 27-53: Review of Legality of Weapons Under International Law (Jan. 1, 1979);
Air Force Instruction 51-402, Weapons Review (May 13, 1994); Sec. of Navy Instruction 5000.2B,
Implementation of Mandatory Procedures for Major & Non-Major Defense Acquisition Programs
& Major & Non-Major Information Technology Acquisition Programs (Dec. 6, 1996), available at
http://www.ar.navy.mil/aosfiles/tools/ipt/html/pdf/38.pdf.
144. Hugh R. Overholt & W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: The Use of Lasers as Antipersonnel
Weapons, Sept. 29, 1988, reprinted in ARMY LAW., Nov. 1988, at 3; Joseph A. Rutigliano Jr.,
Memorandum for the Record: Legality of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Under the Biological
Weapons Convention and Its Implementing Legislation, JA02 (U.S. Dept’t of the Navy, Office of
the Judge Advocate General, Int’l & Operational Law Division), Oct. 22, 2002; J.P. Winthrop,
Preliminary Legal Review of Proposed Acoustic Energy Non-Lethal Weapon Systems (U.S. Dep’t of the Navy,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, Int’l & Operational Law Division, National Security Law
Branch), May 26, 1998; Coppernoll, supra note 40, at 118 (noting several legal reviews of
non-lethal weapons completed by Navy JAG office).
145. Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High and Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle of
Distinction 2-3 (Nov. 2003) (Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research,
International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative Briefing Paper); Human Rights Watch,
Briefing Paper, International Humanitarian Law Issues in a Potential War in Iraq 5-6 (Feb. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/iraq0202003.htm; Human Rights Watch,
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B. U.S. Law on Non-Lethal Weapons Development
In addition to these international law obligations, one domestic U.S.
statute relevant to non-lethal weapons must be highlighted. Under the
Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, as amended, the
United States is even more constrained regarding research and develop-
ment of biological NLW than are other members of the BWC regime.
This statute provides criminal penalties (fines and up to life imprison-
ment), injunctions, and forfeiture for developing, producing, stockpil-
ing, transferring, acquiring, retaining, or possessing any biological
agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, except for
“prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes.”146
The applicable terms are defined very broadly under the statute
(“biological agent,” for example, means “any microorganism” or “infec-
tious substance” or “any naturally occurring, bioengineered or synthe-
sized component”).147 It is clear, therefore, that non-lethal as well as
lethal substances are covered; that agents that attack humans, animals,
plants, or materiel are all equally barred; and that there is no explicit
exemption for anything like “law enforcement” or “riot control agents”
as under the CWC and its implementing legislation. Whether any
bio-related NLW programs could proceed under the rubric of “prophy-
lactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes” has not been tested. As a
consequence, the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate has stayed
completely away from any form of biological NLW.148
C. U.S. Law on Police Use of Force
In contrast to the above two categories, in which the potential
military applications of non-lethal weapons are constrained more by
Objects Attacked: The Need for Full Disclosure and Accountability, in NEEDLESS DEATHS IN THE GULF WAR,
supra note 78 [hereinafter Objects Attacked: The Need for Full Disclosure and Accountability], available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1991/gulfwar/CHAP4.htm.
146. 18 U.S.C. §§ 175-178 (2000).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 178 (2000).
148. See David Ruppe, United States: Pentagon Denies Biological Weapon Charge, GLOBAL SECURITY
NEWSWIRE, May 20, 2002, at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_5_20.html#13
(JNLWD has no ongoing projects within the realm of biological NLW, for anti-personnel,
anti-materiel, or other purposes; it has occasionally received proposals from Air Force and Navy
laboratories for work in those areas, but declines to fund them). But see News Release, The
Sunshine Project, US Army Patents Biological Weapons Delivery System, Violates Bioweapons
Convention (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.sunshine-project.org/publications/pr/
pr080503.html (watchdog group notes that Army has developed a new grenade that could be used
to deliver biological agent).
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international agreements than by federal statutes, the potential police
uses of NLW are regulated largely by domestic law: the U.S. Constitu-
tion, federal and state legislation, and case law. This Article cannot
survey the full array of state and federal legislative and judicial stan-
dards and interpretations reining in police violence, but a quick
overview of the applicable rules may help elucidate the relevant prin-
ciples that will guide law enforcement employment of non-lethal
arms.149
The analysis begins with Tennessee v. Garner, the watershed 1985 case
in which the Supreme Court decided that police may not use deadly
force to prevent the flight of an apparently unarmed suspected felon,
unless there is probable cause to believe that the suspect presents a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or
others.150 The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
seizures, the Court ruled, requires a balancing between the Govern-
ment’s interest in effective law enforcement versus the individual’s
interest in liberty. If a non-dangerous individual is suspected of a
serious, but relatively less hostile, offense, police may not shoot him to
prevent his escape.151
This finding was extended four years later in Graham v. Connor,152
where the Court declared that all claims that law enforcement officers
have employed excessive force (deadly or otherwise) in making an
arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen are to be
evaluated under the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” stan-
dard.153 This delicate and difficult balancing requires careful attention
to the amount, type, and duration of coercion applied, the importance
of the police mission in the particular case, and the individual’s loss of
149. See generally MICHAEL AVERY ET AL., POLICE MISCONDUCT: LAW AND LITIGATION §§ 2:18-2:22
(3d ed. 2003).
150. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); see also Vera Cruz v. Escondido, 139 F.3d
659, 660 (9th Cir. 1997) (defining “deadly force”).
151. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (“It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes,
but the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing
the suspect.”).
152. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
153. A different test, governed by the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process clause, applies to governmental uses of force against incarcerated
individuals. There, too, lethal as well as non-lethal weapons may be employed in some circum-
stances, but the balance is struck differently, and the custodians’ motivations (good faith, malice,
intent to inflict punishment) become more relevant. See AVERY ET AL., supra note 149, § 2:20;
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
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autonomy and bodily integrity.154
These cases helped inspire police forces across the country to
explore alternatives to traditional lethal force with extra vigor. If
ordinary firearms were now judged inappropriate for detaining many
fleeing suspects, what additional tools might be available to assist in
apprehending and subduing suspects?155
In articulating these legal principles, the Court was careful to note
that the determination of “reasonableness” in applying force posed a
unique challenge for police and for judicial review. No formulaic
“cookie-cutter” approach exists for these assessments. Rather, each case
must be analyzed individually, under a “totality of the circumstances”
approach.156 Furthermore, police should be afforded a benefit of the
doubt in close cases, especially where they were compelled to make
split-second decisions under the pressure of incomplete information
and potential hazard to themselves and others.157
Most notably, the case law has preserved a fine point of interpreta-
tion subtly different from the international legal standards noted
above. Police are constrained to use only “reasonable” levels of force,
but not necessarily the “least intrusive” means. In a situation where it
might be considered “reasonable” to choose any of a variety of possible
approaches (and to employ accordingly varied levels and kinds of
force), courts have not insisted that the officers start with the “lowest”
154. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (explaining that the test is one of “objective reasonableness,” in
light of all the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time, rather than focusing on the
motivations or the benign or hostile intentions of the officer).
155. FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 77. The Garner Court noted approvingly that many
states—and most individual police forces—had already barred the use of deadly force against
non-dangerous fleeing felons; only 7.5% of departmental and municipal police forces had policies
seeking to preserve the opportunity to use deadly force to effect an arrest of any felon. 471 U.S. at
15-19.
156. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)
(“The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or
mechanical application.”); Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
157. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (“The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.”); Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 691, 694-95 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that it was reasonable for police to use lethal firearms, and not to be equipped with chemical
mace).
The police may also benefit from a “qualified immunity” from suit, protecting an officer who
mistakenly, but reasonably, believes that a particular exercise of force would be legal under the
circumstances. AVERY ET AL., supra note 149, § 2:19; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Anderson
v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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level of compulsion (however that ladder of violence might be defined)
and work their way up only when the less powerful tools prove unavail-
ing. Of course, there may not be much leeway between the “lowest”
level of force that would suffice to get the job done and a “reasonable”
approach, but U.S. courts are now quite clear that the test is “reasonable-
ness,” not “minimal force.”158
This somewhat murky Supreme Court guidance has, of course, failed
to anticipate or resolve all subsequent controversies, and cases fre-
quently test the application of various forms of lethal and non-lethal
force. Regarding pepper spray, for example, there is no case law
supporting the proposition that use of OC is per se excessive, but in
selected circumstances, even this non-lethal form of police coercion
may be deemed unreasonable. If the targeted person is not resisting
arrest or is sprayed repeatedly, or if police fail to take appropriate
measures to ameliorate the effects of the spray, courts find liability.159
158. Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1994). The police used “pain
compliance” techniques, via “nonchakus” (two wooden sticks, connected by a cord, wrapped
around a demonstrator’s wrist) to clear trespassing anti-abortion protesters. Id. When challenged
by the assertion that it would have been more reasonable to drag or carry the protesters away, the
Ninth Circuit ruled:
Police officers, however, are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force
possible. Rather, as stated above, the inquiry is whether the force that was used to effect
a particular seizure was reasonable, viewing the facts from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Whether officers hypotheti-
cally could have used less painful, less injurious, or more effective force in executing an
arrest is simply not the issue.
Id. at 808; see also Scott v. Henrich, 978 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1992); withdrawn and reissued, 39 F.3d 912
(9th Cir. 1994); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983); Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 48 (7th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 81 (1994) (“[W]here deadly force is otherwise justified under the
Constitution, there is no constitutional duty to use non-deadly alternatives first.”); Brewer v. City of
Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000) (upholding jury instruction to consider “general
reasonableness” of using police dogs without specifying alternative courses of action); Forrett v.
Richardson, 112 F.3d 416, 420 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Fourth Amendment does not require law
enforcement officers to exhaust every alternative before using justifiable deadly force.”); Hegarty
v. Somerset County, 53 F.3d 1367 (1st Cir. 1995).
159. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (unreasonable to use pepper
spray against arrestee whose wrists were handcuffed behind her back and who was placed in a
police car with protective screen between her and the officer); Park v. Shiflett, 250 F.3d 843 (4th
Cir. 2001) (finding it excessive when police twice sprayed unresisting woman with pepper spray at
very short range); Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humbolt, 276 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2002)
(finding it unreasonable to apply pepper spray with Q-tips directly into the eyes, to spray at very
close range, and to refuse to provide water to wash out the eyes of protesters who were passively
resisting arrest, when other means would have sufficed to effectuate arrest); LaLonde v. County of
LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
2005] 751
Likewise, police are generally allowed to employ taser electric guns,
but in some circumstances, it may be unreasonable to do so.160 Bean-
bag munitions (or other reduced impact blunt trauma projectiles)161
and police dogs162 are analyzed in a similar fashion: case-by-case
determinations assess whether law enforcement relied unreasonably
upon these tools. Constraint mechanisms—handcuffs, hogties, etc.—
also pose the same inquiry; sometimes, but by no means always, it will
be deemed reasonable to confine a particular individual in that ordi-
narily non-lethal fashion.163
Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he use of such weapons [e.g., pepper sprays;
police dogs] may be reasonable as a general policy to bring an arrestee under control, but in a
situation in which an arrestee surrenders and is rendered helpless, any reasonable officer would
know that a continued use of the weapon or a refusal without cause to alleviate its harmful effects
constitutes excessive force.”); Gaddis v. Redford Township, 364 F.3d 763, 774 (6th Cir. 2004)
(purpose of pepper spray “is to give police effective options short of lethal force that can be used
to take custody of an armed suspect;” expressing doubt that use of non-lethal force against an
armed suspect would constitute excessive force).
160. See Russo v. Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1045 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that repeated use
of taser was not excessive, even when the suspect lay at bottom of stairwell and posed no
immediate threat to officers).
161. Bell v. Irwin, 321 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003) (record does not establish whether
bean-bag round should be classified as lethal, but where the alternative would have been use of
ordinary firearms, the accused “should have thanked rather than sued the officers” who used the
NLW munitions); Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 958
(2002) (objectively unreasonable to shoot, even with beanbag round, unarmed, mentally dis-
turbed man who posed no flight risk or threat to officers).
162. Jarrett v. Town of Yarmouth, 331 F.3d 140 (1st Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (police dog
trained in “bite and hold” technique does not constitute deadly or per se unreasonable force);
Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (dog is less dangerous than police
baton, but where duration of dog’s bite was excessive and police improperly encouraged
continuation of attack, use of force was unreasonable); Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d
919 (11th Cir. 2000) (police allowing dog to bite for two minutes was unreasonable); Vathekan v.
Prince George’s County, 154 F.3d 173, 179 (4th Cir. 1998) (failure to warn that dog would be
loosed was unreasonable).
163. AVERY ET AL., supra note 149, § 2:19; Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir.
2001) (use of “hog-tie” (binding ankles and wrists together behind the person’s back) is not per se
unreasonable, but is excessive where person’s diminished capacity is apparent and makes use of
constrictions more risky); Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441 (5th Cir. 1998) (hog-tying
a substance-abusing person and placing him face down in the back seat of a police car was
unreasonable); Phillips v. Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1997) (police used reasonable force
to restrain man with hand and ankle cuffs in prone position); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480
(11th Cir. 1996) (not unreasonable for police to restrain psychologically disturbed man in police
car with his feet on the rear seat and his head in the space between the front and rear seats, where
he suffocated due to positional inability to breathe); Garrett v. Athens-Clarke County, Georgia,
378 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (not excessive, where defendant strongly resists
arrest, to use pepper spray and to fetter him by tying his wrists less than twelve inches from his
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
752 [Vol. 36
Car chases demand a rather different sort of analysis because while
the pursuit is underway, there has been no “seizure” of the individual.
Only if police deliberately terminate a suspect’s flight, such as via a
roadblock (whether accomplished through traditional measures or
through modern NLW such as netting systems), would the Fourth
Amendment apply.164
Finally, courts are reluctant to second-guess police departments’
procurement decisions regarding the type of equipment to field.
Arming a police force only with customary lethal weapons does not
violate the Constitution, even in situations where NLW would have
enabled use of better, more deft techniques. The administrative and
budgetary choices not to purchase the equipment that would have
created a particular—and, in hindsight, quite worthwhile—law enforce-
ment capability do not rise to the level of unreasonable.165
Overall, the domestic U.S. law on police uses of force against
non-incarcerated individuals relies upon an ineffable Fourth Amend-
ment balancing test, demanding comparison of the competing values
of personal liberty and governmental law enforcement. There can be
no definitive formula for assessing the lawfulness of particular weap-
onry—lethal or non-lethal—as any tool could be wielded in an exces-
sive fashion in a particular situation. But courts generally provide a
“margin of appreciation” for the predicament of law enforcement
ankles); Carter v. Denison, No. 03-16509, 2004 WL 1895018 (9th Cir. 2004) (police were
reasonable in using OC spray and hand and ankle cuffs on clearly delusional woman who resisted
them and who posed an immediate threat to safety of officers).
164. AVERY ET AL., supra note 149, § 2:21; County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853-54
(1998) (evaluating high-speed chase of motorcycle along 14th Amendment substantive due
process criteria, finding no liability unless police demonstrated arbitrary purpose to cause harm,
shocking to the conscience); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989) (police use of
roadblock to stop a car constituted a “seizure;” next step was to evaluate whether that seizure was
reasonable under the circumstances); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (a seizure of a
person occurs only when police take custody or the person submits to police authority); Seekamp
v. Michaud, 109 F.3d 802 (1st Cir. 1997) (police acted reasonably to establish roadblock, even
though it resulted in injury to driver); Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (not
unreasonable for police to use deadly force after roadblocks had failed to stop speeding truck).
165. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994)
(“There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a
constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers.”); Carswell v.
Borough of Homestead, 381 F.3d 235, 245 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have never recognized
municipal liability for a constitutional violation because of failure to equip police officers with
non-lethal weapons.”); Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the U.S.
Constitution “does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all
foreseeable situations”).
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emergencies. Courts do not require reliance upon the “least intrusive”
NLW mechanism, so long as the actual force applied by the police rises
to the level of “reasonableness.”
IV. THE FBI AND THE DAVIDIANS AT WACO IN 1993
Sections IV through VI survey three representative—if peculiar—
circumstances in which military and/or law enforcement authorities in
different countries were called upon to apply various quantities of
physical force against armed opponents. In each of these confronta-
tions, violence erupted—many people died, and much property was
destroyed—and critics have questioned the tactics, weaponry, and
timing of the final assault, wondering whether some of the carnage
might have been avoided. The following three sections pick apart these
three incidents in some detail, focusing especially on the implements
wielded by the opposing forces and raising the question of the possible
utility of non-lethal weapons, especially new and evolving NLW technolo-
gies. In each section, the Article first examines the background to the
firefight; then describes the shooting itself; then inquires what differ-
ence modern non-lethal devices might have made.
A. Background on the Waco Confrontation
A tumultuous religious community known as the Branch Davidians—
many labeled it a cult—settled outside Waco, Texas in the 1930s. By
1987, this radical offshoot of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (which
emphatically denied any continuing connection) was led by the messi-
anic Vernon Howell, who later changed his name to David Koresh. As
the sect grew, and as Koresh’s control became absolute and bizarre, the
Branch Davidians developed an apocalyptic theology, with Koresh
prophesying the imminent fiery end of the world.166
The Davidians established their sanctuary, known as Mount Carmel,
166. See generally DICK J. REAVIS, THE ASHES OF WACO: AN INVESTIGATION passim (1995); FROM
THE ASHES: MAKING SENSE OF WACO passim (James R. Lewis ed., 1994); BRAD BAILEY & BOB DARDEN,
MAD MAN IN WACO 15-149 (1993); CLIFFORD L. LINEDECKER, MASSACRE AT WACO, TEXAS 42-153
(1993); JOHN C. DANFORTH, FINAL REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE 1993
CONFRONTATION AT THE MT. CARMEL COMPLEX, WACO, TEXAS, app. A (2000), available at http://
www.apologeticsindex.org/b10a03.html; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE EVENTS AT WACO, TEXAS, FEB. 28 TO APR. 19, 1993, at 14-17 (1993) (redacted
version) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO]; Activities of Fed. Law Enforcement
Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians Part 2: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Int’l Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Comm. on Gov’t
Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 156-58 (1996) [hereinafter Activities Part II]; Dean M.
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in a series of ramshackle buildings on a seventy-seven-acre compound,
home to more than 100 men, women, and children from a variety of
countries. Under Koresh’s charismatic leadership, they also accumu-
lated an impressive arsenal of $200,000 worth of weapons, explosives,
and equipment in anticipation of a millennial eruption. The inventory
included submachine guns, .50 caliber heavy machine guns, hand
grenades and a grenade launcher, AK-47 assault rifles, Ruger and
AR15/M16 semi-automatic rifles, Beretta semi-automatic pistols, quan-
tities of explosive black powder, and night-vision goggles. Eventually,
the accretion of all this firepower—especially the illegal possession of
automatic firearms and the purchase of several kits to convert semi-
automatic into fully automatic weapons—attracted the attention of
federal authorities. At the same time, reports—including some from
defecting members of the cult—about Koresh’s frequent practice of
child sexual abuse also aroused concern.167
After more than a year of investigation, approximately seventy-five
Kelley, Waco: A Massacre and Its Aftermath, FIRST THINGS, May 1995, 22-37, available at http://:
www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9505/articles/kelley.html.
167. Regarding the weapons accusations, see U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DEP’T OF
THE TREAS. ON THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, & FIREARMS INVESTIGATION OF VERNON WAYNE
HOWELL, ALSO KNOWN AS DAVID KORESH 73-74 (1993) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT]; EDWARD S.G.
DENNIS, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF THE HANDLING OF THE BRANCH DAVIDIAN
STAND-OFF IN WACO, TEXAS, FEB. 28 TO APR. 19, 1993, at 34-35 (1993) (redacted version); Materials
Relating to the Investigation into the Activities of Fed. Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch
Davidians: Comm. on the Judiciary Prepared in Conjunction with the Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight,
104th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-26, 213-36 (1996) [hereinafter Materials Relating]; LINEDECKER, supra note
166, at 8, 21-22, 180-81; REAVIS, supra note 166, at 33; Kelley, supra note 166. But see Moorman
Oliver, Jr., Killed by Semantics: Or Was It a Keystone Kop Kaleidoscope Kaper?, in FROM THE ASHES:
MAKING SENSE OF WACO, supra note 166, at 71, 83-84; James R. Lewis, Showdown at the Waco Corral:
ATF Cowboys Shoot Themselves in the Foot, in FROM THE ASHES: MAKING SENSE OF WACO, supra note 166,
at 87, 90-92 (describing ATF claims about the Davidians’ weapons violations as false or exagger-
ated).
Regarding the allegations of child abuse and child sexual abuse, see REPORT TO THE DEPUTY
A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 215-27; LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 148-49; BAILEY & DARDEN,
supra note 166, at 153-54; Gustav Niebuhr & Pierre Thomas, Abuse Allegations Unproven; Koresh Was
Investigated in Texas, California, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1993, at A1; Activities of Fed. Law Enforcement
Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians Part 1: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on
the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Int’l Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Comm. on Gov’t
Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 147-62 (1996) (testimony of Kiri Jewell) [hereinafter
Activities Part I]. But see Lawrence Lilliston, Who Committed Child Abuse at Waco?, in FROM THE ASHES:
MAKING SENSE OF WACO, supra note 166, at 169-73; George Robertson, Suffer the Little Children, in
FROM THE ASHES: MAKING SENSE OF WACO, supra note 166, at 175-80; REAVIS, supra note 166, at 229.
During the siege, investigators observed that the children remaining inside the Davidian com-
pound seemed to be well cared for.
LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
2005] 755
agents and support personnel of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms (ATF) entered the Mount Carmel compound on
February 28, 1993, intending to serve an arrest warrant on Koresh and a
search warrant for the illegal weaponry.168 Before the agents reached
the front door, the Davidians opened a hailstorm of fire; fusillades of
bullets were continuous in both directions for forty-five minutes and
sporadic for eighty more. By some estimates, 10,000 rounds of ammuni-
tion were expended in the shootout.169 Four ATF agents were killed
and sixteen others were wounded in the ambush; inside the com-
pound, there were five deaths and an unknown number injured,
including Koresh. An uneasy truce was brokered, and the federal
agents withdrew from Mount Carmel in shock. Shortly thereafter, the
ATF requested the assistance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), which then assumed leadership responsibility for future dealings
with the Davidians. By midnight, more than 300 law enforcement
officers were on the scene.170
168. REAVIS, supra note 166, at 34-36 (discussing shortcomings in the affidavit investigators
filed with the court to obtain the warrants); id. at 138-42; id. at 151-61 (describing the ATF entry
into the Davidian compound and the subsequent shooting); Activities Part I, supra note 167, at
221-32, 810-12 (reviewing sufficiency of affidavit); see also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 167, at
122-28 (discussing sufficiency of the evidence for issuing an arrest warrant on Koresh); John A.
Kolman, A Selective Analysis of Operation Trojan Horse Conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms, reprinted in TREASURY REPORT, supra note 167, at B31, B40-44; Final Raid Plan, reprinted in
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 167, at C25-35; Kelley, supra note 166.
169. The issue of who fired the first shot is still disputed, and much of the evidence is
equivocal or has long since disappeared. See Frontline, Waco: The Inside Story, Oct. 17, 1995
(transcript of PBS television broadcast), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
waco/view; REAVIS, supra note 166, at 138-42; Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 50-51; Activities
Part I, supra note 167, at 520-21, 632-33; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 173; LINEDECKER, supra
note 166, at 35; TREASURY REPORT, supra note 167, at 96-100.
170. Regarding the details of the February 28 shootout, see Materials Relating, supra note 167,
at 34-56; LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 22-41; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 161-77;
TREASURY REPORT, supra note 167, at 96-103.
Some of the ATF agents did enter the building during the melee, but they were driven back
by withering fire, including shots fired through the walls; the agents’ rules of engagement
prohibited them from firing indiscriminately in situations where they could not see their targets.
LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 27, 31; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 172.
After-action analyses concluded that the ATF had lost the element of surprise; someone had
tipped off the Davidians about the planned raid, and instead of arriving at a time when many of
Koresh’s men would be working outside the main building, unarmed, the law enforcement team
arrived when the group was well-prepared. In addition, federal agents were startled by the number
and firepower of the Davidians’ weapons, saying they were simply outgunned. Materials Relating,
supra note 167, at 34-44; LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 166; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at
162-66; Activities Part I, supra note 167, at 464.
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A fifty-one-day standoff ensued, with FBI negotiators engaged in
sporadic, maddeningly frustrating telephone negotiations with Koresh
and his subordinates.171 Over the first month, some thirty-five people
(twenty-one children and fourteen adults) were allowed by Koresh to
leave the compound.172 No shots were fired by either side throughout
the siege, but an array of law enforcement personnel unprecedented in
American history assembled outside the compound. On average, 217
FBI agents were present at the site each day, along with perhaps 500
other officers from the ATF, Waco police, the McLennan County
Sheriff’s office, the Texas Rangers, the U.S. Army, the Texas National
Guard, and other agencies.173
B. The Assault: April 19, 1993
Determined to bring the standoff to a conclusion, the FBI assembled
an assault force, medical teams, firefighting equipment, and a variety of
military and paramilitary vehicles, including five Combat Engineering
Vehicles (CEVs—M60 tanks with booms attached, instead of gun
171. Agreements were occasionally reached, and more were attempted (sometimes through
intermediaries such as clergymen, journalists, lawyers, local law enforcement personnel, and the
Davidians’ family members) to broadcast some of Koresh’s messages, to supply milk for the
children inside the compound, to provide medical care for the injured, and to release some of the
cult members. But far more often, the conversations were elliptical and Koresh’s promises were
soon broken. Activities of Fed. Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the Branch Davidians Part 3: Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec., Int’l
Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 258-61
(1996) [hereinafter Activities Part III] (roster of Koresh’s broken promises to evacuate the
compound); id. at 353 (during the standoff, the FBI held 949 conversations with Koresh and his
lieutenants, totaling almost 215 hours); see LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 200, 212-19; REAVIS,
supra note 166, at 200-14; DENNIS, supra note 167, at 6-26; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO,
supra note 166, at 10-11, 17, 68-73, 90-97, 194-204, app. C; Materials Relating, supra note 167, at
103-23.
172. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 11.
173. Id. at 10, 228-34; Reavis, supra note 166, at 263.
The military presence at Waco was substantial, but subordinate to law enforcement. Under
the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, and the Military Assistance to Law Enforcement
Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-78, the military is barred from performing direct law enforcement functions
(such as conducting searches and seizures) inside the United States, but can act in support of
domestic civil authorities by providing training, information, medical support, reconnaissance,
maintenance, and advice in extraordinary situations. That augmentation authority can be
substantial, in terms of both personnel and equipment. See DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 5, 33-46,
125-32, 138-40; Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 57-102; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO,
supra note 166, app. B (listing military personnel and equipment present at Waco); REAVIS, supra
note 166, at 122-23; Activities Part I, supra note 167, at 346-411, 839-45; TREASURY REPORT, supra note
167, at 211-14.
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barrels), two M1 Abrams tanks, nine M2AO Bradley fighting vehicles,
and two helicopters.174 At 5:55 a.m. on April 19, the CEVs advanced
into the compound, punching holes in the walls of the Davidians’ main
building and inserting CS tear gas—liquid streams covering approxi-
mately fifty feet in fifteen seconds—into first-floor corner rooms. The
original plan was to escalate gradually the amount of CS dispensed and
to inject it into additional portions of the buildings, incrementally
contaminating the compound over forty-eight hours until the David-
ians were flushed out. This action was accompanied by oral messages,
delivered via loudspeaker and telephone, assuring the Davidians that
the FBI was not undertaking a comprehensive assault, and that people
who wished to leave the compound could safely do so via passageways
cleared through the three-foot-high concertina wire barrier that sur-
rounded the installation.175
174. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, app. B. By one estimate, the
standoff was costing the FBI and ATF $1 million per week. LINEDECKER, supra, note 166, at 189; see
also Mary Jordan & Sue Anne Pressley, Cult Leader Wants to Die a Martyr in ‘All-Out Firefight,’
WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1993, at A1 (estimating the total cost to all law enforcement agencies at $2
million per day); Activities Part III, supra note 171, at 430 (citing cost of $5.9 million for the siege).
Some feared that the Davidians might have enough supplies, patience, and internal discipline
to be able to hold out for a year or more. Federal authorities contemplated simply waiting
indefinitely, but eventually felt they could not and should not delay that long. Negotiations had
come to a standstill, with little prospect for a peaceful solution; the welfare of the remaining
children in the compound was an ongoing concern; the endurance of the law enforcement teams
was stretched; and there was always the possibility that outside groups might arrive and try to aid
Koresh. LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 233-35; DENNIS, supra note 167, at 57; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY
A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 246-48, 260-61 (outlining the President’s account of the
considerations leading to the decision to proceed into the compound and other considerations
taken by the FBI); Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 138-46; Activities Part III, supra note 171, at
353-54; Activities Part I, supra note 167, at 944; Michael Isikoff, Reno, FBI Took Fatal Gamble, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 1993, at A1; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 242; DANFORTH, supra note 166, at
150-51; Kelley, supra note 166; Peter J. Boyer, Children of Waco, THE NEW YORKER, May 15, 1995, at
38.
175. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 110-11, 261-63, 276-307;
Activities Part I, supra note 167, at 642-51 (transcript of FBI telephone conversation with Koresh on
April 19, explaining the CS procedure); Frontline, Waco: The Inside Story, supra note 169; DANFORTH,
supra note 166, at 143-63; Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 124-46, 462-82; DENNIS, supra note
167, at 58-59; LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 235-38; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 248-53.
Federal officials debated whether Koresh and the Davidians were suicidal—the evidence,
including statements from Koresh, other Davidians, and outside experts, was quite contradictory—
and feared that an all-out assault might prompt the most extreme reactions. A more limited move,
by gradually inserting tear gas and compelling the inhabitants to exit Mount Carmel, was thought
to be less provocative. Activities Part III, supra note 171, at 354; DENNIS, supra note 167, at 6-8, 16, 22,
25-26, 36-39; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 50, 210-14; Isikoff, supra note
174; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 242-43. But see James D. Tabor, The Waco Tragedy: An
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The Davidians, however, responded with a barrage of gunshots. The
law enforcement officers did not return fire, but the CEVs and Bradley
vehicles bashed down more sections of the compound’s walls, and
grenade launchers shot 389 Ferret rounds with more CS into the
buildings.176 A pause followed, with sputtering attempts at further
negotiations and additional injections of CS. The climax occurred
shortly after noon. Simultaneous fires erupted in at least three loca-
tions inside the facility, and systematic gunfire from inside resumed.
The flames, fanned by thirty-mph prairie winds, reached nearly 2000
degrees Fahrenheit; they quickly engulfed the entire structure, and the
flimsy Mount Carmel compound essentially burned to the ground
inside forty-five minutes. The remains of seventy-five people (fifty
adults and twenty-five children), including Koresh, were recovered
from the ruins, many of them bearing evidence of having been shot at
close range (presumably suicide or execution by other cult members
during the fire). Nine Davidians somehow survived the conflagra-
tion.177
C. What Might Have Been
The FBI and the other law enforcement officers on the scene fired
Autobiographical Account of One Attempt to Avert Disaster, in FROM THE ASHES: MAKING SENSE OF WACO,
supra note 166, at 13 (concluding that Koresh would have surrendered peacefully if the standoff
had continued a little while longer); Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 150-51; Timothy Lynch,
No Confidence: An Unofficial Account of the Waco Incident, POLICY ANALYSIS (Cato Institute, Wash.,
D.C.), Apr. 1, 2001, at 1.
The FBI knew the Davidians had gas masks and other methods for protecting themselves
from the CS, but believed these would be of limited effectiveness. BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note
166, at 250.
176. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 287-90; DANFORTH, supra note
166, at 157; Sue Anne Pressley, Waco Siege Ends in Dozens of Deaths as Cult Site Burns After FBI Assault;
Davidians Set Blaze, Officials Say, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A1; Materials Relating, supra note 167,
at 128-38; REAVIS, supra note 166, at 267-78.
177. Frontline, Waco: The Inside Story, supra note 169; DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 169, 177-79;
REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 111-13, 295-98, 312; Materials Relating,
supra note 167, at 155-63; Pressley, supra note 176; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 253-57;
LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 236-40.
After the fire, investigators recovered 305 firearms from the compound, as well as 1.9 million
rounds of ammunition that had been expended by the Davidians or been “cooked off” in the fire
and 400,000 rounds of live ammunition. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at
309-11; DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 175; Memorandum to the Press, from Chris Peacock,
Director of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Treas. (July 13, 1995) (on file with the Georgetown
Journal of International Law); LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 243; Activities Part I, supra note 167, at
752-53.
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no shots during the April 19 tragedy or throughout the preceding
fifty-one-day siege.178 They were, of course, heavily armed, with an array
of powerful tools now standard-issue on SWAT teams, a number of
special accouterments for the occasion, and an assortment of non-
lethal weapons.179 For example, “flash-bang” concussion grenades were
available for use in any assault; the ATF had thrown some on February
28, and the FBI occasionally applied them during the siege to drive
indoors any Davidians who ventured outside into the yard.180 During
the initial engagement, the ATF agents carried non-lethal fire extin-
guishers with which to spray carbon dioxide at the Davidians’ many
dogs, deterring them from attacking.181 The concertina wire barrier
also performed as a form of NLW, designed to ensure that the David-
ians could not escape the blockade by shooting their way out of the
compound and equally to make certain that no outside reinforcements
could enter the facility to join Koresh.182
178. DENNIS, supra note 167, at 35. On several occasions, FBI snipers spotted Koresh at a
window of the compound and could have attempted to shoot him; their instructions, however,
were to refrain, in favor of continued negotiations. BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 207-08;
Richard J. Davis, Report to Dep’t of Justice & Treas. (Aug. 31, 1993), in U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
RECOMMENDATIONS OF EXPERTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AFTER WACO 22-23
(1993).
Some analysts concluded that the FBI did fire shots into the Davidians’ compound during the
April 19 climax, but careful (albeit belated) technical analysis of videotapes of the incident failed
to establish reliable evidence of any such action. DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 5, 17-29; Lynch,
supra note 175; John Dougherty, Armed and Dangerous, WORLD NET DAILY, June 6, 2001, available at
http://www.cesnur.org/2001/waco_june01.htm#Anchor-49575.
179. The FBI also attempted some sophisticated surveillance techniques in order to obtain
more complete knowledge about activities inside the compound. They smuggled miniature
eavesdropping equipment inside the building when they delivered milk and other goods
(although the Davidians may have detected and destroyed some of these devices) and employed
military-style “[f]orward-looking infrared systems” that can detect body heat even through walls
and doors. LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 214; DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 7, 38; Oliver, supra
note 167, at 80; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 107-08.
180. DENNIS,supra note 167, at 24, 35; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at
98; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 171; Activities Part I, supra note 167, at 471-74 (documents
authorizing ATF use of diversionary devices in the Waco action); Activities Part II, supra note 166, at
369 (questioning the safety of flash-bangs); DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 143.
181. REAVIS, supra note 166, at 138-39; Activities Part I, supra note 167, at 462; TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 167, at 96.
182. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 102; Materials Relating, supra
note 167, at 460. At least two outsiders did manage to penetrate the security perimeter and join the
Davidians early in the siege; officials worried that many others might have attempted similar entry.
REAVIS, supra note 166, at 247-51; BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 181-85; LINEDECKER, supra
note 166, at 198-99; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 83-84, 150-54.
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Bright lights, loud noises, and raucous music can likewise serve as
primitive NLW. The FBI sought to wear down the Davidians’ resistance
by depriving them of sleep with glaring stadium lights at night and by
exposing them to repeated playing of recordings of annoying sounds
such as dental drills, seagull squawks, shrieks of rabbits being slaugh-
tered, sirens, telephone busy signals, crying babies, trains in tunnels,
and low-flying helicopters, as well as jarring music including Tibetan
Buddhist chants, reveille, marches, Mitch Miller Christmas carols,
selections from Alice Cooper, and Nancy Sinatra’s 1960s pop ode,
“These Boots Were Made for Walking.”183
A variety of critical factors impeded the FBI’s application of conven-
tional deadly force throughout the ordeal. There were children in the
compound, as well as an unknown number of persons who might not
have been fully willing participants in Koresh’s vision. The adults
occasionally held children up to the windows, reminding law enforce-
183. LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 221; REAVIS, supra note 166, at 259-62; BAILEY & DARDEN,
supra note 166, at 245. At one point, Koresh responded in kind to the FBI’s recordings, by setting
his own (even larger) stereo speakers in the compound’s windows and broadcasting loud rock and
roll music back at the agents, in an all-night battle of the NLW bands. Frontline, Waco: The Inside
Story, supra note 169; FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 47.
Shining bright lights into the compound also served another purpose, beyond annoying the
Davidians and wearing down their resistance: it impeded the cult members’ sight lines, making it
harder for them to target the law enforcement personnel. REAVIS, supra note 166, at 261-62.
The FBI also shut off the electricity to the compound at irregular intervals, stopping Mount
Carmel’s lights and heat; the Davidians had only a limited capacity to produce their own electricity
via generators. DENNIS, supra note 167, at 14; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166,
at 67; Activities Part II, supra note 166, at 320. The FBI also controlled the telephone lines, allowing
the Davidians only calls to and from the law enforcement negotiators. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G.
ON WACO, supra note 166, at 29-30. Except by turning off all the electricity, the FBI was not able to
interdict the Davidians’ access to television and radio. On one occasion, law enforcement officials
worried that Koresh might have seen a provocative televised report that could have compromised
their negotiating strategy. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 167. But see
DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 38, 140 (equipment loaned to the law enforcement agencies from
the Air Force and the Army Special Operations Command included “classified television jamming
equipment,” which contractors operated briefly during the standoff).
Other tools of “psyops” (psychological operations) were also considered, including blowing
scents (cooking food) into the compound, moving the security perimeter erratically back and
forth, and broadcasting different descriptions of Koresh and the negotiations into the compound,
where other cult members would hear them. Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 535-37.
After the Waco incident, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh signed a memorandum barring most
forms of broadcasting of tapes of chants or other types of noises in future hostage negotiations. He
concluded that such tactics “have no legitimate basis.” Materials Relating, supra 167, at 763.
LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
2005] 761
ment officials of the danger of striking innocent victims.184 Also, the
Davidians were armed with powerful, long-range lethal weaponry,
requiring a safety standoff zone that kept law enforcement personnel at
a distance, enlarging the perimeter that had to be protected and
patrolled and requiring that fire fighting and medical staff and equip-
ment remain somewhat remote.185
How should we evaluate the use of tear gas in this type of situation?186
CS (actually an aerosol powder, rather than a true gas) is the leading
lacrimator, causing temporary but acute and disabling irritation to the
eyes, mouth, nose, and upper respiratory tract. It was invented by
chemists B.B. Corson and R.W. Stoughton in 1928 and by the 1960s had
established itself as the predominant riot control agent for use by
police and the U.S. military (including extensive application in combat
in Vietnam) and for personal protection by individuals. CS is less lethal
and causes less long-term injury (particularly to the eye) than any of its
predecessors, but its overall safety was still in question, particularly
when employed against children or pregnant women and especially
when used in confined spaces or for long durations, as contemplated at
184. DENNIS, supra note 167, at 22; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at
90.
185. DENNIS, supra note 167, at 60; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at
260-61; TREASURY REPORT, supra note 167, at 33, 44. One Davidian who left the compound warned
law enforcement officials that Koresh planned a suicide bombing by having a member of the cult
strap explosives around his waist, armed to detonate when they surrendered to the FBI. DENNIS,
supra note 167, at 37; Activities Part III, supra note 171, at 357 (prepared statement of Attorney
General Janet Reno).
Subsequent criticism challenged the delay in bringing firefighting equipment and personnel
onto the scene when the fire broke out in Mount Carmel. The trucks were standing by, but at some
distance; several minutes elapsed before they were called, and they were held at the FBI
checkpoint for a further period of time before attempting to suppress the fire. James R. Lewis,
Fanning the Flames of Suspicion: The Case Against Mass Suicide at Waco, in FROM THE ASHES: MAKING
SENSE OF WACO, supra note 166, at 115, 118-19; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note
166, at 111-12, 302-04 (noting that in total, thirty-one minutes elapsed between the start of the fire
and the beginning of efforts to fight the flames; safety concerns prohibited earlier action, and,
even if firefighting had commenced immediately, the shoddy construction of the Mount Carmel
buildings would have resulted in the total loss of the structure); Materials Relating, supra note 167,
at 161-62; DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 14, 145, 170; Pressley, supra note 176; Michael Isikoff, Waco
Siege Ends in Dozens of Deaths as Cult Site Burns After FBI Assault; Reno Says, “I Made the Decision,”
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, at A1.
186. Attorney General Janet Reno later recalled, when assessing the FBI’s proposed plan for
inserting CS into Mount Carmel, “I said, isn’t there something that you could distribute through
an airplane and just fly over and put them to sleep for an hour while we go in and get them out and
was told that there was no technology that could be provided.” Activities Part III, supra note 171, at
362.
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Waco.187 The April 19 tear gassing came three months after the United
States had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention; at that time, the
treaty had not yet been ratified, so it was not legally in force for the
United States. In any event, this sort of operation would have been a
valid application of a “riot control agent” for a “purpose not prohib-
ited” under the Convention, i.e., “law enforcement.”188
Could a more effective, safer chemical have disabled the Davidians
quickly enough to pre-empt their shooting at the FBI and enable an
effective surprise assault? In particular, would a more deft delivery
mechanism—i.e., something other than violently and repeatedly punc-
turing the walls of the main building—have quietly sedated or rousted
the members and not frightened them into believing Koresh’s asser-
tions that Armageddon was nigh?189 What if powerful malodorants had
187. Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 128-38; Robert Cancro, Letter to Deputy Attorney
General Philip B. Heymann (Aug. 30, 1993), in RECOMMENDATIONS OF EXPERTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS
IN FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AFTER WACO, supra note 178, at 4; DANFORTH, supra note 166, at
11-14; REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 264-67; Jerry Seper, FBI Used
Chemical Banned for War: Cult’s Children Faced ‘Hell’, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1993, at A1; Jerry Seper,
White House Defends Use of Tear Chemical; Calls CS an ‘Appropriate’ Weapon to End Standoff, WASH.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 1993, at A1; Activities Part II, supra note 166, at 384-401, 473-80 (assessing safety and
effectiveness of CS).
188. CWC, supra note 93, art. II §§ 7, 9; Activities Part II, supra note 166, at 394, 428-29
(testimony of Hays Parks).
189. Despite Attorney General Janet Reno’s anticipation that the April 19 CS operation
would be deft and non-aggressive (it was not supposed to be “D-Day” in her understanding), the
activity must have felt like a full-fledged assault to the inhabitants of Mount Carmel. REPORT TO THE
DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 267; Cancro, supra note 187, at 5; Materials Relating, supra
note 167, at 147-48; Activities Part III, supra note 171, at 117.
One of the most intense controversies in the Waco incident concerned the origin of the
deadly fire. Some alleged that the CS operation was responsible for starting the fire; either the
chemical agent itself or the propellant that accompanied it might have been flammable and might
have ignited upon contact with the Davidians’ lanterns. Alternatively, the tanks that knocked
down sections of wall while inserting the CS might have tipped over some Coleman lanterns that
fell onto hay bales that the inhabitants were using as shields. However, the FBI asserted that the CS
package was not flammable, that the fire began long after the tanks had withdrawn, that the fire
started at three locations simultaneously, and that people inside the compound were (dimly)
heard talking about starting a fire and seen making movements that could have accomplished
that. Years later, it was revealed that the law enforcement officers did fire three rounds of
“military” CS, which were known to be pyrotechnic, capable of starting a fire. However, reviewers
concluded that none of these rounds did, in fact, start a fire (they were expended four hours
before the deadly fire erupted, and none of them came close to the main building). While the
matter can never be fully laid to rest, the evidence now strongly points toward the Davidians’
deliberately igniting the fires in a final suicidal outburst. DENNIS, supra note 167, at 29-34; REPORT
TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 304-07, 329, app. D; LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at
246-48; R.W. Bradford, Who Started the Fires? Mass Murder, American Style, in FROM THE ASHES:
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been inserted into the building; would the people (especially the
children) have been peacefully driven outdoors? Is it imaginable that
biological means might have been able to befoul (or ruin the taste of)
the Davidians’ food and water supplies, a stockpile that, the FBI feared,
might have enabled the cult members to hold out through a year-long
siege?190
Alternatively, could non-chemical means have addressed the situa-
tion?191 If acoustic rays could have penetrated the walls of the buildings
and incapacitated the residents, would the Davidians have surrendered
meekly? Could deployment of non-lethal barrier materials—e.g., slip-
pery or sticky foam—have guaranteed that particular locations, such as
the compound’s water tower and watch tower, were effectively off-limits
for the Davidians, assuaging FBI concerns that such perches could have
been occupied by snipers?192 When one of the .50 caliber guns was
ominously propped into a window, could NLW have somehow neutral-
ized it in a non-explosive fashion, thereby removing one of the worst
threats, without Koresh even realizing that his deterrent had been
compromised?193 Could novel devices have rendered all the Mount
Carmel windows opaque, so cult members could not effectively see—or
shoot—out of them, thereby equalizing things with FBI agents who did
not know what was going on indoors and who were instructed not to
MAKING SENSE OF WACO, supra note 166, at 111; Lewis, supra note 185, at 115; Lynch, supra note 175;
see also Tommy Witherspoon, Former Federal Prosecutor Bill Johnston Indicted by Special Grand Jury,
WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, Nov. 9, 2000; Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 155-63; Activities Part III,
supra note 171, at 121-98.
190. The status of the Davidians’ water supply was an important uncertainty. The compound
had an artesian well from which water was pumped into a 1500-gallon tank. During the February
28 shooting, the tank was punctured, and despite improvisational efforts to patch it, it was capable
of holding only about 200 gallons. When law enforcement officials shut off the compound’s
electricity, the ability to pump additional water from the well was lost. Accordingly, Koresh
ordered severe measures of water conservation (rationing people to only a few ounces per day),
and during the few rainstorms in those dry weeks, the Davidians desperately attempted to capture
rain water. The FBI, however, mistakenly thought the water tower was still full. The law
enforcement officials contemplated tightening the stranglehold still further by puncturing the
bottom of the water tower or breaking the exposed supply lines leading from it. Doing so,
however, would have intensified the suffering of the children inside Mount Carmel. REAVIS, supra
note 166, at 261, 265-66; Activities Part I, supra note 167, at 106 (prepared statement of Ray Jahn).
191. “The Attorney General considered all non-lethal options other than gas.” REPORT TO THE
DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 270.
192. Id. at 109, 257-58.
193. Id. at 141, 260-61; Activities Part II, supra note 166, at 330.
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fire weapons into a room unless it was clear who was there?194
Could snipers have used a long-range non-lethal weapon to incapaci-
tate, but not kill, Koresh when he appeared at a window of the
compound, providing a moment for a sudden assault?195 Could mod-
ern electronic means have shut down the Davidians’ access to radio and
television—even if they had used their generators after the FBI turned
off the compound’s electricity—further isolating the cult and ensuring
that potentially damaging news broadcasts did not reach them?196 If an
assault had still become necessary, would it have been possible for the
FBI to employ non-lethal projectiles or perhaps electric stun guns, at
least until they were confident that a particular room or wing of the
building was not occupied by children or by other incoming law
enforcement figures?197
To ask these questions is not to answer them, either on the level of
the tactics and tools that might be available today (or in the future) but
were not in the inventory in 1993, or on the level of whether it would
have been prudent to attempt them in this particular situation. But the
questions provide grist for speculation about how the increasing pano-
ply of NLW might enlarge the range of options that law enforcement
officials could call upon in crises of this sort.
As discussed above, the operative legal standard for assessing a law
enforcement use of physical coercive power is “reasonableness,” an
elastic yardstick that requires case-by-case analysis, taking into account
all the relevant circumstances. Notably, police are not required to use
“the least possible” force or to escalate their application of power only
when lesser measures have proven unavailing.
Some outside observers charged that the ATF, FBI, and other units
applied excessive, unreasonable power; they wanted to characterize
federal agents as “jackbooted thugs” invading a peaceful, if bizarre,
settlement. But a true measure of the legality of the operation must
take into account the validity of the warrants to be served, the reason-
ableness of the belief that the Davidians were engaged in illegal
194. Mark Fischetti, Less-than-Lethal Weapons, TECH. REV., Jan. 1995, at 14 (describing an NLW
system using laser beams to scatter light through microabrasions on windows, automobile
windshields, and aircraft canopies, rendering the entire sheet of glass an opaque green).
195. See Davis, supra note 178, at 22-23.
196. See DANFORTH, supra note 166, at 38, 140 (suggesting that such jamming equipment was
available to the law enforcement authorities).
197. By some estimates, as many as half the casualties suffered by the ATF officers during the
February 28 raid may have come from “friendly fire,” bullets shot by other law enforcement
officers that accidentally hit their colleagues. Oliver, supra note 167, at 77.
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operations, and, especially, their massive, heavy weaponry and the
degree to which they had dug themselves into their fortification. The
FBI demonstrated great patience throughout the lengthy siege, finally
deciding to force a confrontation only out of frustration with the
sputtering negotiations and dismay at the prospect of an indefinitely
continued standoff.
Finally, it is noteworthy that U.S. courts reviewing a law enforcement
use of weapons do not ordinarily second-guess the procurement deci-
sions that created the available array of weapons at the authorities’
disposal. That is, even if hindsight suggests that better chemicals or an
improved array of other modern non-lethal weapons might have been
effective, police are not liable for their failure to have purchased those
devices. The legal judgment would inspect what the law enforcement
officers on the scene in Waco might have done, not what additional
array of possibilities could have served their purposes had such differ-
ent systems and technologies been available to them.
* * *
In sum, the Waco confrontation was an unmitigated disaster from
start to finish,198 the least successful of this Article’s three case studies.
The ATF and the FBI failed utterly in their objectives: the main
malfeasors were not arrested, the premises were not searched, and the
contraband was not seized. Instead, eighty-four people died; only
forty-four original inhabitants of the Mount Carmel complex survived.
February 28, 1993, was recorded as the bloodiest day in the history of
the ATF and perhaps the most costly day in all of American law
enforcement;199 April 19, 1993, inflicted lasting damage upon the
reputation of—and the public support for—federal authorities.200
This is not the forum in which to second-guess the original ATF
incursion, the FBI negotiation strategy during the fifty-one-day stand-
off, or the timing and planning of the tear gas operation.201 The
198. For stark criticisms of both ATF and FBI, at the operational and the senior levels, see
Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 4-11.
199. See Kolman, supra note 168, at B31, B35; Lynch, supra note 175.
200. Timothy McVeigh had visited the Mount Carmel site after the inferno and chose the
two-year anniversary of the conflict, April 19, 1995, as the inspirational date for his devastating
bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City. Jason Embry, Davidians Don’t
Like Connection to McVeigh, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD, June 14, 2001.
201. DENNIS, supra note 167, at 39-47 (assessing FBI negotiating strategy during the 51 days);
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 178, passim; Boyer, supra note 174, at 44-45; Frontline, Waco: The
Inside Story, supra note 169; Charlie Beckwith, What Went Wrong in Waco? Poor Planning, Bad Tactics
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concern here is with the lethal and non-lethal weapons employed, not
with whether arms could have been avoided altogether by snatching
Koresh when he was away from the compound202 or by adopting a
less-confrontational style.203 And one must remember that the primary
blame for the gunplay, the inferno, and all those unnecessary deaths
lies with David Koresh, the “sinful messiah.” He led his devoted flock to
accumulate and eventually to fire the vast illegal arsenal, and finally to
torch their home, consigning themselves and their children to horrify-
ing deaths.
The intransigence of the Davidians—as well as their foresight in
preparing for a lengthy standoff—created a most difficult and uncer-
tain situation for law enforcement. All paths were risky, and, even with
20/20 hindsight, it is difficult to discern any approach that would have
guaranteed success.204 Federal authorities earnestly attempted to save
lives—Attorney General Janet Reno’s personal commitment to protect-
ing children was well-known—and FBI agents demonstrated incredible
discipline and good judgment by not firing into the compound during
the fifty-one days or during the April 19 denouement.
The law enforcement agencies benefited from some basic non-lethal
weapons—e.g., flash-bang grenades, obnoxious sound and light projec-
tions, and simple barrier systems—but their available inventory was
woefully inadequate. Reno later reflected the obvious conclusion,
saying that if she had known how the Davidians would respond to the
tear gas injections, she would not have proceeded.205 However, she had
few good alternatives. Tear gas was just about the only available tool
that offered much hope of peaceably flushing the cult members out of
Result in Botched Raid, in FROM THE ASHES: MAKING SENSE OF WACO, supra note 166, at 67 (criticizing
the operation of the February 28 ATF action).
202. Officials asserted that Koresh rarely left the Mount Carmel compound before the
February 28 ambush, but critics noted several occasions when he had gone jogging or into town
alone or with only a few other people and opined that he could have been lured off the
compound, even at a late date, with the right approach. See LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 177-78;
BAILEY & DARDEN, supra note 166, at 161; REAVIS, supra note 166, at 180-81; Materials Relating, supra
note 167, at 27-28.
203. Prior to the ATF activities, the local sheriff had some relatively reasonable dealings with
Koresh and had established a relationship of some trust; local child welfare authorities had also
visited Mount Carmel twice, without much satisfaction, but at least without gunplay. Frontline,
Waco: The Inside Story, supra note 169; Niebuhr & Thomas, supra note 167; REAVIS, supra note 166, at
68; Materials Relating, supra note 167, at 742 (statement of Texas Child Protective Services worker
Joyce Sparks).
204. See Davis, supra note 178, at 2; Danforth Privately Praised Reno on Waco, NEWSMAX, June 13,
2001, available at http://www.cesnur.org/2001/waco_june01.htm#Anchor-49575.
205. LINEDECKER, supra note 166, at 248-49.
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their encampment.206
In the aftermath of Waco, Reno undertook to expand the array of
options for future incidents. She wrote a watershed request memoran-
dum to the Secretary of Defense and secured an agreement to expand
interdepartmental collaboration in the pursuit of advanced NLW.207
The Department of Justice had already initiated a small research
program in pursuit of non-lethals,208 but by teaming with the Pentagon
and the Central Intelligence Agency, much greater progress could have
been achieved. Merging the frequent experience that local and federal
law enforcement had garnered with simple NLW with the greater
technology and resources of the national security community might
have offered substantial synergistic benefits to both sets of partners.
One other reflection on Waco: it provided a sampling of both the
best and the worst environments for bringing NLW to bear. On the one
hand, the ATF had been ambushed, losing four agents to a barrage of
deadly fire, and they concluded that part of the reason for the fiasco
was being “outgunned” by superior firepower. That is surely a most
inhospitable setting for application of non-lethal technology; a natural
human instinct is to exert maximum force, to be your toughest, when
already bloodied in battle.209 On the other hand, the extended dura-
tion at Waco eased some of the logistical difficulties traditionally
associated with NLW. The fifty-one-day delay provided ample opportu-
nity to marshal, prepare, plan, and practice with the optimal muni-
tions. The Mount Carmel site was a sitting duck, serviced by adequate
roads, electric grid, and other supporting infrastructure. Law enforce-
ment officials did not have to choose between traditional lethal or
novel non-lethal arms; both sets of equipment could have been as-
sembled at leisure. While in some circumstances police or military units
may face a stark choice about what alternative pieces of equipment to
carry with them into sudden battle and what tactics to employ in
206. DENNIS, supra note 167, at 63 (concluding that “(e)ven if the FBI had been more keenly
aware of [Koresh’s] intentions, it was limited to gassing the compound as the only non-lethal
means of resolving the crisis”).
207. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LESSONS OF WACO: PROPOSED CHANGES IN FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
A16-18 (1993).
208. Activities Part II, supra note 166, at 586, 604 (statement of Larry A. Potts); Boyd, supra
note 9, § 5.1 (as early as 1967, the Department of Justice had undertaken to explore the feasibility
of NLW, but even in 1992, the program was described as “nascent”).
209. REPORT TO THE DEPUTY A.G. ON WACO, supra note 166, at 110. The FBI’s task in Waco was
made more difficult by the fact that the bureau entered the operation “backwards,” after an earlier
assault by another law enforcement agency had already failed disastrously, and emotions were
running high on all sides.
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split-second decision-making, it is worth noting that not all weapons
applications play out at that rapid pace.
V. THE RUSSIANS AND THE CHECHENS IN MOSCOW IN 2002
The second of our three confrontations flashed without warning
across the global consciousness in October 2002, as Russian officials
suddenly confronted a most urgent hostage/barricade crisis in their
nation’s capital. Again, this Article first presents the relevant back-
ground on the event, then describes its dramatic (and still not fully
understood) climax, before finally speculating on the alternatives that
better NLW might have provided.
A. Background on the Moscow Confrontation
Chechnya is a small (17,000 square kilometers), long-turbulent
region in southern Russia, with a population of approximately 1
million. It declared its independence in 1991, but, unlike other restive
Caucasian breakaways, Chechnya was not recognized by other states,
and, after a period of some disinterest and passivity, Russia forcefully
resisted its secession.210 Boris Yeltsin sent troops to Chechnya in 1994
to attempt to quell the separatist movement, but this campaign—
despite a crushing Red Army presence in the Chechen capital of
Grozny—resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Kremlin. When the
demoralized Russian troops withdrew in 1996, the Chechens formu-
lated a government and elected their own president. Under a peace
plan negotiated with Moscow, a decision on Chechnya’s final legal
status was to be deferred for five years.211
Soon, however, any semblance of law and order collapsed, and the
210. Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbijan were among the former republics of the U.S.S.R. that
became independent in the early 1990s. In contrast, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and a
number of other mainly Muslim provinces in the North Caucasus are categorized as “autonomous
republics” within the Russian federation. The population of Chechnya has been variously
estimated as being as high as 1.2 million (before the 1994-1996 fighting) and as low as 500,000
(today). CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 452-56 (2004); Yavus Akhmadov et al.,
Islam in the North Caucasus: A People Divided, at http://www.jmu.edu/orgs/wrni/islam5.htm;
Chechnya Photo Journal—Introduction to Site Visit, U.S. Comm. for Refugees, at http://www.refu-
gees.org/news/sitevisit/chechnya/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2004).
211. See generally DMITRI V. TRENIN ET AL., RUSSIA’S RESTLESS FRONTIER: THE CHECHNYA FACTOR
IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA (2004); CARLOTTA GALL & THOMAS DE WAAL, CHECHNYA: CALAMITY IN THE
CAUCASUS (1998); Q&A: The Chechen Conflict, BBC NEWS, Oct. 29, 2002; Elliot Stanton Berke, The
Chechnya Inquiry: Constitutional Commitment or Abandonment?, 10 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 879 (1996);
Thomas D. Grant, Current Development: Afghanistan Recognizes Chechnya, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 869
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country descended into a morass of religious extremism, terrorism,
banditry, kidnapping, and corruption. A series of terrorist attacks on
apartment buildings and other civilian locations in Moscow and other
Russian cities was linked to Chechnya, and, in 1999, Vladimir Putin led
a second offensive against the chaotic breakaway region. This time
Moscow succeeded in reasserting a shaky partial control, albeit at a
price of 80,000 Russian troops being deployed in the country in
support of a Kremlin-installed government. Widespread terrorist out-
rages continued—even after Putin grandly declared an end to the
military phase of the operation—with frequent large-scale deadly inci-
dents both in Chechnya and in Russia. After September 11, 2001, and
when links appeared between the Chechen rebels and the al-Qaeda
terrorist network, international pressure for restraint on Russia waned,
and Putin further strengthened his resolve to resist sovereignty for the
breakaway province.212
On October 23, 2002, some 800 people (mostly Russians, but includ-
ing perhaps seventy-five foreigners) were enjoying an evening perfor-
mance of the popular romantic musical “Nord-Ost” at the Dubrovka
Theater Center in southeast Moscow, only about three miles from the
(2000); Brian Glyn Williams, The Russo-Chechen War: A Threat to Stability in the Middle East and
Eurasia?, 8 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 128, 136 (2001).
212. TRENIN ET AL., supra note 211, at 35-48, 112-14 (noting that a variety of Russian military
and paramilitary forces were engaged in Chechnya, including forces from the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of the Interior, the border guards, the railway troops, and the security services (the
successor to the KGB, now known as FSB); lead responsibility for activities in Chechnya was
formally transferred from the Ministry of Defense to the FSB in 2001, and from FSB to the Ministry
of the Interior in mid-2003); Q&A: The Chechen Conflict, supra note 211 (recounting history of
Chechen separatism, concluding that a link with al-Qaeda “seems quite likely”); Chechen Rebels’
Hostage History, BBC NEWS, Oct. 24, 2002 (describing three major hostage-taking crises in
Chechnya and Russia in the 1990s), at http://news.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2357109.stm;
OLGA OLIKER, RUSSIA’S CHECHEN WARS 1994-2000: LESSONS FROM URBAN COMBAT 36-49 (2001)
(describing events leading to, and during, the second Chechen war); Christian Caryl, Death in
Moscow: The Aftermath, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 19, 2002, at 58; Sharon Liebetreu, The Moscow
Dubrovka Theater Center Hostage Crisis: Chemical Incapacitants and International Law (2003)
(unpublished seminar paper, Georgetown University Law Center) (on file with the Georgetown
Journal of International Law); Peter Baker, For Putin, a Little War that Won’t End, WASH. POST, Oct.
26, 2002, at A23 (at time of theater hostage crisis, 80,000 Russian troops were stationed in
Chechnya; at least 4,000 Russian soldiers and 80,000 Chechens had been killed in the fighting);
David Chazan, Chechen Rebel Divisions, BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/europe/2364271.stm; Sharon LaFraniere, How Jihad Made Its Way to Chechnya; Secular
Separatist Movement Transformed by Militant Vanguard, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2003, at A1.
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Kremlin walls.213 At about 9:00 p.m., early in the second act of the show,
fifty masked, camouflaged, and heavily armed men and women, led by
Movsar Barayev, one of the most fanatic Chechen terrorists known at
the time, entered the theater, seized control, and locked down the
three-story facility.214 The terrorists confined their hostages—a group
including the audience, cast, and crew—to the theater seats, emplaced
250 pounds of explosives amidst them, and threatened to kill everyone
unless Russia ended its military campaign in Chechnya, withdrew its
forces, and granted independence.215
Over the next couple of days, the terrorists released several hostages,
but there was sporadic gunfire, too, and negotiations with the Russian
Government and a variety of other interlocutors eventually stalled.
Moscow authorities reluctantly concluded that a peaceful resolution
was not forthcoming; the terrorists seemed fully content—and perhaps
determined—to play the role of martyrs. Many of the Chechens guard-
ing the hostages kept grenades and plastic explosives strapped to their
bodies, for quick, suicidal detonation in the event of a rescue attempt.
Around 3:30 a.m. on October 26, shots rang out from the theater; one
hostage was killed and a couple more were wounded. No one outside
could determine whether the threatened wholesale slaughter of the
innocents had begun.216
213. Most early reporting referred to the theater by its original name, the House of Culture
for the State Ball-Bearing Factory. See, e.g., Susan B. Glasser, Rescue Ended Days of Horror and
Uncertainty, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at A1.
214. Chazan, supra note 212 (identifying the group that seized the Moscow theater as “the
most extreme faction” of the splintered Chechen separatist movement). Movsar Barayev was a
nephew of Chechen warlord Arbi Barayev, one of the most notorious hostage-takers, himself
killed in the Chechen fighting in 2001. Q&A: The Chechen Conflict, supra note 211.
215. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, BBC NEWS, Jan. 15, 2004, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/
science/horizon/2004/moscowtheatretrans.shtml; Caryl, supra note 212; The Moscow Theater
Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey
Inst. of Int’l Stud., Monterey, CA ), Nov. 4, 2002, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/
02110b.htm.
216. The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare, supra note 215;
Susan B. Glasser & Peter Baker, Russia Seizes Theater from Militants in Bloody Battle, WASH. POST, Oct.
26, 2002, at A1.
The Chechens had announced various deadlines for the beginnings of the executions,
including one for the early hours of October 26. However, the gunfire heard that morning was not
actually the commencement of organized killings; instead, it was a response to one of the hostages
who, apparently at the end of his patience, suddenly shouted something and started to run. The
terrorists shot and killed him, also wounding two others. No one outside the theater, however,
could determine the scope and meaning of those shots. How Special Forces Ended Siege, BBC NEWS,
Oct. 29, 2002, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2363601.stm; Glasser & Baker,
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B. The Assault: October 26, 2002
Around 5:15 a.m. on Saturday, October 26, Russian special forces
executed their hastily drawn plan, pumping a still-unknown quantity of
a still-undisclosed chemical narcotic gas through the Dubrovka The-
ater’s ventilation system. Everyone inside—terrorists and hostages
alike—grew groggy and listless, quickly falling into unconsciousness. A
few of the terrorists, apparently, recognized what was happening, but
they did not have the time, or the mental and physical dexterity, to
detonate the explosives. Some fifteen to thirty minutes of exposure to
the chemicals rendered everyone inside the theater immobile—
though some of the terrorists positioned in hallways adjacent to the
auditorium remained unaffected.217
By 6:00 a.m., 200 of the Russian elite spetsnaz forces launched their
assault, barging into the theater from multiple directions by breaking
down a wall, plunging through the ceiling, and bursting up from the
basement. There was a short but intense firefight with some of the
terrorists who had lingered in the foyer and on the second-floor
landing behind the balcony and who were thus unaffected by the gas.
Grenades and small arms quickly suppressed this resistance, and the
commandoes raced to locate the unconscious terrorists inside the
theater. The spetsnaz immediately shot and killed them all.218
The troops next began defusing the explosives, escorting or pulling
supra; Steven Lee Myers et al., The Aftermath in Moscow: The Chronology; From Anxiety, Fear and Hope,
the Deadly Rescue in Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at A1.
217. Myers et al., supra note 216; The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215; How
Special Forces Ended Siege, supra note 216. Some of the hostages and some of the terrorists apparently
realized that gas was pouring into the theater through the ventilation system, but for whatever
reason the terrorists did not use those few moments to detonate the explosives. The male
Chechens immediately ran out of the theater auditorium to prepare to meet the incoming
Russian assault; the female terrorists may have been waiting for orders to trigger the explosives,
orders they did not receive before losing consciousness. Mark Wheelis, The Danger of “Nonlethal”
Weapons, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July/Aug. 2004, at 8; Michael Wines, Hostage Drama in Moscow: The
Aftermath; Hostage Toll in Russia Over 100; Nearly All Deaths Linked to Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at
A1; see also Susan B. Glasser & Peter Baker, Gas in Raid Killed 115 Hostages; Only 2 Slain by Rebels;
More Than 600 Remain Hospitalized in Moscow, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2002, at A1.
218. Myers et al., supra note 216; How Special Forces Ended Siege, supra note 216; Wines, supra
note 217. When the assault began, the male terrorists immediately left the theater chamber and
prepared to engage in a gun battle against the assaulting Russians; the female terrorists remained
inside the chamber with the hostages. In the end, the males were killed in the shootout with the
spetsnaz in the hallways; the females were then summarily executed while they lay comatose in the
theater. Wheelis, supra note 217, at 8; Peter Baker, 50 Militants, 90 Hostages Dead After Moscow Siege;
Gas Used to Subdue Chechens; Fate of Americans Unknown, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2002, at A1. One
officer explained the point-blank killing of the unconscious terrorists, “We were finishing off
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hostages out of the building, and engaging medical personnel at the
scene and across the city. Some 450 emergency teams were already on
standby. Ambulances and ordinary city buses were lined up to transport
those in need of medical care. However, the Russian authorities had
not advised the medics to be prepared for chemical casualties, and, in
the chaos of the moment, emergency triage procedures sputtered.
Doctors did not have enough of the key antidote, naloxone; they did
not know how much to administer; and, inexplicably, they were not
even told the exact nature of the sedative they were struggling to
counteract. This failure to disclose precisely what drug the assaulting
troops employed certainly impeded the effective treatment of the
patients and subsequent evaluation of the exercise.219
In the end, the death toll for the assault included all fifty terrorists
(killed by firearms) and 129 hostages (all but one or two killed by the
narcotic gas). None of the assaulting spetsnaz troops was hurt in the
fighting, but nine were injured by the effects of the chemical. Almost all
of the surviving hostages were hospitalized after the rescue; many
required extended treatment because of the gas and may have incurred
permanent disabilities.220 Supporters of the Russian Government’s
strategy claim, with good basis, that in the absence of forceful action,
the terrorists probably would have murdered all 800 hostages, and
perhaps quite soon.221 Critics argue that the use of the still-mysterious
those who had explosives on them because people could come to or, on the contrary, convulsions
could start.” Wines, supra note 217.
219. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215; Myers et al., supra note 216; Glasser,
supra note 213; Wines, supra note 217; Paul Wax et al., Unexpected ‘Gas’ Casualties in Moscow: A
Medical Toxicology Perspective, 41 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 700 (2003); Kathleen Knox, Russia: More
Than Two Days Later, Gas Still a Mystery, RADIO FREE EUROPE—RADIO LIBERTY, Oct. 28, 2002, at
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/10/28102002161259.asp; Mike Hanna & Elise Labotte, An-
ger Grows over Gas Tactics, CNN, Oct. 28, 2002, at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/
10/28/moscow.gas/index.html. But see Michael Wines, Russia Names Drug in Raid, Defending Use,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2002, at A1 (Russian Health Minister Yuri L. Shevchenko asserted that city
health officials had been adequately prepared for dealing with chemical casualties and that 1000
doses of the appropriate antidote were available).
220. Caryl, supra note 212; How Special Forces Ended Siege, supra note 216; Russia: Officials Raise
Hostage Death Toll, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Nov. 8, 2002, available at http://www.nyit.org/
d_newswire/issues/2002/11/8/7p.html; Wheelis, supra note 217, at 8.
221. Moscow Hostage Crisis: Criticism Mounts with Death Toll, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFO. RUSS.
WKLY., Oct. 30, 2002, at 10, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/229-10-pr.cfm; Baker, supra
note 218.
Uncertainty persists about the exact numbers of people involved in this incident. During the
chaos preceding and following the assault, some of the hostages may have wandered off without
being identified and accounted for; some terrorists, too, may have slipped away. There is no
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knockout gas may have been pre-mature; that the chemical was too
powerful, killing 15% of the people it was intended to save; and that
Moscow’s possession and use of the substance in this situation may have
violated its obligations under international law.222
C. What Might Have Been
The obvious “what if” question in this incident is to speculate about
any possible alternative riot control or calmative chemicals that might
have sufficiently disarmed the terrorists without killing so many of their
hostages. More generally, could other tactics and tools of assault,
including advanced NLW, have accomplished the mission with the
requisite speed and power to re-take the Dubrovka Theater safely
without the use of chemical agents at all?
Russian authorities belatedly announced that the chemical pumped
into the theater was based on fentanyl, but they provided no further
specifics.223 Outsiders have speculated that the sedative may have been
the derivatives carfentanil, sufentanil, or remifentanil, or perhaps a
chemical cocktail combining several such ingredients. Fentanyl is a
well-known, potent, man-made opiate, utilized with frequency as a
quick-acting, short-duration anesthetic in the operating room. It is
typically administered precisely, and only in concert with other drugs,
because it can dangerously suppress respiration. Sufentanil is ten times
stronger than fentanyl; carfentanil is ten times more powerful still.
Carfentanil is not approved for human use, but is administered by
veterinarians to tranquilize large mammals such as bison.224
precise count, therefore, of the number and identities of those confined inside the theater during
the crisis. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215; Caryl, supra note 212; Nick Paton
Walsh, Families Claim Death Toll from Gas in Moscow Siege Kept Secret, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 18,
2003; Russia: Officials Raise Hostage Death Toll, supra note 220.
222. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215; The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis:
Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare, supra note 215; Steven Lee Myers, Hostage Drama in Moscow: The
Toxic Agent; Official Silence on Gas Raises Vexing Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A10; see also
Glasser & Baker, supra note 216.
223. See Wines, supra note 217; Russia Comes Clean over Gas, Demands Extradition of Chechen
Envoy, RUSSIA WEEKLY (Center for Defense Information, Wash., D.C.), Oct. 30, 2002, available at
http://www.cdi.org/russia/229-1.cfm; Wax et al., supra note 219, at 701 (noting that the Russian
spokesman asserted that fentanyl “cannot by itself be called lethal”); Maria Granovsky, The Use of
Incapacitating Chemicals to End the Moscow Theatre Hostage Standoff: When the Right Action Is
Illegal 7 (2003) (unpublished paper, on file with the Georgetown Journal of International Law).
224. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215 (describing sufentanil as fentanyl
with sulphur added; carfentanil is fentanyl augmented by carbon; the greater power of these
derivatives means that a smaller quantity would have to be administered to have the desired effect;
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Fentanyl, sufentanil, and carfentanil are not chemical weapons like
mustard gas or nerve agent. They are not listed on the schedules of the
most tightly controlled toxic substances in the Chemical Weapons
Convention. They might fit the treaty’s criteria for riot control agents,
in that they are characterized by rapid onset and short duration of
incapacitating effects. Apparently, however, Russia has never registered
any of these chemicals with the CWC’s implementing organization
under the treaty.225
The leading measure of a drug’s safety and effectiveness in these
types of applications is its “relative safety index” (or “therapeutic
index”), the ratio of its “lethal dose” (or “LD50,” the dose that would
prove fatal for 50% of the people who receive it) to its “effective dose”
(the “ED50,” the rate that would have the desired therapeutic or
sedating effect on half the treated individuals). In general, the greater
the index, the safer the drug. For fentanyl, the relative safety index is
approximately 277, meaning that a deadly dose is 277 times greater
than the amount that should accomplish the intended sedating effect.
For carfentanil, a much safer pharmaceutical in this sense, the index is
approximately 10,000.226
Those statistics, however, are valid only for rigidly controlled applica-
ordinary fentanyl could not have been pumped through the theater’s ventilation system with the
necessary speed); The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare, supra note
215; Wax et al., supra note 219, at 702 (noting that the chemical administered in the theater was
not a gas, but an aerosol of fine particles, which behaves differently from a true gas); Bob Van
Damme, Moscow Theatre Siege: A Deadly Gamble that Nearly Paid Off, 269 PHARM. J. 723 (2002); Theater
Gas Was Probably Powerful Narcotic, Experts Say, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Nov. 11, 2002 (suggest-
ing that sedative was probably combined with halothane, another traditional anesthetic; the
combination may have been deadlier than either drug alone and would have complicated the
efforts of emergency crews administering antidotes), at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/
2002/11/11/8p.html; David Brown & Peter Baker, Moscow Gas Likely a Potent Narcotic; Drug
Normally Used to Subdue Big Game, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2002, at A12 (carfentanil is 8,000 times as
powerful as morphine); Caryl, supra note 212; Liebetreu, supra note 212.
225. See CWC, supra note 93; David Ruppe, CWC: Experts Differ on Whether Russian Hostage
Rescue Violated Treaty, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Oct. 30, 2002 [hereinafter Ruppe, CWC: Experts
Differ on Whether Russian Hostage Rescue Violated Treaty] (fentanyl was not declared by any country as
a riot control agent under the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention), at http:
//www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_10_30.html#11;“Law Enforcement” and the CWC,
CBW CONVENTIONS BULL., Dec. 2002, at 1-2; The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and
Chemical Warfare, supra note 215. But note that the CWC reporting requirement on its face applies
to chemicals used for riot control purposes, not to those intended for other types of law
enforcement applications. CWC, supra note 93, art. III §1(e).
226. The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare, supra note 215; Wax
et al., supra note 219, at 702 (providing slightly different index values); Brown & Baker, supra note
224. Notably, if the objective is to incapacitate everyone, instead of merely 50% of the population
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tions, such as a hospital operating room, where the status (age, health,
body mass, etc.) of the patient is well-known and the amount of the
drug that is administered can be carefully modulated. In the Dubrovka
Theater, however, exactly the opposite conditions prevailed. The hos-
tages who inhaled the chemical were of vastly differing and unknown
health profiles, and all were surely in decline due to stress, enforced
inactivity, and the absence of adequate food and water for fifty-six
hours. They were located at quite different places throughout the
theater, some closer to or further from the building’s air conditioning
vents, with the result that they inhaled radically different amounts of
the narcotic. They were unattended immediately after the exposure to
the drug, so when they became unconscious, some slumped into
awkward positions that constricted their airways, further reducing
respiration. And after exposure, they were not afforded prompt treat-
ment, and whatever treatment they did receive was compromised by
the Russian Government’s refusal to specify what chemical had been
utilized.227
The sorry excuse proffered by the Moscow authorities—that many of
the fatalities among the hostages were due to heart attacks, prior poor
health, stress, and other complications—may contain a grain of truth,
but the chemical and the Soviet-style secrecy that surrounds it obscure
valid conclusions.228
Could a better chemical have been employed? There is, despite
persistent research in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere, no
magic chemical bullet. No calmative gas can rapidly and surreptitiously
sedate or incapacitate a group of people distributed throughout a
building without killing some of them. No matter how great the
hypothetical safety index, the danger of unintended casualties in these
idiosyncratic, uncontrollable circumstances will always remain.229
(e.g., all the terrorists in a hostage situation), then much higher levels of the medication must be
provided, with a correspondingly greater danger of over-medication. Liebetreu, supra note 212.
227. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215; Wax et al., supra note 219; Van
Damme, supra note 224; see also Glasser & Baker, supra note 216.
228. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215; Caryl, supra note 212; Peter Baker &
Susan B. Glasser, U.S. Ambassador Critical of Russia in Hostage Crisis; Gas Secrecy May Have Cost Lives,
He Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2002, at A14 (quoting Alexander Vershbow, the American
ambassador to Russia, as alleging that more hostages’ lives could have been saved if the Moscow
authorities had been more forthcoming and more prompt in disclosing the exact sedative used in
the theater).
229. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215; The Moscow Theater Hostage Crisis:
Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare, supra note 215; Myers et al., supra note 216; John Bowman,
Russian Knock-Out Gas, CBC NEWS ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2002, at http://www.cbc.ca/news/features/
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Opaque legal questions, too, surround the application of chemicals
in this context. Was this truly a use of chemicals for treaty-permitted
“law enforcement” against terrorists, or was it more akin to a prohibited
“method of warfare” against armed rebels? The CWC does not define
the borderline between those two forms of violence, and the corpus of
international law likewise has trouble separating those sometimes-
conjoined twins. The scale and frequency of the fighting surrounding
Chechen separatism may seem sufficient to classify the struggle as an
“armed conflict,” at least for some purposes of international law. The
disparate locations of the plague of guerrilla violence—not confined to
Grozny or Chechnya alone, but spreading to Moscow and other Rus-
sian cities—likewise seem to implicate a characterization of the conflict
approaching civil war.230
If this confrontation is judged by the standards of armed conflict,
then the Chemical Weapons Convention would prohibit the applica-
tion of any toxic chemicals (lethal or non-lethal) as a method of
warfare. Even if Moscow officials believed in good faith that the
fentanyl saved lives, and even if they were correct in that judgment, the
world has turned its back on chemical combat, and some other
mechanism would have to have been found. In addition, the customary
knockoutgas.html; Guy Gugliotta, U.S. Finds Hurdles in Search for Nonlethal Gas, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,
2002, at A30; David Ruppe, United States: U.S. Military Studying Nonlethal Chemicals, GLOBAL SECURITY
NEWSWIRE, Nov. 4, 2002 [hereinafter David Ruppe, United States: U.S. Military Studying Nonlethal
Chemicals], at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_11_4.html#7; see also The
Search for a Knockout Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at A26; Judith Miller & William J. Broad,
Hostage Drama in Moscow: The Toxic Agent; U.S. Suspects Opiate in Gas in Russia Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2002, at A1.
230. See Cherylyn Brandt Ahrens, Note, Chechnya and the Right of Self-Determination, 42 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 575 (2004); “Law Enforcement” and the CWC, supra note 225, at 1; Ruppe, CWC:
Experts Differ on Whether Russian Hostage Rescue Violated Treaty, supra note 225; Ruppe, United States:
U.S. Military Studying Nonlethal Chemicals, supra note 229; Knox, supra note 219
Under the 1977 Protocol II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the rules for
“non-international armed conflicts” apply to fighting involving “dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations” but not to
“situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of
violence and other acts of a similar nature.” Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, supra note
132, art. 1.1, 1.2; see also Paola Gaeta, The Armed Conflict in Chechnya Before the Russian Constitutional
Court, 7 EUR. J. INT’L LAW 563, 568 (1996) (noting that Russian Constitutional Court has
determined that the conflict in Chechnya is a civil war under Protocol II, as a prolonged internal
conflict having great intensity). Of course, a “law enforcement” operation could occur even in the
midst of an “internal armed conflict,” so even if there were greater clarity about the legal
characterization of the overall Chechen conflict, that would not by itself resolve the question of
Russia’s compliance with the CWC in the Moscow theater incident.
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international law of armed combat would bring to bear the require-
ments for avoiding “unnecessary suffering,” for “discriminating” be-
tween combatants and civilians, and for refraining from attacking
fighters who had already been wounded or otherwise rendered unable
to resist.
Alternatively, if this were judged to be a law enforcement operation,
instead of combat, the legality under the CWC is still dubious. One
might like to look more closely at the Russian chemical inventory itself:
what, exactly, was this substance or combination of pharmaceuticals?
Could it have been, as some have speculated, an entirely new member
of the remarkable fentanyl family, a variety unknown in the West?231
What quantities of the drug have been produced and has Russia ever
considered reporting it under CWC Article III.1(e)?232 Has it ever been
used elsewhere? (There have been occasional murky reports of other
applications of unknown chemicals in domestic riot control operations
in the former Soviet Union.)233 How quickly do the disabling physical
symptoms of the drug disappear? (Many hostages required extensive
hospitalization and may suffer years of lingering effects.) And how
would it fit inside the CWC’s definition of legitimate riot control agents
as those that lose their effect “within a short time following termination
of exposure”?234
Moreover, one would like to know more about the administrative
side: which entity or entities within the Russian bureaucracy are respon-
sible for this drug? Was it created for, held by, and applied by “military”
forces (making it look more like a tool of war) or “police” forces
(making it appear more akin to counter-terrorism and domestic law
enforcement)? The spetsnaz “Alpha Team” that conducted the assault
on the theater is a commando unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB,
the successor to the KGB); there were also plenty of local police and
other law enforcement teams engaged in the operation, a combination
231. The Moscow Theatre Siege—Transcript, supra note 215.
232. Global Security Newswire, Russia: U.S. Believes Russian Gas Was an Opiate (Oct. 29, 2002),
at http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/newswires/2002_10_29.html#9; Ruppe, CWC: Experts
Differ on Whether Russian Hostage Rescue Violated Treaty, supra note 225.
233. Leader in Soviet Georgia Says Gas Killed Some Protesters, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 1989, at A10.
234. CWC, supra note 93, art. II § 7; see Glasser & Baker, supra note 216; Wax et al., supra note
219; Caryl, supra note 212. If the chemical (as in the Moscow theater incident) is employed for “law
enforcement” purposes other than “riot control,” perhaps the CWC requirement of short-
duration effects is less applicable. See Ruppe, CWC: Experts Differ on Whether Russian Hostage Rescue
Violated Treaty, supra note 225.
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that creates an additional film of legal ambiguity.235
NLW proponents would also question whether other, non-chemical
assault tactics might have ameliorated the situation. Instead of (or in
addition to) pumping some form of fentanyl into the theater, what if
other non-lethal tools had been available? Could an effective acoustic
system have penetrated the walls of the theater and suddenly incapaci-
tated the terrorists; could a millimeter wave device, such as the Active
Denial System, have immobilized them quickly enough to preclude
their detonation of their explosives? One suspects that even vastly
improved “flash-bangs,” intended to stun the targets by sudden bursts
of dazzling light and sound, would have been insufficient here—well-
trained, disciplined, and committed terrorists might have triggered
their doomsday on mere seconds’ notice.236 Likewise, even powerful
malodorants might not have driven the Chechens out of the theater
before carrying out their threats. In any event, after the spetsnaz found
the unconscious terrorists inside the theater, why did they peremptorily
execute them, instead of immobilizing them with sticky foam, modern
plastic handcuffs, or other secure, easy-to-apply non-lethal restraint
systems, disarming them, and taking them prisoner?237
* * *
In sum, the Moscow confrontation is still difficult to assess. The
surreptitious injection of a supposedly non-lethal knockout gas killed
235. Spetsnaz: Russia’s Elite Force, BBC NEWS, Oct. 28, 2002 (noting that the 1500-2000 man
counter-terrorist Alpha unit has seen extensive action in Afghanistan and Chechnya), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2369273.stm; Gas “Killed Moscow Hostages,” BBC NEWS, Oct.
27, 2002 (quoting Lev Fyodorov, president of Russia’s Union for Chemical Safety, as claiming that
“[t]his was a military operation using non-lethal chemical weapons developed during the cold
war. . . . They would have been intended for a military opponent.”), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/world/europe/2365383; OLIKER, supra note 212, at 8, 28, 60 (describing use of spetsnaz in
combat in Chechnya); Ruppe, CWC: Experts Differ on Whether Russian Hostage Rescue Violated Treaty,
supra note 225; Ruppe, United States: U.S. Military Studying Nonlethal Chemicals, supra note 229; Mark
Wheelis, Will the New Biology Lead to New Weapons?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, July/Aug. 2004, at 6;
Wheelis, supra note 217.
236. See Spetsnaz: Russia’s Elite Force, supra note 235 (observing that the spetsnaz forces lack
much of the sophisticated gear (e.g., night vision goggles and other surveillance equipment) that
is standard among Western elite corps).
237. From Idea to Invention, Techbeat (Nat’l Law Enforcement & Corrections Tech. Ctr.,
National Institute of Justice), Spring 2001 (describing advances in handcuff mechanisms and in
restraint systems that can quickly and reliably secure suspects); see Caryl, supra note 212 (taking the
terrorists as prisoners for interrogation, instead of killing them, might have produced consider-
able intelligence value). Killing an unconscious combatant who has already been rendered hors de
combat may also constitute a violation of the law of armed conflict.
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over 125 hostages and seriously injured scores more of the very people
it was supposed to help rescue. On the other hand, some 700 Russians
and others survived their encounter with a most brutal terrorist—a far
better outcome than most would have predicted on October 25, 2002.
The theater building was damaged by the assault and the shootout, but
none of the terrorists’ 250 pounds of explosives detonated, precluding
a much wider swath of destruction. All of the terrorists, but none of the
spetsnaz troops, perished.
Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. Ambassador to
Russia Alexander Vershbow pronounced the raid a qualified success,
but only when judged by the most desperate criteria, comparing the
outcome to the complete disaster that could have eventuated. Both
governments also rightly assigned the real culpability for the disaster to
Barayev and the scourge of terrorism.238
Some of the fatalities could surely have been avoided if not for the
dark Soviet propensity for secrecy. Even if legitimate concerns for
operational security might have inhibited informing medical teams in
advance about what tactics the special forces would employ, there was
no valid reason to refuse to disclose, after the assault, exactly which
chemicals had been used, in what concentrations, and what antidotes
might prove most availing. And the continuing secrecy over hospitaliza-
tions, morgue activities, and private lawsuits only fuels conspiracy
theories and impedes intelligent “after action” analysis of lessons
learned.239 Shooting the unconscious terrorists where they lay instead
of disarming them and taking them prisoner also reflects a most
troubling tactical choice and perhaps an under-appreciation for mod-
ern NLW tools that could immobilize and render harmless even
desperadoes who had strapped explosives to their own bodies.
Given the fanaticism of the Chechens, it may have been impossible to
negotiate a peaceful outcome: nothing short of precipitous Russian
capitulation would likely have ameliorated the crisis. But Russia is not
the only place that such a scenario could have taken place: hostage/
barricade situations of varying scales are all too common, inspired by
terrorism, organized crime, domestic disputes, and drug impairments.
In the same vein, future confrontations of this sort may echo the
Moscow experience by engaging, in some fashion, both the military
special forces and the domestic law enforcement apparatus. It is still
not clear how well the Dubrovka Theater incident fits into the neat
238. Baker, supra note 218.
239. Glasser & Baker, supra note 216.
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dichotomies of military versus law enforcement and international
versus internal. Nor is it yet clear how well Moscow’s behavior, both
before and during the confrontation, complied with the obligations of
international law under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The hope that technology—especially modern biochemistry—can
provide a better solution to these tragedies-in-the-making is equally
widespread. In these agonizing scenarios, we earnestly wish for some
magic calmative potion that would instantly, safely, and totally incapaci-
tate the combatants, a lightning strike that could free the hostages,
defuse the explosives, seize the firearms, and incarcerate the malefac-
tors. But that sort of anesthetic pixie dust is currently unavailable; in
fact, it may never be achievable. Although it is always risky to venture
that something could “never” be invented, Elisa Harris may have it
right, at least for now, when she asserts, “The whole idea of nonlethal
chemical warfare agents is a myth. Anyone who tries to suggest other-
wise is ignoring the evidence.”240
VI. THE BRITISH AND THE IRAQIS IN BASRA IN 2003
Finally, the Article turns to a third case study, an instance of conven-
tional, or nearly conventional, military combat—when modern troops
are engaged in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), many of
the ordinary verities of warfare are suspended or modified. The wres-
tling in Iraq at the outset of Gulf War II revealed many of the
characteristic difficulties of fighting in an environment in which armed
enemy troops are intermingled with civilians and with irregular, non-
uniformed—but no less deadly—opponents, and in which the troops’
assigned mission may creep inexorably forward.
A. Background on the Basra Confrontation
Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, is situated in the southeast of the
country at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It com-
mands Iraq’s only port (on the Persian Gulf), and its population
(variously estimated as between one and two million) is squeezed
between Kuwait to the south, Iran to the east, and the rich Rumeila oil
fields to the west. Importantly, sixty percent of the residents are Shia
Moslems, the sect which is numerically more common in Iraq, but
which was for decades repressed by Saddam Hussein and his predomi-
240. Gugliotta, supra note 229 (quoting Elisa Harris, former Clinton Administration National
Security Council official).
LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
2005] 781
nantly northern Sunni Moslem brethren.
In the run-up to the 2003 invasion, the United States, the United
Kingdom, and their coalition partners fashioned a battle strategy
emphasizing speed and flexibility, as well as overpowering force, with
the intention of stampeding into the capital as quickly as possible and
deposing Saddam Hussein. An immediate objective in that progression
was to pounce on Basra; the U.S. forces would quickly dispatch any
organized resistance in the area, then advance north toward Baghdad,
leaving to the British forces the tasks of quelling any lingering pockets
of resistance in the south and occupying Basra. The expectation was
that an immediate show of overwhelming force (the “shock and awe”
campaign), coupled with local antipathy to the regime, might lead to a
prompt negotiated surrender of Basra within only a day or two,
obviating the need for prolonged localized fighting. Basra could then
become a shining illustration of the Iraqis’ anti-Saddam fervor, of
Westerners greeted as liberators, and of the benefits a city could obtain
through cooperation with the foreigners.241
Basra was defended by a surprisingly small force, consisting of
perhaps only one or two thousand fighters, including remnants of the
51st Mechanized Division, armed with second-class equipment, such as
outmoded Soviet-era T55 tanks. These less-than-frontline troops were
supplemented by a few hundred fedayeen, the irregular militia of poorly
trained but ruthless and fanatic devotees of Saddam Hussein and his
Ba’ath party. In command of the city was the notorious Ali Hassan
al-Majid, a cousin of the dictator who had earned the nickname
“Chemical Ali” for his brutal 1988 campaign, featuring illegal use of
chemical weapons against the rebellious Kurds in the northern part of
the country.242
The coalition’s initial concept of operations called for the British to
advance up to, but not into, Basra; the forces would pause there,
anticipating a surrender of the city, perhaps to be spurred by a
spontaneous, indigenous Shia uprising against their long-time repres-
sors. At all costs, the invaders wanted to avoid the specter of prolonged
241. Victor Mallet et al., Attack on Basra Begins with Land and Sea Assault, FIN. TIMES (London),
Mar. 21, 2003, at 4; Richard Norton-Taylor et al., British Elite Troops Push Towards Basra, GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 21, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/
0,,918817,00.html.
242. Norton-Taylor et al., supra note 241; Dexter Filkins, A Nation at War: Southern Front; As
Many Iraqis Give Up, Some Fiercely Resist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at B1; ‘High Risk’ as Desert Rats
Battle for Basra, YORKSHIRE POST, Mar. 25, 2003; Keith B. Richburg & Susan B. Glasser, Iraqi Tanks
Try to Break Out of Basra: British Troops Bombard City, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2003, at A23.
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street fighting in Basra: the laborious process of a house-by-house
campaign against the fedayeen would be both costly in terms of British
soldiers’ lives and devastating to the process of building Iraqi support.
If the Iraqis’ city were turned into a battleground, the residents would
surely despise an army that succeeded in “liberating” them only by
destroying their homes and businesses and killing innocent civilians.243
The first phases of the war went basically according to plan: the
ground invasion began on March 20, 2003, and within about twenty-
four hours, U.S. and U.K. forces had traversed the twenty miles from
the Kuwaiti border to the outskirts of Basra. With the British reluctant
to jump into the city or to engage in large-scale artillery or airborne
strikes against it, the defenders adopted a variety of tactics of “asymmet-
ric” warfare, employing guerrilla, terrorist, and patently illegal maneu-
vers: they co-located military and civilian sites, placing tanks in residen-
tial neighborhoods, military headquarters next to schools, and armed
troops at hospitals; they abandoned military or even paramilitary garb,
dressing and fighting as civilians; they conducted fake surrenders,
amounting to perfidy under the laws of armed conflict; and they used
civilians as human shields, grabbing children as cover to preclude
British fire.
The coalition forces outside the city occasionally called in targeted
bombing, with one such attack destroying the local headquarters of the
Ba’ath party (while preserving basically unharmed a neighboring school
on one side of the building and a hospital on the other). The strikes
also destroyed a television tower that the regime had used to broadcast
anti-Western propaganda to the population, some bridges over the
region’s waterways, the telephone exchange, and electrical facilities.
An odd stalemate then ensued. Some 25,000 coalition troops con-
trolled vast areas of the southern countryside and neighboring desert,
but few of the urban areas, and none of Basra. The southern oil fields
were protected because they were taken so quickly that the retreating
Iraqis had no opportunity to set more than a few wells on fire. Some
disaffected or demoralized Iraqi troops surrendered, including one
rather substantial group of the 51st Infantry Division, which seemed to
augur a repeat of the massive surrenders that had occurred in 1991.
Overall, though, the Iraqi troops fought better and surrendered less
243. Norton-Taylor et al., supra note 241; Victor Mallet et al., Division of 8,000 Iraqi Troops
Surrenders; Battle for Basra, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 22, 2003; Patrick E. Tyler, Allies Outside Biggest
Southern City; Firefights on the Route to Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2003, at A1; Dexter Filkins, A
Nation at War: Southern Front; Eyes on Capital, U.S. Troops Flow Past the South, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2003, at B1.
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often than anticipated.244
For two weeks, the standoff persisted, with the British incrementally
tightening their grip and the defenders still entrenched within. The
British sometimes crept closer, and their air-strikes and artillery firing
sometimes had an impact. For example, on March 28, accurate intelli-
gence directed U.S. F15E bombers to a building where the fedayeen
were meeting, and 200 fighters were killed. On April 5, prompted by
another tip, British aircraft battered the home of “Chemical Ali.” Early
reports suggested that the despot had been killed, but that turned out
to be erroneous; still, it was an important psychological victory, under-
scoring the new vulnerability of even the top Ba’ath leadership.245
Eventually, the British began probing raids into the city, zipping
down Basra’s main corridors in armored vehicles, engaging in brief
firefights, and withdrawing. With these tactics, the British were able to
demonstrate that the defenders no longer exerted total control over
Basra; equally important, they were able to gather information about
concentrations of enemy units (to provide targets for subsequent air
and artillery fire), to destroy at least a handful of Iraqi tanks and other
military equipment, and—by ostentatiously pulling down statues of
Saddam and other symbols of the regime—to wage a “psychological
operations” campaign against the regime and the fedayeen.246
For their part, the Iraqi fighters attempted to lure the U.K. forces
into close-quarters street fighting. The British, however, steadfastly
refused to be drawn into the city, recognizing that a major assault in the
urban terrain would be disastrous for soldiers and civilians alike and
hoping that, eventually, intense combat and the inevitable collateral
244. Mallet et al., supra note 241; Mallet et al., supra note 243; Welsh Troops Prepare for PoWs,
BBC NEWS, Mar. 22, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/2875245.stm; Patrick E. Tyler, A
Nation at War: The Attack; U.S. Bombs Ravage Targets in Baghdad; Waves of Troops Sweeping South Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2003, at A1.
245. “Saddam Loyalists” Bombed, BBC NEWS, Mar. 29, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/middle_east/2898013.stm; Michael R. Gordon, A Nation at War: Military Analysis; Basra
Offers a Lesson on Taking Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at B1; David Ignatius, Editorial, Tipping
Points, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2003, at A29.
246. “Saddam Loyalists” Bombed, supra note 245; Gethin Chamberlain, Troops Relish Basra Statue
Raid, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk/2899717.stm; Keith B. Rich-
burg, Standoff at Basra Hints at Tough Time in Baghdad: Allies Have Yet to Face Iraq’s Most Elite Troops,
WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2003, at A22; Tim Butcher, Commandos Launch Battle for Basra, GUARDIAN
(London), Mar. 31, 2003, at 7; Keith B. Richburg, British Use Raids to Wear Down Iraqi Fighters, WASH.
POST, Apr. 3, 2003, at A25 [hereinafter Richburg, British Use Raids to Wear Down Iraqi Fighters].
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harm to residents’ lives and property would not be necessary.247
Occasionally, groups of Iraqi vehicles attempted an abortive counter-
attack—a breakout from Basra, massing for an excursion to the south—
such as a group of seventy tanks and other vehicles on March 26. But
those columns were quickly obliterated by British fire, with such
certainty that observers speculated that only something malicious, such
as fedayeen threats against the Iraqi soldiers’ families, could have im-
pelled them into such a suicidal mission.248
As the standoff continued, Basra seemed to become, not the hoped-
for symbol of an easy victory prompted by local welcoming of coalition
liberators, but precisely the opposite symbol: an illustration of Western-
ers getting “bogged down” in the Middle East, stumbling into a
tougher-than-anticipated military campaign, with sparse indigenous
support. The Westerners were not inflicting casualties upon the Basra
residents, but they were being blamed for the slow pace of humanitar-
ian relief and for being overly cautious in dislodging the fedayeen. If it
took weeks to capture Basra, what could be anticipated as the U.S. and
British forces took on Baghdad?249
B. The Assault: April 6, 2003
The episodic British incursions into central Basra became more
frequent and prolonged, and the troops also began to inch in from the
periphery, establishing a camp just inside a key bridge over the Shatt al
Basra waterway. On Sunday, April 6, U.K. forces undertook yet another
of these in-and-out bursts, this one code-named Operation Sinbad (the
legendary Sinbad of 1,001 Nights fame had been from Basra). On this
occasion, two convoys (each comprising 28 tanks, 28 other armed
vehicles, and 1,500 soldiers) followed distinct routes into the heart of
the city, converging at the College of Literature. To their surprise, the
U.K. forces encountered significantly less resistance than usual, and on
the spur of the moment, they decided to stay, rather than to beat the
247. Keith B. Richburg, Everyday Life Goes On Despite Siege, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2003, at A17;
Keith B. Richburg, Residents Say Hussein Loyalists in Full Control: Impact of British Siege Described as
Minimal, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at A19; Richburg, British Use Raids to Wear Down Iraqi Fighters,
supra note 246.
248. UK Troops ‘Back Basra Uprising,’ BBC NEWS, Mar. 25, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hi/uk/2885713.stm; see also Susan B. Glasser & Richard Leiby, British See Uprising by Civilians in
Basra, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2003, at A1; Richburg & Glasser, supra note 242.
249. R.W. Apple, Jr., A Nation at War: News Analysis; Iraqis Learn the Lessons of How U.S. Fights
Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at B1; see Tim Ripley & Paul Gallagher, Cordon of Steel Tightens on
Basra, SCOTSMAN, Apr. 1, 2003; Richburg, British Use Raids to Wear Down Iraqi Fighters, supra note 246.
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customary hasty retreat to the suburbs. A substantial British force of
10,000 then quickly followed the incursion, occupying critical portions
of the city.250
A day of intense—but sporadic and disorganized—fighting ensued.
Pockets of hostile fire were uncovered around the city, but the dwin-
dling Iraqi forces were vastly overmatched. Only three U.K. soldiers
were killed; perhaps 300 Iraqi fighters died. There were very few Iraqi
surrenders: the remaining regular army and militia personnel either
fought to the bitter end or, more often, doffed their uniforms and
quietly slipped away, leaving Basra and melting into the countryside.251
When it became clear that the British forces were there to stay, and
that the hated Ba’athists had at last been deposed, the local population
reacted with enthusiasm. The residents welcomed the Westerners (at
least to the point of expressing gratitude for their assistance, leavened
with suspicion about their true long-term objectives) and eagerly
identified any hidden resistance fighters or weapons caches. The locals
also violently took matters into their own hands against individual
antagonists; lynch mobs attacked remaining police, Ba’athists, and
others, settling old scores with revenge beatings and vigilante kill-
ings.252
Within only two or three days, most of Basra was relatively secure, but
control over some sections—including the historic old city, where the
streets were often too narrow for tanks to maneuver—remained dubi-
ous. The British suddenly found themselves called upon to play a
variety of incompatible roles: they were fighting a conventional war;
250. Irish Guards Advance on Basra, BBC NEWS, Apr. 3, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
northern_ireland/2915311.stm; Q&A: Assault on Basra, BBC NEWS, Apr. 6, 2003, at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/uk/2922553.stm; Gordon, supra note 245; Craig S. Smith, A Nation at
War: In the Field, Basra; British Assault Captures Half of City in South, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2003, at A1;
Keith B. Richburg, British Forces Enter Basra as Residents Loot City, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2003, at A1
[hereinafter Richburg, British Forces Enter Basra as Residents Loot City]; Peter Beaumont & Martin
Bentham, War in the Gulf: After Two Weeks at Bay, British Troops Cut Swath Through Saddam Loyalists:
Taking Basra, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 7, 2003, at 3, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
international/story/0,,931199,00.html; Rafael Behr & Mark Nicholson, British Forces Press on in
Move to Wrest Control from Saddam Loyalists, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 2003, at 3; David Williams,
The City Fell and Its People Cheered; Iraqis Throng the Streets in Celebration as Basra Is Liberated by British
After a Day of Desperate Fighting, DAILY MAIL (UK), Apr. 7, 2003, at 4.
251. Q&A: Assault on Basra, supra note 250; “Large Parts” of Basra Under UK Control, BBC NEWS,
Apr. 6, 2003, at http://news.co.bbc.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2922977.stm; Smith, supra note
250; Richburg, British Forces Enter Basra as Residents Loot City, supra note 250; Williams, supra note
250.
252. Beaumont & Bentham, supra note 250; Williams, supra note 250; Marc Santora, A Nation
at War: The South; The Tides of Revenge in Basra Rise Quickly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2003, at B2.
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they were engaged in sporadic urban anti-guerrilla operations; and
they were also asked to provide a wide range of law enforcement, civil
administration, and humanitarian functions.253
The U.K. forces temporized on the last of those responsibilities,
declining to turn their attention to “governance” tasks so long as active
combat was still being waged (and, to some extent, not resisting the
inclination of many Basra residents to vent their hostility by looting
official buildings associated with Saddam). But residents demanded
immediate British leadership in quelling the onslaught of looting and
street crime. Despite modest disarmament efforts, the city was awash in
firearms and no one felt safe. Even Saddam, for all his oppression, had
enforced a measure of physical security for the residents; would their
British liberators do less?254
As the fighting dwindled, and as the smoke cleared, it became
apparent that the city of Basra had indeed been spared the worst
ravages of urban warfare. There were plenty of damaged buildings,
bombed bridges, and torn up roads, but much of the critical infrastruc-
ture remained intact (or, at least, in no worse shape than it had fallen
into during Saddam’s reign). Many people were angered at the hor-
rible individual misfortunes of war—bombs that had gone astray or
that had accidentally taken their loved ones or their homes—and at the
slow pace of refugee assistance. But there were not nearly as many
grieving mourners as there would have been following a major urban
assault. Humanitarian aid—trucks distributing potable water and engi-
253. Keith B. Richburg, Lawlessness Spreads in Villages: As Bandits Rove, Allied Forces Are Blamed
for Not Enforcing Order, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Richburg, Lawlessness Spreads
in Villages]; Peter Finn, U.S. Hopes Aid, Selective Favors Will Help Win Political Allies, WASH. POST, Mar.
30, 2003, at A22; Keith B. Richburg, British Troops’ Dual Role: Soldiers and Relief Workers; Near Basra,
Forces Hand Out Food, Water as Fighting Continues, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2003, at A29; Peter Beaumont
& Rory McCarthy, War in the Gulf: British Tanks Force Way into Basra and Destroy Ba’ath Party HQ,
GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 7, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/
0,,931226,00.html; Charles Clover & Victor Mallet, Allied Troops Fail to Halt Widespread Looting, FIN.
TIMES (London), Apr. 7, 2003, at 2; Keith B. Richburg, In Basra, Growing Resentment, Little Aid:
Casualties Stoke Hostility over British Presence, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 2003, at A23 [hereinafter Richburg,
In Basra, Growing Resentment, Little Aid].
254. Richburg & Glasser, supra note 242; Richburg, Lawlessness Spreads in Villages, supra note
253; Tim Butcher, UK Troops Urged to Police Basra, BBC NEWS, Apr. 8, 2003, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2930061.stm; UK Aim to Restore Basra Order, BBC NEWS, April 8, 2003,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2927127.stm; Richburg, In Basra, Growing Resentment,
Little Aid, supra note 253; British Take on Balancing Act in Basra, BBC NEWS, Apr. 8, 2003, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2928615.stm; Nicholas Watt & Richard Norton-Taylor, Alarm as
Lawlessness Goes Unchecked: Britain to Send Just Two MoD Police to Advise Troops as UN Leads Criticism of
Coalition over Collapse of Public Order, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 11, 2003, at 4.
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neers attempting to restore the electricity grid, running water, and
other public services—only very gradually came on-line.255
C. What Might Have Been
The question to ponder from this case study is whether advanced
non-lethal weapons could have enabled the British to have their cake
and eat it, too: i.e., could there have been a mechanism that would have
allowed them both to avoid the perils of street-by-street fighting and to
come sooner to the assistance of the beleaguered residents of Basra?
Perhaps the answer is no. The fundamental inadequacy of the
situation was the difficulty in separating fedayeen and other hostile (but
often covert) forces from the civilians; where the residents are too
terrified to provide the necessary intelligence and identification, there
may be little that improved weaponry alone can add to the mix. But for
other functions, current or projected NLW enhancements could have
served a useful role.
The dilemma of dealing with human shields, for example, might
have been ameliorated in some situations if the British had been able,
via acoustic or other technologies, to disable everyone within range; the
incapacitated could then safely be sorted out at leisure. Likewise,
potential suicide bombers (those who volunteered for the horrific duty,
as well as those coerced into it) might be identified and frozen by
netting at standoff distances, permitting inspection and disarmament.
House-to-house combat will always be exceptionally dangerous and
destructive, but perhaps some of the worst features can be mitigated by
tasers, rubber bullets, and systems that non-destructively penetrate
walls to temporarily incapacitate those inside. Perhaps loud noises and
blinding lights could have dissuaded the merely curious and driven
away the casual hangers-on, enabling the troops to identify more
readily those determined individuals who posed the genuine threat.
When relief aid does come forward, it is obviously unacceptable to
employ deadly force against those who urgently press forward for food
or water; perhaps chemical NLW could have helped ensure an orderly
255. Marc Santora, A Nation at War: In the Field, Basra; British Soldiers’ Long Battle for a Southern
City’s Trust Requires Bullets and Handshakes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003, at B3; Richburg, British Forces
Enter Basra as Residents Loot City, supra note 250; Richburg, In Basra, Growing Resentment, Little Aid,
supra note 253; Keith B. Richburg, People in Basra Contest Official View of Siege: Life Was Mostly Normal,
Residents Say; Doctors Report Many Civilians Killed, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2003, at A13; Ryan Dilley,
Basra Bombing “Destroyed My Family,” BBC NEWS, Apr. 16, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/middle_east/2952339.stm; Basra Utilities “Were Not Bombed,” BBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2003, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2955623.stm.
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and fair distribution process, with less danger of uncontrolled rioting.
Anti-materiel NLW can provide distinct advantages, too. Vehicle
checkpoints established on a city’s egress routes are notoriously vulner-
able; the British might have benefited from vehicle-stopping nets or
electro-magnetic pulse systems that could channelize or disable an
oncoming car or truck that, for either legitimate or hostile reasons,
ignored the traffic control directions. Other types of barrier systems
might have protected important facilities from looting. NLW might
have quickly and easily created an impenetrable seal on vulnerable
buildings, a more effective barrier than the earthen berm built up
around one oil company building or the use of deadly firearms, such as
by the British unit that fatally shot five bank robbers.256
Instead of catastrophically blowing up valuable infrastructure, per-
haps NLW such as slippery foam and carbon fibers could have enabled
the invading force to put bridges, roadways, and public utilities out of
commission only temporarily, permitting a more rapid return to ser-
vice when the fedayeen left and facilitating the occupiers’ efforts to “win
the hearts and minds” of the citizenry. A “soft kill” of the telephone
system, the television apparatus, and other services could likewise have
benefited the invaders in the not-so-very-long run. Regarding the
episodic columns of troops and vehicles that bolted out of the city
during the siege: if they really were impelled by threats against their
families, instead of by misbegotten military strategy, it might well have
been more desirable to disable and contain them, via caltrops and
ignition arresting systems, rather than by inflicting wholesale destruc-
tion and death. NLW might have played a role even in operations
undertaken to destroy captured enemy weaponry: a large ammunition
dump at the Basra stadium might have been more productively sealed
and disabled by non-explosive means.
One potential NLW device was conspicuous by its absence, or at least
by its non-use. President Bush had authorized the deployment of
non-lethal chemical munitions into the theater of conflict, where some
had advocated their potential utility against entrenched resistance. The
British, however, rejected any such maneuver as inconsistent with the
Chemical Weapons Convention, and, in any event, no chemicals—riot
control devices or other—were ever applied by any side on the Iraqi
battlefield.257
256. Richburg, Lawlessness Spreads in Villages, supra note 253; Last Week in the Iraq War, WASH.
POST, Apr. 13, 2003, at A26.
257. Nicholas Wade & Eric Schmitt, Bush Approves Use of Tear Gas in Battlefield, TORONTO STAR,
Apr. 2, 2003.
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In legal terms, the issue here centers on the law of armed conflict
principles discussed above, especially the fundamental principles of
avoidance of unnecessary suffering and the mandate for careful discrimi-
nation or distinction between combatants and civilians. The fedayeen
and the Iraqi army manifestly did their best to violate those canons:
they intermingled legitimate military targets with protected locations
and people and attempted to deter or frustrate the British—or to lure
them into the sort of action that would further imperil the non-
combatants. The British, on the other hand, did their best to comply
with the customary international law, acknowledging that warfare,
especially in an urban environment, can never be surgical, but accept-
ing the responsibility to minimize the collateral damage.
* * *
In sum, British patience in Basra ultimately paid off. By waiting until
the time was ripe, the U.K. forces avoided what might have been much
more protracted and destructive urban combat, with devastating conse-
quences for the invaders, the defenders, and the surrounding civilians.
When the assault finally came, there was much less destruction of the
city and much less antagonism between occupiers and residents than
would have arisen otherwise.258
Still, we cannot help but wonder whether judicious application of
non-lethal weapons might have generated an even better outcome. The
two-week delay in occupying the city was hardly cost-free: during that
interval, the citizens suffered under the multiple burdens of a devas-
tated municipal water system, rampant looting, and rapacious fedayeen
forces that killed countless individuals. Anything that might have
cracked the local resistance more quickly—i.e., tactics or tools that
might have ended Basra’s anarchy sooner and might have sped coali-
tion forces on their campaign toward Baghdad and the toppling of
Saddam—is worth exploring. And the combined firepower of aircraft,
artillery, tanks, and other warfighters did, of course, damage the city
and kill and injure innocent civilians. Even if the toll was not as high as
it might have been, any unintended casualty is regrettable.
Outside observers—and even the British forces themselves—fre-
quently analogized between the ongoing difficulties in Basra and the
much more protracted troubles in Northern Ireland. Many of the U.K.
troops, veterans of that domestic conflict, were experienced in the
258. Gary Eason, UK Troops “Lived Up to Expectations,” BBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2003, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2956787.stm.
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
790 [Vol. 36
nuances of crowd control, the dangers of urban fighting, and the
conundrum of providing civil services while promoting law and order.
And they were intimately familiar with the role that judicious use of
non-lethal weapons can play.259
The final act of the saga of Basra, like that of Iraq itself, is still to be
written. The plague of terrorism, the unquenched ambitions of Ba’athist
loyalists, and the irregularities of local law and order remain outstand-
ing hurdles. But even there, NLW might play a role in enforcing
legitimate authority without further inflaming tensions between occu-
pier and occupied. As one British soldier put it, “We’d hate to win the
war but lose the peace.”260
VII. CAUTIONARY CONSIDERATIONS
The implicit message of the previous sections must not be over-read.
The roster of emerging NLW technologies might, at first, generate a
breathless anticipation about future “bloodless conflict,” in which U.S.
troops and police could one day prevail with only minimal costs to
themselves, to innocent civilians, and even to the hostile forces. The
three case studies, and the speculations about how NLW of various sorts
might have ameliorated the confrontations in Waco, Moscow, and
Basra, might generate a knee-jerk mandate to develop, procure, and
deploy more of those devices as soon as possible.
But there are important reasons to hesitate before blindly pursuing
NLW. Three classes of caveats must be surveyed in any balanced
consideration of the future of NLW for police and military applica-
tions: “operational” considerations about how the mechanisms might
suit the realities of modern law enforcement and conflict; apprehen-
sions about proliferation of the technologies to malign users; and the
dangers of encouraging facile over-reliance upon force that must, even
with non-lethal capabilities, be exercised with restraint.
A. Operational Constraints on NLW
The transition from drawing board to operational field is laden with
impediments, and any of the non-lethal weapons concepts discussed
above must address several potential pitfalls. This Section briefly notes
259. Keith B. Richburg, British Forces Confronted by Guerrilla Tactics, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2003,
at A1; Matt Maclean, UK Troops “Trained for Urban War,” BBC NEWS, Mar. 25, 2003, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2884667.stm.
260. British Plan Joint Patrols in Basra, BBC NEWS, Apr. 12, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/uk/2941799.stm.
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some of the constraints that NLW (as any new weapon) must overcome
and, not coincidentally, some of the reasons why non-lethals have not
yet succeeded in flooding the market for police and military arse-
nals.261
1. Tactical Considerations
Cost is a major consideration: any new system would have to justify its
place in the funding queue, and the budgets for police and the armed
services traditionally favor the tried-and-true technologies that might
be displaced by unproven newcomers.262 Related are logistics con-
cerns: if police and military would be required to maintain two sets of
overlapping capabilities—NLW alongside traditional lethal force—the
burdens of transportation, maintenance, and supply increase. A police
squad car, for example, can pack only so much equipment; when the
cop leaves the vehicle to investigate a threatening situation, how much
can he or she conveniently carry? A military unit, likewise, would be
doubly encumbered if its logistics tail had to include—and if each
member had to haul into conflict—both lethal and non-lethal fire-
arms; even if the same weapon could be modified to fire both types of
261. Many in the military have been reluctant to embrace the concept of non-lethal weapons,
and progress toward adopting them has been slower than many observers had anticipated.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 73-77 (finding a “wide gap” between the rhetoric of
senior Department of Defense officials on the importance of NLW, compared to the limited
attention these systems receive in planning, research, and acquisition); Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at
129-30, 142-43 (“[T]he defense establishment has been slow to accept these technologies.”);
Duncan, supra note 9, at 4 n.9:
Generally, commanders will employ only those weapon systems they feel comfortable
using. For most commanders, the comfort level for lethal weapon systems is much
higher than the comfort level for non-lethal weapons. Raising the comfort level of
commanders for non-lethal systems will require a concerted effort by the military
services through the implementation of improved training and instruction with respect
to their capability and versatility.
Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. & Steven Metz, Nonlethality and American Land Power: Strategic Context and
Operational Concepts (U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute), June 15, 1998, at 12-15,
available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil.ssi.pdfiles/pud231.pdf; CFR TASK FORCE 1, supra note 7,
at ix-xi.
262. Matthew B. Stannard, Cops Go Ga-Ga over Latest Gadgets, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 20, 2002, at
A21 (describing trade show at which police express great interest in a wide array of NLW
capabilities, though budget constraints prevent them from making substantial purchases); NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 45-46 (uncertainty over the effectiveness of NLW
systems threatens to be a “show stopper” blocking adoption of the weapons).
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rounds, the burden of lugging around two sets of ammunition may be
considerable.263
Another danger is the very real possibility that the NLW will not
perform as advertised, and the devices may err in either of two
directions. First, a weapon might not prove to be reliably non-lethal; it
might inflict fatal wounds or prove poisonous for too many of its
targets. Second—at the opposite extreme—it might be ineffective,
failing to disable or dissuade the target, compromising the mission and
exposing the user to possibly lethal return fire.264
Training is another formidable obstacle and cost. Obviously, police
officers on the beat and soldiers in the field must always be properly
instructed about any new weapons and afforded adequate opportuni-
ties to practice modified tactics before putting them to the test in
operation. But that responsibility is even greater here than in other
contexts because NLW imply very different strategies for the applica-
tion of force: these are not merely new tools, but the beginning of a
new way of thinking about many law enforcement and military func-
tions. The operators, therefore, will require careful guidance in the
new doctrines and concepts of operations. Any weapon is subject to
misuse, whether through misunderstanding or malice; thorough, re-
peated training and leadership can be the best bulwarks against misap-
plication of NLW.
The military services, sensitive to this imperative, have already de-
voted considerable resources to NLW training, including dedicated
courses for deployed units, for leaders, and for NLW instructors.265 But
it must be a perpetual commitment to ensure that the fielded forces are
adequately prepared for proper use of their new equipment.
263. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 87-93 (assessing NLW systems for training,
effectiveness, logistics and maintenance, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures); Joint Concept,
supra note 5, at A5 (stressing that “commanders must be able to deploy and employ non-lethal
systems without sacrificing other critical offensive and defensive capabilities and options”);
Duncan, supra note 9, at 24-26, 29-33.
264. See, e.g., Eric M. Weiss, supra note 45 (suspect resisted police officers despite their use of
pepper spray, taser, and handgun); Thomas Farragher & David Abel, Postgame Police Projectile Kills
an Emerson Student, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 2004 (describing shooting by police into unruly crowd
with pepper-spray pellets, one of which hit a student in the eye, resulting in death); Parks, supra
note 117 (noting that even ordinary lethal bullets do not always suffice to disable a person; the
popular image of the immediate, overwhelming stopping power of firearms is overstated).
265. Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, FM 3-22.40, MCWP 3-15.8, NTTP 3-07.3.2,
AFTTP(I) 3-2.45, USCG Pub 3-07.31 (joint publication of Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, &
Coast Guard), ch. IV, apps. C-D (Jan. 15, 2003), available at https://www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.
mil/mcwp/htm/mcwp3158.htm.
LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
2005] 793
In addition, as with any other contemplated armament, any NLW
system must pass the traditional tests of being sufficiently small, light,
durable, and rugged for use in the field, and it must not require
elaborate support or care. An NLW system must act quickly, preferably
at a range sufficient to keep the user away from a rock-throwing crowd.
The system must be immune to adverse weather conditions and must
not expose the user to undue smoke, noise, or other toxic or obnoxious
effects. Further, the system must not unduly outrage public opinion,
and it must not create excessive pollution or other long-term safety
hazards. Some NLW candidates can—or will soon be able to—pass
these tests, but others will likely remain simply pipe dreams.266
Police and military leaders also have to think about NLW in dynamic
terms, anticipating the likely responses of other actors to our deploy-
ments of these new weapons. That is, are there simple, inexpensive
counter-measures that would be available to a calculating opponent,
enabling the targets to evade or blunt the NLW effects? The Davidians
were equipped with rudimentary gas masks that might have afforded
them some breathing space amidst the CS in Waco; the occupiers of the
Dubrovka Theater lacked such foresight, but future Chechen terrorists
will likely undertake future missions with better protective devices.
(There have been indications that the terrorists responsible for the
school massacre at Beslan, Russia in September 2004 did carry gas
masks.) In general, any non-lethal weapon that is susceptible to effi-
cient counter-measures will be of greatly reduced value, and we should
anticipate the possibility of an action-reaction “arms race” model
evolving, with competitive innovations alternating between offensive
and defensive capabilities.
Next, there is the “wimp factor” to consider: if our police and military
forces come to utilize non-lethal force, and if that posture becomes
known to their opponents, will that practice embolden the criminals
and enemy troops to resist with even greater zeal? These targeted
individuals might then rationally calculate that, if they defy official
authority, the worst that could happen would be infliction of a painful
or disabling blow, followed by detention; reducing or eliminating the
prospect of being shot to death might mitigate the instinct to surren-
der. It is not just a macho preference for traditional deadly force that
sometimes inspires military and police to resist the notion of NLW: in a
266. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 21-22 (summarizing desirable characteris-
tics for Naval NLW), 91-93; Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A5; Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 141-42;
Heal, supra note 18, § 4; LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 51-58 (outlining concerns and criteria
against which NLW will be assessed).
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world where violence is frequent and sometimes lethal, being armed
with more firepower than your opponents is the traditional formula for
success and sheer survival.267
2. Legal Considerations
Legal considerations, too, might impede the evolution toward NLW.
The treaties and statutes surveyed above circumscribe certain weapons
pathways, notably regarding lasers, chemicals, and biological agents.
These are especially sensitive fields, and, despite the hypothetical
possibility that judicious application of non-lethal chemicals, for ex-
ample, might humanely save some lives in particular wartime applica-
tions, skeptics wisely caution against the danger of undermining the
essential arms control constraints of the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion and the Biological Weapons Convention. Most military uses of
chemical and biological agents, even for relatively benign NLW applica-
tions, are therefore simply off limits.268
A different type of legal concern grows out of the constraints upon
official violence reflected in both customary international law and
domestic case law. That is, if police and the military are required,
pursuant to various formulations, to utilize only “reasonable” or “pro-
portionate” levels of force, would their future possession of NLW
capabilities subtly shift that calculation? In short, if police and military
forces possess non-lethal capabilities, might they become legally com-
pelled to utilize those restrained approaches first, before resorting to
traditional lethal means?269
267. Military personnel often assert a strong preference for the traditional power of over-
whelming lethal force, expressing impatience and disinterest in anything perceived as “softer”
than conventional bullets and bombs. See, e.g., Parks, supra note 117, at 4-5 (quoting a Marine
officer as saying that the only “non-lethal” weapon he needed was a Marine with his finger outside
the trigger guard of his weapon).
268. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, app. C.
269. A similar progression may be occurring with regard to precision-guided munitions. That
is, as the United States develops sophisticated “smart bombs,” capable of targeting particular
locations with exquisite accuracy, and as these munitions become much more common in the
arsenal, some argue that it may become inappropriate, illegitimate, and eventually illegal under
humanitarian standards to use old-fashioned “dumb bombs,” which create much more indiscrimi-
nate collateral damage through their imprecision. This purported requirement for using the best
technology would not be imposed upon other countries that, due to inferior technology or
defense budgets, did not procure the smart weaponry. FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 197; Danielle
L. Infeld, Precision-Guided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But Is a
Country Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 109 (1992); Schmitt, supra note 145, at 9-10; International Humanitarian
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Government officials, sensitive to this possibility, have already as-
serted their opposition to any such trend. The U.S. Department of
Defense and NATO have both issued guidance asserting without
reservation that self-defense remains the first touchstone for the mili-
tary; if deadly force is authorized, there is absolutely no requirement or
even recommendation that it be approached step-wise, starting with
NLW first. Non-lethal capability is intended to augment, not displace,
traditional weapons, and it does not alter existing standards for the
employment of fully lethal force.270 Likewise, domestic U.S. courts and
other authorities reviewing police operations are traditionally deferen-
tial to use-of-force decisions, especially those made in exigent circum-
stances. The Supreme Court’s focus on “reasonable”—as opposed to
“minimal”—force makes a fine distinction; no cases suggest that police
are obligated to procure non-lethal mechanisms for use in threatening
and fluid situations.
Still, it is predictable that, as law enforcement and military agents
acquire the ability to behave with a more deft touch—to immobilize,
incapacitate, or deter, instead of to kill and destroy, and to do so with
equal effectiveness and safety—the law may well develop in the direc-
tion of requiring them to proceed with the less deadly means first. And
that preference may apply even in situations where the opposing
forces—due to opposite decisions they made about which weaponry to
procure—are not similarly constrained.271
B. The Danger of Proliferation
It is not plausible to assume that U.S. police and defense forces
would proceed alone toward NLW. If the technology works; if it is
cost-effective, sufficiently portable, and field-rugged; if it succeeds in
Law Issues in a Potential War in Iraq, supra note 145, at 9; Objects Attacked: The Need for Full Disclosure
and Accountability, supra note 145.
270. DoD Directive No. 3000.3, supra note 1, § 4.4-4.5; Joint Concept, supra note 5, at A4; NATO
Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, supra note 4, ¶ 4 (observing that “[n]either the existence, the
presence nor the potential effect of non-lethal weapons shall constitute an obligation to use
non-lethal weapons, or impose a higher standard for, or additional restrictions on, the use of
lethal force”); Coppernoll, supra note 40, at 121-22.
271. See Schmitt, supra note 145, at 10 (observing that “[h]umanitarian law is not intended to
ensure a fair fight. Rather, it is designed to protect, to the extent possible, those who are not
participating in hostilities, and their property, from the effects of those hostilities. It is also
calculated to ensure that combatants do not suffer unnecessarily. Suggesting that a party with the
technological ability to exercise great care in attack need not do so because its opponent is not
similarly equipped runs counter to such purposes.”).
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overcoming resistance from opponents; and if it facilitates our forces’
ability to accomplish their assigned missions, then others will mimic
our pattern. The imitators may not immediately develop devices that
are quite as robust, sophisticated, or safe as what the United States
fields, but they may not need to set such high performance standards,
and this “reverse engineering” may expose us to a variety of unwelcome
new threats.272
One obvious proliferation danger arises from enemy militaries. Just
as the United States might find advantages in inflicting illness, pain,
and disorientation upon our opponents, they might discover the same
advantages, with the result that our troops may become more vulner-
able. A new international arms race in NLW could further burden our
military budget and complicate the battlefield; furthermore, there is no
certainty that American inventiveness would perpetually ensure an
edge for us. An entirely non-lethal war is surely not in sight; whether a
conflict characterized by an asymmetric mixture of lethal and non-
lethal capabilities would play out to American advantage is impossible
to foresee. Already, several other countries are proceeding apace with
their own NLW investigations; self-restraint on the part of the United
States might not elicit a reciprocal response from them at this point,
but it is certainly clear that if we pioneer the field, others—including
potential adversaries—will not willingly cede the entire realm of NLW
to us.273
Terrorists, too, might someday piggyback upon the Government’s
non-lethal weapons research and development work. If (as seems
inevitable) the NLW technology slips into the commercial marketplace
272. CFR TASK FORCE 1, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that as “the most open, technology-
dependent, and vulnerable society,” the United States may be particularly susceptible to NLW
retaliation); Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 140; FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 181-82 (observing that
the risk of retaliation in kind is a danger with every type of weapon).
273. Duncan, supra note 9, at 11-12 (observing that “[a]round the world, many nations are
creating non-lethal weapon systems. . . . There will always be foreign governments and terrorists
groups who will mimic the non-lethal technology as it is developed” in the United States.); Steve
Metz, Non-Lethality and the Revolution in Military Affairs, in NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL
AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, § 2.1 (observing that “[n]early every advanced state has
at least begun to explore the integration of non-lethality in their armed forces, and many have
elaborate programmes to develop non-lethal weapons and the operational concepts to use
them”); Lewer & Feakin, supra note 37, at 127-40 (noting that 110 countries deploy non-lethal riot
control agents; presenting a case study of India’s use of tear gas and other crowd control
mechanisms); J.A.C. Lewis, France Reverses Policy on Non-Lethal Weapons, JANE’S DEF. WKLY., Feb. 3,
1999; LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 43-44 (predicting that “non-lethal weapons will become
increasingly available through the [international] arms trade”); Peter Enav, Israeli Army to Use
Non-Lethal Shells, AP, Aug. 23, 2004.
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(or the black marketplace), how might terrorists conspire to adapt the
ADS system, the vortex ring generator, or the microwave engine-
stalling apparatus for their pernicious objectives?274 As Robin Coup-
land has observed regarding NLW chemicals, “The same agents may be
as useful, if not more so, for taking hostages than releasing hostages, or
for spreading terror than deterring it.”275
Another, equally problematic form of proliferation would be to
domestic criminals. Surely, if people are going to rob banks and
convenience stores, it would be better for everyone involved if they did
so with tasers and pepper spray, rather than with automatic weapons.
The question remains, however, would the easy availability of non-
lethal force lead to an even greater incidence of that anti-social
behavior? If criminals acquired the ability to immobilize taxi drivers or
people on the street—and, a fortiori, if they could instantly but tempo-
rarily paralyze everyone in a building with a future variant of an
acoustic wave system—would they yield to that temptation even more
frequently, leading to an enlarged and further empowered criminal
force?276
Finally, another category of proliferation causes great concern: the
possible spread of pain-inducing NLW technology to human rights
abusers. According to U.S. Department of State annual reports, a great
many countries around the world still rely upon horrific practices of
torture and punishment, either to coerce confessions and information
from criminal suspects or to violate, agonize, and deter political
opponents or disfavored religious or social groups.277 Many of these
274. Fidler, The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 94-95
(observing that “[t]errorists armed with ‘non-lethal’ weapons might be even more dangerous than
those with only conventional weapons because the ‘non-lethal’ weapons give the terrorists mission
flexibility”).
275. Robin M. Coupland, Incapacitating Chemical Weapons: A Year After the Moscow Theatre Siege,
362 THE LANCET 1346 (2003).
276. Already, non-lethal weapons have occasionally been adapted for criminal purposes: to
disarm victims, to effectuate an escape, etc. See Shoplifting Suspect Squirts Pepper Spray at Officer,
TheIndyChannnel.com, Aug. 3, 2004, available at http://www.theindychannel.com/news/3609467/
detail.html; Police Blotter, PALM BEACH POST (Florida), Aug. 4, 2004, at 16 (OC allegedly used in
attempted robbery of convenience store); North Side Woman Stabs Acquaintance, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Aug. 4, 2004 (in a fight, one woman used pepper spray to disarm her opponent, then
seized the opponent’s knife and stabbed her with it); Davison & Lewer, supra note 41, at 13-16
(describing recent crimes committed in various countries using non-lethal weapons).
277. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—2003
(detailing countries’ practices regarding fundamental human rights, including torture, noting
many countries where barbaric violations still occur regularly); see AMNESTY INT’L, ANNUAL REPORT
(2004), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/index.html (annual survey of na-
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torturers satisfy themselves with the most primitive forms of barbarism,
through whips, clubs, food deprivation, and the like, but some have
come to rely upon more sophisticated—and often Western-supplied—
implements such as electric shock devices.278 What additional horrors
could they inflict if their arsenals were supplemented with tools such as
pepper spray that could be so easily misused? The millimeter wave
devices, for example, could inflict outrageous pain, especially upon
someone who was physically restrained, unable to retreat and avoid the
beam, and they could do so without inflicting any visible wounds or
other permanent harm that subsequent investigators could detect and
document.279
C. The Possibility of Over-Reliance upon NLW
Finally, there is a danger that NLW might work too well, or at least be
perceived by the political leadership as succeeding so fully, that the
existing—and already quite fragile—constraints upon the use of force
were dissipated. That is, if national authorities (wrongly) relied upon
the illusion that future NLW could permit the United States to project
its power into international crises with appreciably less cost in terms of
lives and property, would they be tempted to exercise that power more
often? Would American troops find themselves deployed with even
greater frequency into tumultuous, perhaps unwinnable, conflicts,
because of the facile confidence that non-lethal force would offer a
cheap, bloodless triumph?280
tional practices on human rights). Abuses by American military and intelligence officials at the
Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq demonstrate additional human rights violations via use of NLW
(especially attack dogs) in pursuit of intelligence-gathering or perverse “fun.” DOD INDEPENDENT
PANEL REPORT, supra note 19; White & Ricks, supra note 19.
278. See AMNESTY INT’L, ARMING THE TORTURERS: ELECTRO-SHOCK TORTURE AND THE SPREAD OF
STUN TECHNOLOGY (1997); AMNESTY INT’L, USA—MARKET LEADER IN THE TORTURE TRADE (2001)
(detailing U.S. production and export of electroshock weapons and restraints); AMNESTY INT’L,
STOPPING THE TORTURE TRADE (2001).
279. Steve Wright, The Role of Sub-Lethal Weapons in Human Rights Abuse, in THE FUTURE OF
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGIES, OPERATIONS, ETHICS AND LAW, supra note 7, at 75-78; Fidler,
The International Legal Implications of “Non-Lethal” Weapons, supra note 3, at 93-94 (noting that NLW
may afford human rights abusers additional tools for torturing their victims while leaving little
physical evidence). The vehicle-mounted version of the ADS system is obviously large and
expensive, but a human rights abuser might one day be able to procure a less powerful and less
expensive “desktop” version, capable of inflicting great pain upon nearby individuals who could
not escape from a torture chamber.
280. CFR TASK FORCE 1, supra note 7, at 8-11; Siniscalchi, supra note 5, at 140-41; Duncan,
supra note 9, at 9-10. But see FUTURE WAR, supra note 6, at 180-81 (arguing that congressional
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On the law enforcement side, would an enhanced arsenal of NLW
prompt officials to send police or FBI into harm’s way too quickly,
fueling an impatience that should yield, instead, to a more judicious
self-restraint and prolonged negotiations? Would an illusion about a
completely non-lethal capability lull us into a false sense that police
should immediately exercise their ability to “do something” in a crisis,
instead of waiting for calmer options?
A related concern: the adoption of additional non-lethal capabilities,
consciously translated from military into law enforcement applications,
might intensify an ongoing process of “militarization” of the police.
SWAT teams have already led that progression, both in the United
States and elsewhere, and the effectiveness of those enhanced weapons
and tactics is invaluable in certain situations. But surely something is
also lost when a community departs increasingly from an older, simpler
model of less-forceful policing. There is evidence that violence—even
the appearance of readiness for violence—by law enforcement can
serve counter-productively to elicit a violent response from a crowd that
might otherwise tone itself down.281 If police come to possess what they
see as a fine-grained ability to modulate their use of force, and if they
accordingly sometimes turn to available non-lethal force when they
might otherwise have had no real power to do anything at all, might the
display of NLW perversely serve to inflame the mob’s passions and
escalate the controversy?
Finally, a similar issue arises at the tactical level of individual police
and military operations in the field. That is, the ready access to an array
of effective NLW may allow the uniformed personnel on the street
more leeway to “shoot first and ask questions later.” There are already
suggestions that police, newly armed with tasers, utilize that level of
force with surprising frequency. Observers applaud the reduced reli-
ance upon lethal firearms, but worry that law enforcement officials are
becoming too “quick on the trigger” with electricity, in a situation
where even lower levels of force, and greater levels of patience, might
suffice.282
oversight could check any temptation to allow NLW to put the United States on a “slippery slope”
into unwise war).
281. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 87, at 330 (noting that “use of
excessive force—even an inappropriate display of weapons—may be inflammatory and lead to
even worse disorder,” and citing FBI riot control manual as cautioning that unwarranted use of
official force can incite a mob to further violence and prolong a disturbance).
282. Shaffer, supra note 34, at 20 (quoting sociology professor John Noakes, “There’s a
perception that less lethal weapons are a good thing because no one wants to see cops using billy
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In a dangerous, uncertain, and fast-moving milieu, soldiers and law
enforcement personnel might welcome tools that reduce the adverse
consequences of erroneous, off-target, or premature firing: NLW could
minimize the dangers of fratricide and of striking innocent civilians.
Instead of sitting back passively and absorbing the first blow, police and
military could take the risk of seizing the initiative with NLW. But the
question remains: do we really want our protectors to become more
proactive in this fashion? Is there an offsetting danger that NLW would
inspire too much quickness on the trigger, spurring anticipatory action
when greater restraint would be the wiser course?
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to generalize about non-lethal weapons, owing to the
great diversity in the objectives, current status, and future prospects of
the various systems. Proponents sometimes refer generally to the
“family” of non-lethal weapons programs, but that vocabulary over-
states their commonality. The different breeds of NLW are not really
closely related, and each must be evaluated on a careful, case-by-case
basis for its individual feasibility, legality, and wisdom.283 Some NLW
devices are familiar, having been successfully operated for years; others
are just now on the cusp of deployment; still others appear only dimly
on the horizon; and a few have already been discarded.
By the same token, perhaps it would be intellectually cleaner not to
speak of a category of “non-lethal weapons” at all. If the entrants in this
category have so little in common, and if each must be assessed
separately, perhaps they should simply be labeled “weapons” and not
generically distinguished from any others under that overarching
heading. That notion has some appeal; in general, NLW are no more
clubs. But this new technology is frightening because now the police don’t have to exercise
restraint.”); Berenson, supra note 45 (describing a study in Orange County, Florida, which
reported that police officers used pepper spray and batons much less frequently after they were
also equipped with tasers, but their increased reliance upon the electrical stun guns more than
compensated for the decreases in other implements, and total incidents of the use of police force
increased by 58%); Police Sued over Pepper Spray Use, TENNESSEAN, Dec. 16, 1996, at B1 (alleging that
police resort to OC too quickly); Davison & Lewer, supra note 41, at 26-28 (reporting controversies
and lawsuits asserting inappropriate taser use and police policies regarding use).
283. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS,
JOINT MISSION AREA ANALYSIS/ JOINT MISSION NEED ANALYSIS, at v (Dec. 2000); U.S. Dep’t of
Defense, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Mission Need Statement, quoted in CFR TASK
FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 7 (both referring to the desirability of pursuing a “family” of non-lethal
capabilities).
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and no less than “weapons,” and the same rules ought to apply to them
as to all others.
But there is much to be gained by exploring the field, or sub-field, of
non-lethal arms, apart from all the other types of weapons, and by
conceptualizing NLW as a distinct breed. That is, there is something
new and different going on here: the conscious effort to create capabili-
ties that have not existed previously (or not nearly to the current
extent). These enterprises do have something in common, and we
would be overlooking an important development if we merely chalked
up all the NLW programs as indistinguishable from other types of
weapons. Military and police forces are on the threshold of acquiring
important new capacities; these revolutionary technologies may augur
correspondingly altered functions and roles. Concerted attention to
the field of NLW can help illuminate the policy choices we now face.
To that end, I recommend that the United States pursue non-lethal
weapons with increased vigor. There is genuine promise for a host of
valuable applications at home and abroad. Of course, not all NLW are
equally promising: inevitably, some will be winnowed out, and others
will survive the competitive battles for resources, acceptance, and
public approval. But the first approach at this point is simply to do
more, by investing more time, attention, and dollars into the nascent
NLW revolution.
This strategy demands more money, especially at the earliest stages
of NLW concept development and research; the commitments to date
from both the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice
have been paltry. The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JN-
LWD), in particular, must be re-invigorated and expanded; with its
current budget and staffing, it can provide only modest leadership to
the military services in identifying and pursuing promising NLW leads,
and it can provide even less interaction with domestic law enforcement
or with foreign allies. Any specific dollar figure would be largely
arbitrary at this point, but the United States should think in terms of an
order of magnitude increase over the current JNLWD allotment of
roughly $45 million per year.284
The elusive concept of “visibility” may also be a key here: non-lethal
weapons have not yet broken through the consciousness of the key
players. Military and civilian leaders in the Department of Defense have
routinely proven themselves disinterested, Congress has not seized the
284. CFR TASK FORCE 3, supra note 21, at 15-18 (stressing need for more staffing, funding,
and visibility for JNLWD).
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issue, and the general public is only vaguely and episodically aware of
pending breakthroughs. Somehow, that situation must be changed; the
relevant players need to understand more fully what is at stake here and
what can be accomplished.
Some of this could be achieved through “top-down” leadership.
Senior officials could direct additional resources to this promising,
revolutionary field, laying the groundwork for benefits that would be
realized years hence. Alternatively, some of the impetus could be felt
from the “bottom up,” as the military services and police forces seek
better arms for their gun-toters in the field.
Looked at another way, NLW should be a subject of both “technol-
ogy push” (with research and development laboratories inventing
attractive new systems to offer to the military and police forces) and
“demand pull” (with individual soldiers and cops asking their superiors
for improved tools to achieve their assigned objectives). The problem
to date is that the inventors do not seem to understand exactly what
augmented capabilities the fielded forces would most appreciate, and
the individual cops and soldiers are not aware of what technology
might be able to offer. Leadership, therefore, is necessary to ensure a
better match-up, allowing the laboratories to respond to, and even
anticipate, the demands from the field, and the front lines to articulate
better what innovations would best equip them to deal with the novel
pressures they now face.
Another component of this effort should be much greater public
relations outreach. For whatever reason, the traditional strategy at the
Department of Defense has not been to publicize the efforts and
achievements in NLW. Perhaps fearing that any program for new
weapons at this time might elicit knee-jerk opposition, the Pentagon
has deliberately kept a low profile on non-lethal activities across the
board. But the consequence has not been sub rosa success; instead,
public watchdog groups have challenged JNLWD, which has been
constrained about putting forward its own perspectives. The public
relations battle is one that NLW should be able to win: this is, after all, a
quest for a more humanitarian mechanism, a device for accomplishing
U.S. objectives with less bloodshed and destruction. But in order to
succeed in the public relations arena, JNLWD (and the Department of
Justice, for that matter) will have to get into the game; to date, their
silence has been deafening.
There are, of course, dangers inherent in non-lethal weapons, and
our programs should proceed cautiously in recognition of them. We
must continue to insist upon rigorous human effects testing, to ensure
that “non-lethal” systems reliably earn that moniker. We have to be
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attentive, too, to long-term environmental consequences of some NLW
concepts. We must train, as well as equip, the forces, so the new NLW
will be used in a manner consistent with the underlying intentions. And
we have to be especially alert to the danger that some candidate
non-lethal technologies could be diverted for sinister purposes—
exploited by common criminals, human rights abusers, or those who
would distort these tools for applications of malevolent social con-
trol.285
In particular, we should assiduously avoid adverse implications for
the slender reeds of arms control. The existing standards of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention,
and other worthy but fragile standards of international law might be
jeopardized by unconstrained NLW developments. Riot control agents,
in particular, have long exerted a tantalizing allure for military applica-
tions, and it is undeniable that in particular scenarios, they might prove
a transitory boon. But the world consciously decided, for manifest good
reasons, not to go down that treacherous pathway, and even if the
treaties were crafted long before modern NLW arose, we should take
pains not to unravel that global consensus. Chemical and biological
weapons are among the few areas where international law has been
laboriously installed to restrict combat violence; those taboos should
not be relaxed.
Similarly, the traditional standards of the law of armed conflict must
be re-evaluated for the modern era. The greatly enhanced threats from
weapons of mass destruction and catastrophic terrorism and the greatly
augmented military capabilities offered by technologies such as NLW
now require fresh insights from the legal community. The core prin-
ciples of the law of war retain their vitality, but we are now pressed to
think in different ways about how to apply them to an era in which
military operations in urban terrain will become even more prominent,
in which enemy combatants do not routinely honor the requirements
to differentiate and separate themselves from civilians, and in which
NLW capabilities such as the VMADS system may be able to “clear a
space” by compelling everyone, civilians and fighters alike, to evacuate
a neighborhood, avoiding the horrendous cost of street-by-street com-
bat. Implicit in that tactic is the direct or indiscriminate targeting of a
weapon system upon civilians located at the periphery of a battle
285. Nick Lewer, Benign Intervention and Non-Lethality: Wishful Thinking for the 21st Century?, in
NON-LETHAL WEAPONS: TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROSPECTS, supra note 9, § 8.8 (noting
the danger that NLW could be perverted into tools of social manipulation and repression).
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space—not at all a comfortable procedure within the realm of tradi-
tional warfare.
One check and balance that can help here—a point already noted
above—is publicity. There is little reason to keep secret the NLW
technologies that we might develop and procure for domestic law
enforcement. Unlike in the military arena, there is less incentive for
holding our adversaries ignorant of our current and future capabilities.
Being more transparent with our NLW research and development
programs, therefore, can help “sell” the legitimacy of the undertaking,
enhancing public confidence that the Government is not covertly bent
on social manipulation.
More generally, we should be loathe to trigger a new form of
international arms race, with countries voraciously competing to invent
and deploy still more military capability. Humanity already has suffi-
cient means to conduct warfare; it hardly needs new tools—even
non-lethal tools—to further those practices. For that reason, some have
already called for treaty negotiations looking to regulate NLW, or at
least to channel the emerging programs into safer, less provocative
directions.286 At this point, however, that instinct seems premature;
articulation of any international restrictions on non-lethal weapons
development should be held in abeyance until we have a better idea of
which capabilities may be possible and which may be unnecessarily
dangerous.
Associated with that conclusion is the imperative of avoiding the type
of lazy thinking that could lead to over-reliance upon NLW in inappro-
priate situations. We must not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false
sense that weapons—even relatively safe non-lethal weapons—could
be wielded costlessly against foreign or domestic antagonists. Any
confrontation must be approached with wisdom and restraint; there
can never be a guarantee that NLW will provide a safe, bloodless
solution. The continuum of threats faced by police and military units—
from a lone gunman all the way up to the paroxysms of Waco, Moscow,
and Basra—is inherently dangerous, and the political process must
never underestimate those risks or overestimate the ability of NLW to
dodge them.
This Article’s analysis of three recent confrontations should not be
read as an assertion that NLW would have ensured a better outcome in
286. Rupert Pengelley, Wanted: A Watch on Non-Lethal Weapons, JANE’S INT’L DEF. REV., Apr. 1,
1994, at 1; Altmann, Non-Lethal Weapons Technologies, supra note 48, at 122-23 (calling for
“preventive arms control” measures to limit the qualitative improvement in NLW).
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Waco, Moscow, or Basra. It is entirely possible that none of those sorry
circumstances could have been handled much better, even with an
improved arsenal of deft NLW. Perhaps nothing—currently available
or in development—could be sufficiently fast-acting, precise, safe, and
powerful to be effective against such fanatic, suicidal opponents. Still, it
is worth thinking about: these sorts of situations will continue to
emerge with some frequency, and if technology can provide any
traction in helping to develop a strategy for handling them with greater
success, we should explore all the options. As one of the U.S. Govern-
ment’s experts commented upon reviewing the Waco debacle, “Hind-
sight is of little value except when it is used to provide new solutions to
recurring problems.”287
A related recommendation arises from the observation that the
actors in the three case studies are so independent from each other:
the military and the law enforcement NLW efforts seem oddly isolated
in the United States, not connected in the manner anticipated by the
1994 memorandum of cooperation between the Department of De-
fense and the Department of Justice. No doubt, the two enterprises will
continue to have different emphases and areas of specialization: the
obvious contrasts between all-out international combat and domestic
policing inevitably generate important differences in equipment and
tactics. But there should be more cross-fertilization. When General
Zinni led his Marines into Somalia in 1995, he had to rely largely upon
commercial, off-the-shelf equipment and upon the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department experts for training and tactics. If the Pentagon
can bring the deeper pockets to the NLW enterprise, police depart-
ments across the country can supply a wealth of prior experience. But
the 18,000 local law enforcement departments in the United States are
generally too small and disparate to unite in a well-funded NLW
research protocol, and they will seek to piggy-back on the Department
of Defense development investment. This is not a plea to blur the
important lines between police and military—each will continue to
have its unique needs and strengths—and still less is it a call to further
“militarize” law enforcement.288 But there is a natural synergy between
the two types of NLW applications, and both sides would benefit from
287. Cancro, supra note 187, at 6.
288. LEWER & SCHOFIELD, supra note 3, at 130; NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS,
supra note 87, at 492 (arguing that great harm can result from police use of destructive military
weapons); Boyd, supra note 9, § 5.3; Coupland & Loye, supra note 134, § 7.5. But see Bunn, supra
note 93, at 395 (noting the view of the U.S. Government, expressed at the United Nations in 1966,
that it would be anomalous to prohibit military forces from using chemical devices in interna-
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greater interaction.
The new mission of providing homeland security amidst a variety of
foreign and domestic threats is a most challenging undertaking, engag-
ing both military and law enforcement assets and a variety of other first
responders. It is terribly complicated to prepare to battle terrorists both
at home and abroad; to conduct dangerous missions in the midst of
civilian populations; to be trained and equipped to undertake both
lethal and non-lethal missions interchangeably. But that complexity is
now a fact of life; regrettably, but unavoidably, our military and police
guardians must now adapt themselves and their weaponry to the
confusing, still-evolving threats and missions, and NLW can make a
unique contribution.
A variety of factors will, and should, push us increasingly into the
realm of NLW.289 The concept of non-lethal weapons is (or, at least,
should be) both more effective and more humane, sparing civilians
and operators alike some of the worst predations of conflict. Especially
in an era when warfare impacts non-combatants with increasing fre-
quency and brutality (in recent international and internal fighting of
various sorts, upwards of 80% of the casualties have been civilians),
NLW should be welcome.290 At the same time, the impetus toward
non-lethal weapons is not simply to be “nicer” to our opponents. The
devices are intended primarily to provide better mechanisms for accom-
plishing the mission. They enable police and the military to behave
more flexibly, more deftly, and more precisely, all of which translates
into greater effective power. In too many current situations, our
officials’ hands are tied; in the absence of tools of finesse, they may be
paralyzed by the chasm between lethal over-reaction and feckless
inaction.
Non-lethal weapons, as a result, may also provide a benefit of greater
public acceptability. It is, of course, far from guaranteed that the
community will warm to these unfamiliar technologies: chemicals,
biologicals, and blinding lasers have helped put the worst foot forward
for NLW, and it is hardly surprising that many people greet the
prospect of new, still-mysterious weapons with distrust. Still, in the long
run, rubber bullets are better for use against crowds than are real
bullets; a soft kill of an enemy power plant will play better than would
more permanent destruction; the VMADS millimeter wave system, if it
tional combat that police forces were allowed to use against their own citizens for riot control
purposes).
289. See generally Heal, supra note 18.
290. Coppernoll, supra note 40, at 114.
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is used properly, will not horrify people the way that bloodshed or
other oppressive devices do.
In short, non-lethal weaponry will not replace traditional lethal force
in these agonizing confrontations, but should complement it, provid-
ing a cheaper, more flexible, more useable capability. There is, of
course, always a danger in augmenting the power of governments, even
with apparently benign motivations, but in the case of selected NLW,
that is a risk worth running. If we continue to want our officers in khaki
and in blue to help us and our neighbors out of a wide variety of
international and domestic jams, we should start providing them with
suitable mechanisms for doing so without using too much force.
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